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Abstract 
The construction industry is characterised by complex contracting and sub-
contracting arrangements, relatively short-term working phases and high levels of 
occupational injury and death. This thesis examined judgements brought by the New 
South Wales WorkCover Authority under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety 
Acts 1983 and 2000 for offences in regard to workplace fatalities, and which were 
heard in the Industrial Court of New South Wales from 1988-2008. It demonstrated 
that penalties were low, representing approximately 18 per cent of the maximum 
penalty allowable. This figure is commensurate with other research on penalties for 
workplace death, and the thesis reflects on procedures of judicial sentencing and if 
the de-contextualising of workplace crime in the court process and in the wider 
community acts to result in punishments that are questionable as deterrent measures. 
The thesis considers these questions through the lens of a broad political economy, 
addressing the social construction of penalties through the perspective of judicial 
rules and norms, regulatory policies, state legislation and ideological constructions 
about workplace health and safety offences as essentially non-criminal events. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be 
advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and desires, 
as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit.
1
 
Part One  
In 2006, the New South Wales (NSW) branch of the Construction and General (C 
and G) Division of the Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU C 
and G) built a Wall of Remembrance at the union’s state branch office in the Sydney 
suburb of Lidcombe to commemorate those killed at work on construction sites. On 
it were inscribed the names of one hundred and twenty nine men who suffered a fatal 
traumatic workplace injury, over a nineteen-year period from 1988 to 2007. These 
injuries were caused by crushing, electrocution, falls from heights and being hit by 
moving vehicles or machinery.
2
 Their ages ranged from 17 to 65 and, where 
available, court records show that instrumental in their deaths, were failures of 
comprehensive and legally required safety management systems. These deaths raise 
many questions regarding the adequacy of health and safety systems, compensation, 
the delivery of justice to relatives and friends of the deceased, the punishment of 
perpetrators and the adequacy of deterrence measures. Furthermore, they call into 
question the role of state occupational health and safety (OHS) regulators, the 
functions of the judicial system and the impact of neo-liberal ideologies on work 
health and safety. 
This thesis focuses on the building and construction sector because, as will be shown, 
it ranks as the third most dangerous industry in Australia. Furthermore, I argue that 
its complex structure incorporates multiple contracting levels, and short term, 
contingent labour requirements that contribute to high rates of mortality, injury and 
disease. This thesis asks the broad research question – why has there been no 
                                                 
1
 Harvey D, A Brief History of Neo-liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 at 5). 
2
 The CFMEU Wall of Remembrance Project also provides free legal assistance and support to 
widows and families of deceased workers. CFMEU Wall of Remembrance Project’http://www.cfmeu-
construction-nsw.com.au/wallremembrance.htm (6/9/10) 
 2 
significant decline in fatalities in the NSW construction industry over this nineteen-
year period? This period has seen significant changes to OHS regulation in NSW yet 
the rate of fatalities remains largely constant. In developing an explanation for the 
stable rate of workplace fatalities this thesis considers the hegemonic ideologies that 
inform thought and action around the regulation of health and safety and asks what 
effect they have on penalty outcomes, deterrence and legislative effectiveness. It 
asks, how are penalties framed for crimes against OHS legislation? It explains the 
empirical phenomenon of the penalty quanta by considering theories about judicial 
sentencing, arguing that the de-contextualising of workplace crime in the court 
process acted to dilute punishment. That is, it explores how actions, activities and 
behaviours at work are isolated or disconnected from their structural and political 
environment so that economic imperatives that may drive unsafe behaviours are not 
considered, rendering the structural causes of injury and fatalities at work as 
obscured or ignored. The thesis also asks if laws and policy positions pertaining to 
the industrial relations of the construction industry which affected its representative 
trade union, had any bearing on workplace health and safety.  
The thesis examines these issues through a systematic examination of 127 court 
judgements
3
 of the New South Wales Industrial Commission (NSW IC) related to 76 
workplace traumatic injury incidents in NSW from 1988 to 2008. This period saw 
changes to industrial relations and health and safety legislation that affected the 
workplace and these changes form part of the overall analysis of events. The data 
collected from the examination of judicial decisions was supplemented with informal 
discussions with senior legal officers, union and industry representatives and senior 
regulatory officers in order to gain background information. In the course of 
researching this topic, government and regulatory responses to union activities 
around occupational health and safety (OHS) in one of the four most dangerous 
industries in Australia were also assessed.
4
  
This thesis begins with the position that occupational health and safety cannot be 
removed from the arena of industrial relations (IR), in that decisions relating to 
corporations’ or businesses’ strategic planning and activities have at least some 
                                                 
3
 There were 114 cases resulting in 127 individual prosecutions in the matter of 76 fatalities. That is, 
most cases involved multiple defendants. 
4
 Safe Work Australia. Notified fatalities statistical report 2008-2009, (Commonwealth of Australia 
2010) 
 3 
bearing on OHS. Consider, for example, the use of employment strategies such as 
shift work, overtime, bonus and incentive payments, contractual arrangements, 
labour hire, casual and part time work, and the employment conditions of precarious 
or contingent workers. There are health and safety implications for workers arising 
from each of these practices.
5
  
The industrial relations literature was, historically, relatively silent on work health 
and safety issues, other than discussions about OHS committees and union 
campaigns that included OHS. By the late 1980’s, traditional labour collectivism was 
on the decline, due to structural and legislative changes, and the interrelationship 
between IR and OHS as a field of academic interest, was largely passed by, with 
some exceptions, for instance the work of Lobel and Tucker in Canada.
6
 The relative 
absence in the industrial relations literature of ‘institutional and regulatory inter-
linkages’ between industrial relations and OHS was also noted by Australian 
researchers.
7
 This is an absence with both theoretical and practical implications, 
especially given the ‘de-collectivist’ regulatory changes during the years of the 
Liberal-National Party (LNP) federal government of 1996 to 2007. These changes 
had a concomitant effect on other industrial structures, such as increases in flexible 
labour arrangements, de-unionisation and the undermining of OHS, due to these 
labour arrangements.
8
 This academic oversight has not assisted the discovery of 
underlying causes of illegal or dubious OHS or IR practices. Furthermore, the 
separation of IR and OHS both institutionally and ideologically aids the portrayal of 
health and safety as an area of mutual benefit
9
, in opposition to the contested arena of 
IR. 
                                                 
5
 See, for example. Michael Quinlan and Claire Mayhew (nd) ‘Evidence versus ideology: lifting the 
blindfold on OHS in precarious employment’ 
http://www.docs.tce.unsw.edu.au/orgmanagement/Working Papers/WP138.pdf. (14/09/2010). See 
also Mayhew C, Quinlan M and Ferris R, ‘The Effects of Subcontracting/Outsourcing on 
Occupational Health and Safety: Survey Evidence from Four Australian Industries,’ Safety Science, 
(1997) Vol 25, No 1-3 at 163-178.  
6
Quinlan M and Johnstone R, ‘The implications of de-collectivist industrial relations laws and 
associated developments for worker health and safety in Australia, 1996-2007’, Industrial Relations 
Journal (2009) 40:5, 426-443, p.426. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ibid 3. 
9
 That is, reflective of Robens OHS philosophy of mutual interests and cooperation between labour 
and capital. 
 4 
The approach 
This thesis establishes relationships between OHS and IR both empirically and 
theoretically. First, it empirically connected the two by an analysis of the NSW IC 
judgements arising from fatal traumatic workplace incidents. Secondly, it examined 
relevant literature, policy documents, legislation, regulatory guidelines and reports to 
build a picture of the broader influences on health and safety at work. By situating 
the discussion around court decisions, not least of which is the low penalty amounts 
imposed, as a ‘centrepiece’, it was possible to show how other social, political, 
economic and cultural forces contribute to a diminution of workplace protections. 
The thesis finds that penalties for workplace fatalities in the construction industry 
were never exacted in full in NSW, nor did they come close to the maxima available. 
The analysis of decisions shows that for fatality prosecutions under the NSW 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (OHSA 1983) and the NSW Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 2000 (OHSA 2000), the average penalties represented 18% of 
the maximum penalty allowed, a finding that is in accord with other national and 
international research.
10
 This finding raises legitimate questions as to the deterrent 
effect of the law. 
                                                 
10  See Chapter Four. 
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Figure 1.1. Conceptual model 
There are no simple or straightforward explanation for the discrepancy between 
maximum legislated penalties for breaches of health and safety laws and the level 
actually imposed on offenders, which then has consequences for the effectiveness of 
deterrent mechanisms in the current regulatory model. The model in figure 1.1 
demonstrates the dialectical relationships between the State and civil society, 
represented by the regulatory body (WorkCover), the federal and State legislature 
(government), the judiciary (Industrial Court), industrial organisations and the 
construction workforce. The promulgation of laws and regulations around IR and 
OHS influences the decisions of OHS regulators in their enforcement and 
administration of OHS laws, which in turn shapes the functions of the judiciary in 
their administration of these laws. These influences are not unidirectional, with 
judicial decisions in turn shaping the decisions the regulator makes concerning 
prosecution targets, as well as government views on the effectiveness of legislated 
penalties. The model shows some of the inter-linkages between IR and OHS 
regulation, which as the thesis will demonstrate, addresses some aspects of the social 
relations of production that impact on construction fatalities, and the contest between 
labour and capital in labour’s attempt to improve workplace health and safety. 
 6 
Worker organisations (construction unions) are included in the model, because they 
are part of the regulatory machinery of both OHS, through their role in Australia’s 
tripartite consultative mechanisms, and IR legislation as agents in the arbitration 
system
11
 both being institutions of the State.
12
  
 Implicit in Gramsci’s theory of the hegemonic State13 is not only its own relative 
autonomy, but also the relative autonomy of its different institutions and the 
inevitable areas of conflict between them. That is, empirically, the State is comprised 
of different institutions that operate autonomously and the interactions among these 
institutions have inevitable consequences for their behaviour. These are dynamic 
rather than unilinear interactions, which mean that there is always a degree of 
disorder, even confusion, surrounding the interactions between each. 
Significance of the thesis 
The thesis considers the propositions posed in the previous section through the lens 
of a broad political economy approach. It addresses the social construction of 
penalties through the perspective of judicial rules and norms, regulatory policies and 
state legislation. It also considers how ideological constructs, confusing legislative 
definitions and the absence of OHS as a category in governmental literature show 
how workplace health and safety offences are constructed as essentially non-criminal 
events. The OHS prosecution process is situated in social relations reflective of 
capitalist relations of production. This process is ‘narrowly constructed’, workplace 
inequalities are ‘left unchallenged’ and it plays ‘a part in an ideologically significant 
fashion in the political process of shoring up hegemonic social structures’.14  
Key in understanding the relationships between crime (fatalities), courts (including 
the State apparatus as a legislator and enforcer) and punishment (penalties for 
offences against OHS legislation, enforcement, effectiveness, suitability), is an 
analysis that seeks to discover the mechanisms through which a hegemonic class 
                                                 
11
 See Gardiner M and Palmer G, Employment Relations: Industrial Relations and Human Resource 
Management in Australia, 2
nd
 ed. (Australia: MacMillan 1997); while Althusser and Gramsci saw they 
are part of the institutions of the State. 
12
 Following Pusey, State is spelt with a capital ‘S’ when referring to the government, legislature and 
bureaucracy, and with a lower case ‘s’ when referring to the geographic entities of for example NSW. 
See Pusey M, ‘Australia: state and polity’ in J.M Najman and J.S Western (eds) A Sociology of 
Australian Society: Introductory Readings, (Melbourne: Macmillan, 2003) at 28.  
13
 As discussed in Chapter Three. 
14
 Johnstone R, Occupational Health and Safety, Courts and Crime: The Legal Construction of 
Occupational Health and Safety in Victoria (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2003) at 276. 
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obtains the consent of others through alliances brought about by political and 
ideological struggle. The movement of the intersecting forces of capital, state and 
labour at one time or another will have common or opposing interests and therefore 
court processes alone are not sufficient in explaining low penalties, as they are 
framed by outside mechanisms and structures, which among other things, isolate 
OHS regulation and OHS as a concept, but which are intrinsic to the realities of the 
workplace.  
The thesis characterises the management of risks and hazards associated with the 
construction industry in terms of hegemonic modes of governance. As Pearce and 
Tombs suggest, this approach allows ‘... an appreciation of the limits of the possible 
in terms of the regulation and management of such risks, both historically and in the 
present…it indicates the significance of competing and allied social groups and 
forces, some of which have been counter-hegemonic, some of which have been 
integral to various hegemonic groups’.15  
The ‘competing’ and ‘allied’ groups that figure in this research include corporations 
and their managers, industry groups, state regulators, the judiciary, workers, trade 
unions and community groups who whether consciously or not, are engaged in 
struggle ‘over contested and changing ideological and material terrain’, which in this 
case is health and safety at work.
16
 Radical theory sees these contests as underlying 
all forms of industrial relations, and all forms of social existence, as classes struggle 
to assert themselves in the unequal social relations that characterise capitalist 
societies. As Hyman observes ‘industrial relations (are) …an element in the totality 
of social relations of production’.17 It is from this standpoint that the thesis proceeds, 
in order to examine one aspect of the forces and relations of production that impinge 
on the safety and health of workers and their working environment, and which 
privileges capital and its allies in the process. Chapter Three introduces and develops 
the theoretical paradigms that are used in the thesis.  
                                                 
15
 Pearce F and Tombs S, ‘Hegemony, risk and governance: ‘social regulation’ and the American 
chemical industry’ Economics and Society, (1996) 25:3,428-454 at 446 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Hyman, in Bray M, Waring P and Cooper R, Theory and Practice: Employment Relations (North 
Ryde: McGraw-Hill Australia, 2009) at 62. 
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This research builds on Richard Johnstone’s18  study of the prosecution of OHS 
offences in the Victorian state magistrates’ courts. It examines how prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and judges of the NSW IC construct OHS issues where prosecutions 
under OHS legislation were brought by the state regulator, WorkCover Authority of 
NSW (WorkCover NSW), in relation to traumatic injuries causing death at a 
workplace. Like Johnstone, the analysis of court decisions uses Mathiesen’s 19 
‘pulverisation’ typology that positions the silencing of opposing forces or viewpoints 
as a tool to deconstruct the discourse of the courts which, in this study, is that of the 
NSW Industrial Court (NSWIC). However, this study differs from Johnstone in 
several ways. His was an historical examination of outcomes for all OHS 
prosecutions from the late 19
th
 century to the 1990s, in all industries where 
prosecutions occurred in both fatal and non-fatal incidents. He observed numbers of 
prosecutions in the Victorian Magistrate’s Court, noted the tactics of the court 
officers during those proceedings, conducted follow up interviews with these 
officers, and interviewed members of the regulator’s inspectorate.  
In contrast, this thesis focuses mainly on a textual analysis of the decisions,
20
 and 
draws its conclusions as to the tactics of the defence, the prosecution and the judge’s 
reasoning from them. Its focus is solely on traumatic fatalities in the NSW building 
and construction industry, which provides solid ground for considering NSW OHS 
legal procedures and practices within the broader context of the contested terrains 
disputed by agents of the state, the interests of capital and of the working class. As 
will be demonstrated, these contests are amplified in the construction industry, 
because of its unique position in the economy, its particular mode of production and 
a strong union presence. It shows how the structures of the state, the legislature, the 
regulator and the judiciary interrelate to silence or pulverise, not just penalties, but 
also the nature of workplace OHS offences generally. In addition, the thesis adds 
new information to the literature on OHS in the construction industry in relation to 
workplace fatalities and provides new insights into the question of why the rate of 
annual fatalities remains constant. It also goes some way to redress the theoretical 
                                                 
18
 Johnstone, above note 13. 
19
 Thomas Mathiesen T, Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiescence in Modern Society 
(Winchester: Waterside Press, 2004).  
20
 The terms ‘decisions’ and’ judgements’ are used interchangeably. 
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separation of IR and OHS literatures and to highlight the importance of a radical 
sociological approach to the study of work, employment, health and the law.  
Part Two 
Method 
The aim of the methodological approach taken in this thesis was to examine how 
courts treated and penalised offenders over a certain period of time. This involved 
examining the quantum of the penalties to look for consistencies, as well as 
examining the reasoning and rhetoric adopted by the courts in rationalising these 
penalties, through a textual analysis of the cases. This thesis uses qualitative and 
quantitative methods. This ‘mixed method’ approach allows for data triangulation, 
enhances and strengthens ‘conceptual linkages’ 21  and broadens the investigative 
process. Quantitative analysis of judgements was carried out using the computer 
spreadsheet application Excel to code elements related to the judgement decisions, to 
perform simple descriptive statistics and create tables, graphs and charts.  
Quantitative data analysis 
A database was built using information gleaned from judgements. Judgements were 
coded according to 19 criteria that served as the basic data elements in the database 
(see Table 1.1). Fatalities were coded according to the ASCC’s Type of Occurrence 
Classification System 3
rd
 Edition.
22
 The mechanism of incident classification was 
used to ‘identify the overall action, exposure or event that best describes the 
circumstances that resulted in the most serious injury or disease’. 23  Univariate 
statistics were used to provide information about the central tendency and variability 
of the empirical data. Thus, summary statistics are given for the mean, minimum and 
maximum metrics, standard deviation and p values where applicable.  
                                                 
21
Berg B, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston: Pearson, 2004) at 6; see also 
Buchanan J, ‘The Multi-method approach: benefits and challenges’, in Kelly D (ed) Researching 
Industrial Relations 2
nd
 ed. (Leichhardt: The Federation Press, 1999) at 152. 
22
 Australian Safety and Compensation Commission Type of Occurrence Classification System 3
rd
 
Edition, (Commonwealth of Australia). 
23 Ibid 143. 
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Table 1.1. Data elements selected from cases. 
 
1 Name of deceased 
2 Name of judge 
3 Name of defendant 
4 Company size 
5 Plea–guilty/not guilty 
6 Prosecutions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 
7 Prosecutions under the  Occupational Health and Safety Act OHSA 2000 
8 Prescribed penalty 
9 Penalty imposed 
10 Penalty discount amount 
11 Percentage of prescribed penalty paid 
12 Appeal yes/no 
13 Appeal outcome- upheld/dismissed 
14 Appellant’s name 
15 Years to judgement (time elapsed from fatal incident to judgement) 
16 Date of the fatal incident 
17 Incident type 
18 Mechanism of injury 
19 Occupation of deceased 
 
Qualitative analysis 
Analysis of judgement texts was undertaken using the computer software NVIVO 9, 
which aids in the analysis of large amounts of rich text based information and 
enables trends and concepts to be more easily identified, classified and sorted.  
The categories (or nodes, as they are termed in NVivo) chosen to analyse texts of the 
NSW IC decisions were drawn from Mathiesen’s24 original typology, in which he 
demonstrated the mechanisms that resulted in the ‘pulverisation’ of information and 
facts that were implicated in a major oil spill disaster.
25
 With some modifications, 
this conceptual tool was later used by Richard Johnstone, when researching OHS 
prosecutions in the Victorian magistrates’ courts.26  
Decisions of the NSW IC were captured from electronic databases and the texts were 
also analysed by coding according to NVivo nodes. Categories were chosen to reflect 
                                                 
24
 Mathiesen above note 18.  
25
 See Appendix A. 
26
.Johnstone above note 13. 
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the elements of the Mathiesen pulverisation model, with the relevant nodes shown in 
Table 1.2 below. 
Table 1.2. Mathiesen pulverisation model 
Pulverising Technique Application 
Blame-shifting a) Worker 
b) State 
c) Other parties – manufacturer, supplier, installers 
Anthropomorphising defendant a) Good character of defendant ‘morphed’ into characteristics of 
company 
b) Corporate defendant could receive benefits of its good 
managers/owners 
c) Corporation given human qualities – company active in 
community; company has “good heart”; company members 
“respectable” citizens 
Corporate citizenship a) Responsible, good record 
b) In business many years 
c) Numbers of workers 
d) No priors 
e) Cooperation with WorkCover 
f) Awards 
g) Low compensation premiums 
h) Good policies, procedures, practices 
Individualising event a) Event unique, incomparable, special, abnormal 
b) Essential to scrutinise event without reference to OHSM 
system 
c) Often linked to good corporate citizenship 
Normalising event a) Event normal, usual, general 
b) Removed from context and made normal in another 
c) Use of analogies to place event in context of the everyday 
d) Emphasis on similarity of event features with common 
experience of others (magistrate) 
e) Work practice common across industry 
Isolating from the future a) Ignore future consequences of event 
Isolating in the present  a) Emphasis on what employer did for injured worker 
b) Defendant traumatised by event 
c) No priors 
d) Defendant rectified situation 
e) Defendant now acting appropriately 
f) Used in tandem with good corporate citizenship. 
Relegating to outmoded past a) Past is an aberration and now rectified 
b) Similar to isolating in the present, but different time scale 
c) No concern to current circumstances or likely future 
d) Not transferable to other parts of company activity 
 
Categories were also chosen to collect text referring to different elements of the 
sentencing hearings, as seen in Table 1.3 below. 
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Table 1.3. Elements of the sentencing hearings 
Element Element 
Charge Judges summation 
Company size Mitigating pleas 
Contractors Objective features 
Defence submission Subjective features 
Prosecution submission Penalty 
Penalty discounts Objective features 
General deterrence Subjective features 
Specific deterrence Utilitarian factors 
Incident particulars Verdict 
Fatality data collection 
In the early part of 2000, the C and G Division of the CFMEU requested WorkCover 
NSW to provide details of persons who had sustained fatal traumatic injury in the 
workplace, starting at the year 1988. On behalf of the union, WorkCover then invited 
families to give permission for the names of their deceased family member to appear 
on a Wall of Remembrance constructed by the union at their state offices at 12 
Railway Street Lidcombe, New South Wales. In total, one hundred and twenty nine 
names of deceased workers, their occupation, and cause of death were inscribed on 
the Wall, which was officially opened in 2004. These details formed the basis of the 
sample, and attempts were made to retrieve judgements in relation to these workers. 
Judgements could not be retrieved for all 129 persons, for reasons stated below, and 
the final sample resulted in the retrieval of judgements relating to 79 fatalities.  
Prosecution data collection 
In 1999, the electronic database, NSW Caselaw,
27
 was launched through the NSW 
Industrial Relations Commission (NSWIRC) to provide on-line judgements and 
decisions for Courts and tribunals in NSW. This resource covers material from 1999 
to the present time. Another electronic source, again from the NSW IRC and linked 
through the Australian Legal Information Institute (AustLii) data base,
28
 contains 
judgements and decisions from 1985 to the present. Most judgment decisions were 
obtained through this medium. In addition, hard copies search of the NSW IC judges’ 
                                                 
27
 See http://caselaw.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/index.htm. Note that case names are displayed as taken 
directly from the electronic source and not as usually seen when cited from hard copy law index. 
28
 See http://austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWIRComm/ 
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decisions in the IRC Library provided a further six decisions. Of the total number of 
names inscribed on the Wall, details of about 50 fatalities were unable to be located 
in the NSW IRC electronic databases or in hard copy from the IRC library. Case 
references are cited as they appear on the electronic databases and not in the more 
usual law report citation style. All other citations in the thesis and bibliography 
follow the Australian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation.
29
 
The search for hard copy records relating to decisions in fatal construction incidents 
that are held in the NSW IRC library was undertaken by examining all judgements 
held according to the name of the presiding judicial officer. Very few judgements 
were retrieved in this way.  The reasons for inclusion in hard copy form are due to 
selection by judicial officers because of their legal interest so judgements would need 
to be deemed of interest or would otherwise be excluded, or more mundanely, the 
matter may have been physically removed and not returned.  
The availability of judgements and decisions displayed on NSW Caselaw is usually 
within 24 hours after completion of court deliberations. However, delays may occur 
due to administrative arrangements concerning court-reporting variations. Of interest 
are those matters that do not appear on the NSW Caselaw site. These include 
instances where a member of the court or a judicial officer decides against publishing 
the matter on NSW Caselaw. This decision may be made because the matter contains 
a ruling on evidence given during a criminal trial; because the matter is private or 
because it is a minor decision made in a continuing case. In some cases, decisions 
and judgements are temporarily removed from NSW Caselaw, as in the case of a jury 
trial where a prior judgement mentioned the accused. These are normally reinstated 
at the expiration of the trial.
30
 
Where a matter is unavailable in either electronic or hard copy form, it may be able 
to be retrieved by application to the Industrial Registrar of the Industrial Relations 
Commission, who in turn would seek the file from the relevant judge. However, 
relevant details are required for this such as file numbers, case numbers and the name 
of judge. Judgements and decisions are not retrievable if the only information is the 
name of the deceased worker, which effectively means that only those parties 
                                                 
29
 Rozenberg P, Australian Guide to Uniform Legal Citation,2
nd
 ed. (Pyrmont: Lawbook Co., 2003) 
30
 See NSW Caselaw ‘Statement of availability’ 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/caselaw/ll_caselaw.nsf/pages/cl_soa  
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directly involved in the court proceedings have access to that information.  Further 
information regarding the case particulars could be sought from WorkCover NSW, 
which could be used to seek access to files from the Industrial Registrar.
31
 However, 
both time limitations and costs involved in seeking permission have made this access 
unviable for this research.  
WorkCover NSW does not prosecute in certain circumstances: there may be 
insufficient evidence to establish a breach; or an event may not be considered a 
workplace incident, but rather one of public safety. Other circumstances include 
fatalities that occur in a recreational incident; the deceased is a member of a family 
business; the deceased is the only defendant; where difficulties exist in establishing 
place of work; and in cases of suicide.
32
 
The twenty year time frame of 1988 to 2008 was chosen as it marked the beginning 
of the records available to the CFMEU C and G Division and the cut off date of 2008 
was chosen due to the time lag of court hearings (anywhere between 2-8 years). It is 
likely that fatalities recorded by WorkCover Authority NSW up to 2004 had been 
finalised through the court process (in the event that a prosecution followed the 
workplace death) by 2008. The period also presented the most easily accessible 
record of electronic and hard copy transcripts of judgements of the NSW IC and it 
coincided with changes to OHS and IR legislation, both of which were significant 
factors affecting the lives of workers in NSW and Australia. A review of legal 
documents, specifically around sentencing policy guidelines and relevant legislation 
was undertaken to enable comparisons with other studies on penalty quanta for 
occupational health and safety prosecutions. 
Informal background discussions were held with CFMEU C and G Division union 
officials and delegates and with senior safety officers of the Master Builders 
Association (MBA) of New South Wales. These discussions sought to gain opinions 
on government policies and legislation in respect of health and safety in the industry 
and their views on prosecutions for fatalities, appropriate penalties, and sentencing 
and deterrence options. Other discussions were held with the convenor and president 
of the NSW Workplace Tragedy Support Group (WTSG) to gather insights about the 
                                                 
31
 Information from clerical staff, Industrial Registrar New South Wales.  
32
 Advice from WorkCover New South Wales to Secretary C and G Division CFMEU, received 
22/10/03. 
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impact of fatalities on families, effectiveness of deterrent measures and issues of 
restorative justice. Discussions were also held with senior legal officers (one judge, 
three barristers, and two solicitors) about questions of penalty, prosecution and 
defence procedures and deterrence, and informal discussions were conducted with 
senior WorkCover inspectors. Three NSW IC hearings concerned with prosecutions 
related to fatalities on site were attended to gain insight into the court process. 
The researcher is a long-standing and experienced tertiary qualified health and safety 
professional, specialising in the fields of occupational hygiene. Much of her work is 
conducted on building sites, particularly acting in the role of independent peer 
reviewer, advisor and educator to workers, unions and management, in matters 
relating to workplace hazardous substance exposures. In this capacity, she has a 
firsthand view and intimate knowledge of the complexities and constraints involved 
in maintaining safe and healthy construction sites. The researcher was not involved 
in a professional capacity with any of the fatality cases discussed in this thesis. The 
emic approach that the researcher brought to this thesis allowed a depth of technical 
and ‘insider’ knowledge to enhance the analysis. However, this approach also posed 
a potential source of bias because of this ‘cultural participation’, and so it was 
important for the researcher to observe a form of reflexivity, which aided in 
questioning assumed knowledge and beliefs. This was achieved through the literature 
and policy document review, as well as conversations with a wide range of 
personnel. All research was undertaken with the approval of the Human Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Sydney. 
Chapter outline 
Chapter Two establishes the empirical problem, that is, the rate of injury and death in 
the construction industry and its relative stability over the last 20 years, and its 
context through an overview of some characteristics of the building and construction 
industry. It comments on the industry’s economic contribution to the country, and 
some negative effects of that contribution seen in its high rates of workplace injury, 
illness and death. It discusses the complex web of sub-contractual relationships, and 
some of the negative aspects of those relations, such as sham contracting and 
‘phoenix’ companies. The role of the regulator, WorkCover NSW and the NSW IC is 
considered, especially in relation to the level of penalties imposed in cases of 
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traumatic work fatalities. Finally, the chapter looks historically at the contribution 
made to safety by the building trades unions, principally the CFMEU C and G, and 
examines how regressive government policies have diminished their legal capacity to 
address health and safety.  
Chapter Three draws on a range of literatures to identify the theoretical tools useful 
in explaining the problems posed in this thesis. It focuses on the theories of the State, 
of criminology and on social harm theory as a useful means of considering OHS 
crimes. It considers the problem of how serious OHS crimes are positioned as 
regulatory, rather than criminal offences and the possible consequences of that view 
as being detrimental to deterrence.  
Chapter Four presents the analysis of the empirical data concerning decisions of the 
NSW IC from 1988 to 2008 for prosecutions against individual employers and 
corporations in relation to breaches of the NSW health and safety legislations of 
1983 and 2000. It shows that penalties for workplace traumatic fatality are 
commensurate with other studies that also demonstrates penalty leniency. The second 
part of the chapter begins to identify reasons for the lenient penalties imposed for 
these breaches by describing some of the social rules and social norms that shape and 
influence judges and their judgements. 
Chapter Five advances this discussion, where the argument is situated at the level of 
state structures and state apparatus. The elements of Mathiesen’s model of 
‘pulverisation’ are used to illustrate the ways in which crucial structural elements 
contributing to workplace fatalities are silenced. It also considers other factors such 
as state policies and regulatory rules, arguing that they are also implicit in low 
penalty outcomes.  
Chapter Six examines more closely specific legal rules, such as those regulating 
sentencing and considers some reasons behind the ‘silencing’ of OHS crimes in 
general discourse. It re-introduces the theme of conflict between labour and capital as 
it explores attempts by the State (federally and local level) to impede the ability of 
unions to protect and monitor health and safety provisions on building sites.  
Chapter Seven explores a series of important recent developments in OHS at state 
and federal level, which, it is argued, will have consequences for workers, unions and 
the judiciary. These changes reflect a policy agenda informed by neo-liberal ideology 
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where ‘market efficiency’ is prioritised ahead of worker safety in OHS reforms. 
These changes, it is argued, will weaken the agency of workers and their 
representatives. Furthermore, changes that the government has made to judicial 
jurisdictions in hearing OHS prosecutions in NSW have uncertain implications for 
future penalties and by corollary, deterrence value. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by discussing some ways in which deterrence of 
OHS harms might be enhanced; the continuing problem of the ‘softer’ perspective of 
OHS crimes as essentially non-criminal, and the future role of the NSW courts in 
dealing with OHS prosecutions. It suggests recommendations and avenues of future 
research. 
 
. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Structure of the building and construction industry 
The building and construction industry in Australia is characterised by its scale and 
complexity. This chapter identifies a number of factors considered relevant to 
understanding and explaining injury and illness in this industry. It is important to 
identify these factors as they are often overlooked in the judicial processes 
surrounding prosecuting and sentencing under OHS laws. The chapter begins by 
establishing the place of the construction industry in relation to the overall Australian 
economy. It is an important vehicle for public and private capital investment. It has a 
large and relatively well-paid workforce, a condition won through determined union 
action since the mid 19
th
 century.
1
 It then moves to describe the fragmented nature of 
the industry, which is characterised by multiple tiers of contracting and sub-
contracting arrangements, and illegal or dubious practices that, among other things, 
affect industrial relations and workplace health and safety. Building companies are 
fragmented across time and space because of their varying locations, trades and 
labour skills, ethnicities and different building stages. In the industry, labour is 
obliged to move where capital dictates. Labour faces both internal risks (actual 
dangers) and external risks (economic, social relations of production).The dangers of 
the industry can be partly attributed to these characteristics, as well as to the inherent 
risks and hazards present in the materials and methods used in construction. 
These characteristics are mediated by wider social relations, which ultimately have a 
detrimental effect on workers’ health and safety. The chapter concludes by taking an 
historical view, examining how building unions have shaped the industry, and how 
the interaction between unions, the State and the regulator have at times been 
harmonious and consultative, and at other times, antagonistic. State legislation has 
been influenced by its own economic concerns and by the interests of private capital. 
This section of the chapter argues that the Robens philosophy of mutual interests 
                                                 
1
 McQueen H, We Built This Country: Builders’ Labourers and Their Unions (Port Adelaide: 
Ginninderra Press, 2011). 
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between capital and labour and the self-regulatory regime on which it was built has 
not proved as beneficial to workers as was anticipated.
2
 This is particularly so due to 
the growth of subcontracting in the industry.
3
 The changes in the political landscape 
over time from the principles of social democracy to neo-liberalism have affected not 
only the economy but also ideological notions about work, its organisation and 
representation of its workforce. The relations between and among these 
superstructural elements are important to consider if we are to gain a deeper 
understanding of the forces affecting thought and action around the regulation of 
health and safety. 
Economic characteristics 
The construction industry is one of Australia’s largest employers, providing major 
infrastructures through civil, commercial and residential construction. The Australian 
and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) 2006 defines the 
industry as ‘...those businesses mainly engaged in the construction of residential and 
non-residential buildings (including alterations and additions), engineering structures 
and related trade services...’.4 
For the three sectors (residential, non-residential and engineering structures), it was 
estimated that the value of construction work was AU $40.5 billion in 1996-97 
Australia wide.
5
 In NSW alone, it was estimated to be worth AU$18 billion per 
annum in 1998/99, with Government spending about $6 billion annually in 
construction works.
6
 In 1998, it was estimated that there were 88,000 construction 
enterprises in Australia and about 25,000 in New South Wales. Of these, 65% 
                                                 
2
 Safe Work Australia estimates that the cost of OHS fatalities, injury and disease is $60.6 billion 
annually, representing 4.8% of GDP, with workers bearing 74% of the cost in loss of current and 
future income, social and medical costs and non-compensated medical expenses. Safe Work Australia, 
‘The Cost of Work-related Traumatic Injury Fatalities, Australia 2009-10,(Canberra: Safe Work 
Australia, 2012) 
3
 Mayhew C and Quinlan M, ‘Subcontracting and Occupational Health and Safety in the Residential 
Building Industry’ Industrial Relations Journal, (1997) Vol 28, No.3. 
4
 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Feature article: a statistical overview of the construction industry’. 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/1350.0Feature%20Article1Aug%202
008?opendocumentandtabname=Summaryandprodno=1350.0andissue=Aug%202008andnum=andvie
w (2/2/2009) at 2. 
5
 Lingard L and Rowlinson S, Occupational Health and Safety in Construction Project Management 
(London: Spon Press, 2005) at 1.  
6
 New South Wales Government White Paper, Construct New South Wales: seizing opportunities to 
build a better construction industry DPWS report NO. 98022 (New South Wales Government 1998) 
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employed two people or less and only 1% employed more than 50 people. Eighty 
eight percent earned less than $500,000 per annum, with 1.3% earning $20 million or 
more.
7
 As will be shown, the industry continued to remain an economically 
important factor in the state’s economy. 
At that time, the NSW Labor government of the day saw itself as a leader in the 
industry through its status as a major client, influencing ‘standards of behaviour’ as 
well as rewarding excellence, leading debate and providing guidance.
8
 The 
government noted the diverse and dynamic nature of the industry, which contributed 
to its being ‘highly competitive’, and commented on its ‘...adversarial nature, short-
term relationships, low margins and levels of capitalisation, and a generally 
fragmented approach’. 9  The adversarial nature of the industry arose from 
competitiveness among ‘organisations, enterprises, individuals, clients and service 
providers’,10 usually culminating in litigation. Under capitalisation was identified as 
leading to ‘...well known problems such as poor “security of payment”, neglected 
research and development or training, and the so-called “cost plus” (incurred costs 
plus a profit allowance irrespective of productivity) view of transactions between 
parties’.11The problem of running on low margins increases the vulnerability and 
viability of firms if uncertainties arise. The necessity to ensure flexibility in meeting 
demand is achieved by subcontracting, which in itself reduces opportunities to 
develop strong business relationships, producing ‘...a tendency for self interest to 
dominate, (and) a reliance on short term expedience rather long term planning’.12 
The government’s views on fragmentation in the industry are worth noting. 
The industry structure is biased toward the traditional approach to building, 
based on craft practices. This means that work is organised into small, almost 
isolated packages. The outcome is a fragmented approach... where multiple 
levels of small specialist subcontractors and suppliers are used. This 
fragmentation...limits opportunities for efficiency gains and encourages the 
pursuit of singular interest.’13  
State government projections estimated that by 2005, the value of the three areas of 
construction would exceed $45 billion in annual output with non-residential and 
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engineering construction expected to be $24 billion annually.
14
 The government 
predicted that the industry’s service providers, the ‘small, diversified, specialist 
contractors, sub-contractors’ and other suppliers would ‘link up in longer term 
consortia, partnerships, and similar arrangements’, in contrast to the ‘largely 
unconsolidated and fragmented’ industry of the mid 1990s. Then, approximately 
20,000 subcontractors supplied 75 to 85 per cent of the value of production in the 
industry.
15
 However, as will be seen, the government’s hopes for a less fragmented 
industry were not realised, though the industry continued to thrive.  
Nationally, in 2006-07 the construction industry was the fifth largest Australian 
industry in current price terms, following property and business services, 
manufacturing, finance and insurance and mining. The dollar value of construction 
work done in 2006-07 was $112,817.1 million, a 5.7 % increase from the previous 
year.
16
  Engineering construction was the largest component, with work valued at 
$47,538.5 million or 42.1 % of total construction. In the same period, non-residential 
and residential construction contributed $25,907.2 or 22.9 % and $39,371.5 million 
or 34.9%. In sum, the industry contributed 6.7% to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).   
At the May 2007 quarter, it employed 9.0 % of the country’s workforce, an increase 
of 16.9% in the three-year period from May 2004 to 2007. It employed 937,300 
persons, with 30 % employed in General Construction and 66% employed in 
Construction Trade Services.
17
 In May 2007, construction workers worked, on 
average, four more hours than all other industry groups, and earned higher wages 
than the average for all industries. At the same time, the average weekly earnings 
(AWE) for all construction employees were 23.3% higher than the AWE for all 
industries, showing an increase of 25.5% between 2004 and 2007.
18
 In May 2007, 
72.1% (676,000) of workers were classed as employees, compared to 88.3% for all 
industries. Twenty two percent (210,600) were classed as ‘Own account’ workers, in 
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other words, contractors or self-employed, compared with 8.8% for all industries. In 
general, the construction industry was only second to the Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing industry (37.4%) for ‘Own account’ workers.19 By 2009/2010, the number of 
workers in the industry rose to 938,000, representing 9% of the Australian 
workforce, with 71% classed as employees, representing a slight increase in the 
‘non-employee’ classification.20 This large number of contractors and self-employed 
persons makes the regulation of health and safety requirements on jobs difficult for 
all parties, including employers and involved unions.  
Industry structure 
The industry is obviously a vital and important component in the Australian 
economy, and its potential as a source of wealth for successful developers and 
entrepreneurs is significant.
21
However, its financial contribution comes at the cost of 
its workers, who are killed or injured at a higher rate than most other industries 
worldwide.
22
 The reasons behind this unacceptable morbidity and mortality rate are 
numerous and are closely related to the structure of the industry. It is project based, 
meaning that worksites are ever changing; it engages many different trades and 
labourers; it relies heavily on contract and sub-contract work, usually on a short-term 
basis. Increasingly, large firms have relinquished employment of full time personnel, 
in favour of increased sub-contracting models. This ‘business model’ lends itself to 
increased risk of injury, illness and death.
23
 Lingard and Rowling maintain that 
suitable organisational structures should be in place to deal with the changing and 
dynamic nature of a construction site. That is, an ‘organic’ management style is 
necessary to deal with the varying phases of the project, the day-to-day contingencies 
that may arise, and the need for quick, decentralised decision-making. The older style 
approach based on traditional craft practices ‘...engenders a free, independent spirit 
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in construction site personnel and has, traditionally, led to a disregard for authority 
and regulation...’ which on occasion has led to corruption and malpractice. 24 
This industry structure makes it one of the most dangerous industries in Australia, 
contributing to the deaths of about 50 construction workers per annum, fatality rates 
that are three times the national workplace average. Moreover, the injury rates are 
50% higher than those in other sectors, and building workers are 2.4 times more 
likely to be killed at work than in any other Australian industry. ‘Although these 
health and safety statistics are ‘comparable to the United States (US) and Europe’, 
they are ‘double that of the United Kingdom’.25 In NSW, the industry had the third 
highest incidence of employment injuries and the second highest number of work 
related fatalities of all industries in 2003-2004.
26
 The statistics are typical for the 
industry as will be seen in figures for fatalities and serious injury for the period 1998 
to 2009 shown later in this chapter. 
The primary causes implicated in workplace injury, disease and death in the 
construction industry include poorly maintained and unsafe sites, changing worksites 
and unsafe site conditions, continuously changing worksites with numerous work 
processes carried out, and often crowded or cramped working conditions. Other 
primary causes include under-capitalisation, which limits the firm’s ability to expand 
and withstand adverse economic events; low margins, which are disincentives for 
development and research into new technologies and new processes; a focus on 
short-term projects, short term planning and relationships and a ‘fragmented and 
aggressive approach to doing business’. 27  Secondary causes are associated with 
management systems, namely financial, time and budgetary pressures, ‘lack of 
commitment to safety, policy, standards, knowledge and information, restricted 
training and task selection, and poor quality-control systems.’28 
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A number of other cultural, social and behavioural traits are believed to be 
contributing elements to poor health and safety. These included an aging workforce, 
inexperienced workers, high labour turnover and work intensification.
29
 A ‘between 
the lines’ reading of the court decisions in this thesis shows that both primary and 
secondary factors played a major part in the traumatic injury resulting in the death of 
workers. However, because of the way in which the prosecution was structured 
through the OHS Acts of both 1983 and 2000, there was only a limited number of 
elements, or specific sections of the Acts that the court could consider, and so fatal 
incidents could only be seen through a narrow lens. Chapters Five and Six provide a 
fuller discussion of this and related features. 
The production processes in the industry are largely determined by its sub-
contracting structure, in which businesses are typically small, family owned 
specialist trade enterprises. As many as twenty specialist sub-contractors may work 
on cottage/residential projects and up to 200 may be employed on a major 
construction site. Competitive pressures promote cost-cutting measures, such as 
neglect of basic health and safety policies and practices, poor equipment 
maintenance, use of illegal labour, non-payment of statutory obligations, such as 
workers compensation, non-payment of award rates and superannuation. Studies in 
Australia, Europe and North America have identified a clear link between high levels 
of subcontracting and elevated levels of injury and ill health. For example, Francois 
and Lievin found that temporary agency (labour hire) and fixed-term contract 
workers in 85 French enterprises experienced both a higher incidence and a greater 
severity of injury than did employees in permanent employment.
30
  
Richard Johnstone has observed 
These organisational forms, particularly those which involve introducing third 
parties to work arrangements and creating multi-employer worksites, result in 
fractured, complex and disorganised work processes, weaker claims for 
responsibility and ‘buck-passing’ and a lack of specific job knowledge 
(including knowledge about OHS) among workers moving from job to job. 
                                                 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Francois and Lievin (1995) and Storrie (2002) cited in Underhill, E., ‘Changing Work and OHS: 
The Challenge of Labour Hire Employment’, 2002. www.actu.asn.au/public/ohs/reactivatecampaign/ 
1064475108_26370.html.(14/4/2006)  
 25 
They also make it more difficult for worker interests in OHS to be effectively 
represented.
31
  
Worker consultation about health and safety problems can be problematic on a 
building site where sub-contractors come and go as work progresses, which makes 
adequate representation of specific work groups/trades on safety committees 
problematic. There are also high numbers of workers from non-English speaking 
countries who tend to be under represented on OHS committees. The implication for 
miscommunication due to language barriers is also important as particular 
trades/labouring groups tend to reflect high numbers different NESB workers, for 
example, Koreans in tiling
32
 and in NSW, South Pacific Islanders in demolition 
work, Cambodians in asbestos removal.
33
 
Large building sites usually employ dedicated safety officers and have a union 
presence, while the opposite is generally true for the small domestic sector.
34
Over 
time, financial and OHS risks have been outsourced to sub-contractors. Occupational 
health and safety has been compromised as ‘moral’ builders’ tenders are more costly 
due to health and safety considerations, and so, in a highly competitive market, less 
scrupulous tenderers win contracts. Sub-contracting also weakens health and safety 
through longer, more intensive and arduous working conditions, cutting corners, cost 
cutting, ignorance of, or ignoring OHS regulations and a growing culture of 
resistance to OHS regulators.
35
  
In summary, it can be seen that the construction industry is a large and important 
segment of the Australian economy. There are various factors that render it unsafe, 
namely the structure and economic characteristics of the industry that create 
disincentives to safety, and it is inherently dangerous through the scale and 
complexity of the construction labour process, where hazardous tasks are carried out 
in close proximity to other workers, thus increasing the overall risk.  
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Complexities of contracting 
The ‘power hierarchy’ in multiple employer organisations also has an impact on site 
safety through the way in which organisations respond to safety and legal liability.
36
 
Examples from the construction industry are abundant, because of ubiquitous 
contractual arrangements in which lines of responsibility are blurred and there are 
power differentials amongst the parties. Small sub-contractors have the ability to 
react to legal liability by changing their name, changing the legal status of the 
company or increasing insurance, however size does not necessarily mean that 
positive strategies for health and safety overtake defensive strategies to limit liability. 
However, it does mean that larger organisations have the resources to employ 
effective defensive strategies when needed.
37
 
The complexities of contracting in the construction industry, which reflect the 
fragmentation and lack of consolidation referred to earlier, are illustrated by some 
examples drawn from the sample judgements in the following prosecutions for 
workplace fatalities. The defendants in the first of these operated small to medium 
companies employing 20 or less persons; in the second case, quite large corporations 
were involved.
38
  
In Case 27, three prosecutions were launched in relation to the death of a labourer 
engaged in concreting work in 2004. Three companies and three directors were 
charged and convicted with offences under Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(OSHA 2000). These included the labour hire firm, Company A, who contracted 
with Company B, (who also had a state subsidiary, Company C, both B and C were 
companies employing less than five workers) to provide six labour hire workers. 
Company B employed three persons at the site, including the deceased. One sole 
trader also performed contract labour for Company A. The site was owned by a 
medium sized firm, Company D, who operated another smaller company, Company 
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E. All companies and directors were charged and found guilty of offences related to 
breaches of the duty of care provisions of the Act.
39
   
In another case, Case 17,
40
 the self-employed defendant was charged in relation to 
the death of a worker drowned in a flooded pipeline. The defendant had been 
contracted as a project manager by Company A, a medium size enterprise. Company 
A was contracted by Company B, a large semi-government corporation that owned 
the reserve where work was carried out. Company C was a large subsidiary of 
Company B and it was contracted by Company A to carry out a range of works. In 
turn, Company C contracted Company D, a labour hire company to supply labour to 
the site. The deceased was an employee of Company C.  
Some common problems emerging where layers of contracting arrangements exist 
include lack of appropriate OHS controls, poor OHS awareness and practices, time 
and financial pressures. The use of labour hire can obscure lines of responsibility, as 
workers can ‘fall between the cracks’ of management safety systems. This 
demonstrates the confusion between prime contractors and sub-contractors about 
who has responsibility on sites. The NSW government’s inquiry into death and 
serious injury recommended that WorkCover undertake regular unannounced site 
inspections to ensure that all parties were aware of and operating with due care, as 
well as requiring duty holders to furnish appropriate OHS management plans.
41
 
Illicit practices – phoenix companies and sham contracting 
The complex corporate structures and entities that are typical of the industry may 
mask financial dealings and obscure legal responsibilities.
42
 Corporations can 
organise themselves in different company groups and subsidiaries, taking on an 
independent existence within the larger corporate group structure. Corporations can 
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also outsource and build pyramids of supplier contractors, and in doing so are able to 
obscure lines of responsibility, which, in turn, makes the regulatory duties of 
investigation an onerous one.
43
 In the construction industry, these structures also 
typify some small and medium sized enterprises, and these business arrangements 
could be more closely scrutinised during prosecutions for OHS beaches. 
Companies, especially small operations, commonly go into liquidation following, or 
even preceding, a court sentence. In some cases, this is a legitimate business decision 
because of limited capital, or insolvency, but in others, it is a fraudulent activity to 
avoid paying penalties, as well as taxes and worker entitlements, by re-emerging as a 
‘phoenix’ company. Essentially, directors engaging in ‘phoenix’ activities transfer 
assets of an indebted company into a new company of which they are directors. The 
indebted company is then placed into administration or liquidation but with no assets 
to pay creditors. The directors then continue to trade under the new company 
structure.  
In the 1990s, the Australian Securities Commission estimated that annual losses due 
to this practice totalled $1.3 billion or 0.28 per cent of Gross Domestic Product of the 
Australian economy. Eighteen per cent of small to medium companies had engaged 
in phoenix activities, and 45 per cent ‘appeared to be in the building/construction 
industry’.44 A report on phoenix companies by financial analysts Dun and Bradstreet 
showed that of the 10,200 companies in Australia that went into liquidation in 2009, 
29 per cent involved companies whose directors had been previously involved in 
liquidation, compared to 10 per cent in 2004-2005. It also showed that the number of 
directors involved in multiple business failures had increased from 8 per cent in 
2004-2005 to 20 per cent in 2010.
45
 The CFMEU C and G Division had been 
monitoring illegal business practices for years, as well as being represented on 
government reviews and policy committees established to address the problem. The 
National Secretary made the point that phoenix activities went beyond problems of 
worker entitlements, creditors and the taxation office. It raised questions about the 
role of lawyers and insolvency advisors; asset less liquidation, and how companies 
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use the practice to gain unfair business advantage through non-payment of debts at 
the completion of the building project.
46
  
The analysis of judgements in this thesis found several instances where companies 
had gone into liquidation after a fatality. In one instance, following the death of a 
worker in 1999, the company appointed an administrator soon after the incident.
47
 
The company was established in 1995, and by the end of the decade, its annual 
turnover was in excess of one and a half million dollars, but the company 
experienced cash flow problems from bad debts, and in June 2001, the company was 
liquidated.
48
 In this case, the prosecution insisted on a penalty, regardless of the 
financial circumstances of the company. The judge commented that 
The prosecutor expected the company to argue the futility of penalty imposition 
because there would be no claim by WorkCover. Notwithstanding this, the 
prosecutor argued ‘... the fact of a penalty is a matter that has relevance to the 
WorkCover Authority and its systems and statistics... in the circumstances that 
... imposition of a fine on the corporation would not be a futility even if no fine 
was recoverable. An appropriately large fine would also have a general 
deterrence effect. There is no need in these circumstances to reduce the amount 
of the fine to reflect the incapacity to pay’.49  
The director of the company took a position with another firm, in which he was the 
sole shareholder, and his daughter the sole director, and that company took over 
contracts held by the liquidated firm. Despite these manoeuvres, the judge 
commented 
...nothing has changed. His financial circumstances, it was submitted, are far 
from pallid. There is nothing in his circumstances which permits any claim of 
incapacity to pay. Specific deterrence is a matter which should be expressly 
considered in assessing an appropriate penalty to impose on Mr .[X].
50
  
A penalty of $88,000 was imposed on the defendant company, and the director fined 
$8,250.
51
 This example typifies the way in which companies or their directors 
attempt to evade penalty or seek penalty reduction, yet continue to operate in the 
industry under different guises. However, in this case, the court was aware of the 
reality of the defendant’s financial situation. 
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Sham contracting is another growing form of illicit business practice in an industry 
that is ‘ uniquely at risk of being exploited by sham operators’, according to the 
Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner’s (ABCC) Sham 
Contracting Inquiry Report 2011.
52
 The report also noted that there were more 
independent contractors working in this industry than in any other, and that the 
proliferation of contractors makes it easier for unscrupulous employers to take 
advantage of the situation. There is no widely accepted definition of sham 
contracting, but in relation to the building and construction industry, the ABCC 
report suggested that ‘a sham arrangement or sham contract involves misrepresenting 
or disguising an employment relationship as one involving a principal and contractor 
under a contract for services’.53 In other words, a worker is deemed to be a contractor 
when he or she is, in reality, an employee.  
The disadvantages for the employee are that, as a ‘deemed’ contractor, they must 
supply and maintain their own tools and equipment, pay for compulsory taxes and 
insurances and carry a risk of loss. While these are standard elements in a contractual 
relationship, the problem arises when workers, who are legitimate employees, are 
persuaded, tricked, or in some cases, coerced, into entering into bogus contracting 
arrangements. The benefits to the employer are obvious, as they are exempted from 
considerable financial obligations and legal responsibilities that would arise in a 
proper employer/employee relationship. There are downsides for the government in 
loss of revenue; and honest employers are placed at a competitive disadvantage. For 
the industry generally, there is reduced health and safety performance and poorer 
workplace relations. 
54
  
The CFMEU C and G Division had led the campaign against sham contracting 
arrangements, through direct intervention on worksites, negotiations with prime 
contractors and through publication of instances where workers have been 
disadvantaged by bogus employment relationships through its national and state 
journals, Unity and Hard Hat. However, because of general union opposition to the 
ABCC
55
 (the reasons for which are described in Chapter Six), both the, Australian 
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Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the primary building union, the CFMEU C 
and G Division, declined to take part in the Inquiry run by the ABCC. The 
construction union published its own report in 2011, where it concluded that between 
26 to 46 per cent of all independent contractors were in sham arrangements,
56
 a 
finding that the ABCC Report found was ‘unreliable’57.  
Sham contracting is not confined to Australia, as Lamare’s study of New York 
workers found. This research also highlighted a problem common to Australia, that 
is, the targeting of non-English speaking workers by unscrupulous employers.
58
 
Lamare describes the practice as ‘misclassification’ meaning the incorrect 
designation of employment status of workers when they are incorrectly ascribed the 
status of contractors. In the American context, this occurs especially with vulnerable 
workers, that is, those who are unaware of their rights, and in particular, migrant 
workers. Improper misclassification has a threefold cost. Firstly, to workers denied 
the legal entitlements and rights of full time employees; to other employers, who 
suffer from the undercutting unscrupulous firms can then engage in (and who then 
may be tempted to use the same tactics to retain a competitive edge); and, third to the 
public who lose the taxes which would otherwise have been collected. 
59
 
In the US, the construction industry accounts for ‘tens of thousands’ of employees 
being improperly classified with loss of wages calculated at about US$12 million, 
with further millions in workers compensation premiums lost as well.
60
 The primary 
reason for employers misclassifying workers is to avoid paying compensation 
premiums,
61
 which is also a factor in the Australian context. 
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 The ability or propensity of companies to go into administration and liquidation and 
their (sometime) re-appearance as ‘phoenix’ companies, and the prevalence of illegal 
employment relations, such as sham contracting, are testimony to the exceptional 
nature of the building industry. These forms of business operations have an obvious 
impact on health and safety. ‘Phoenix’ operations mean that companies with poor 
OHS practices are able to continue to harm workers; they escape the penalties which 
would otherwise be imposed, and the public exposure that those penalties may incur; 
they are able to present a ‘clean’ record’ when tendering for government or other 
large contracts which require disclosure on OHS performance. The use of sham 
contracting is particularly insidious, as it robs workers of all legal entitlements, of 
which, given the high-risk nature of the industry, workers compensation is one 
important aspect. 
Injury, disease, fatality 
The number, type and variety of jobs and tasks required in the construction industry 
contribute to its high-risk profile. While some former high-risk work practices have 
disappeared, others have taken their place, such as erection of concrete wall panes or 
curtain walls. Occupational groups include trades or semi-trades, such as bricklayers, 
tilers, floor layers, carpenters, electricians, plumbers and gas fitters, gyprockers, 
plasterers, renderers, painters, riggers, scaffolders, crane drivers, sheet metal 
workers, lift installers, air conditioning installers, labourers, amongst others.  
The diversity of occupations exposes workers to numerous dangers. These include 
physical hazards, mechanical and manual handling hazards, chemical and biological 
exposures and psychological stressors. Toxic substance exposures include asbestos, 
synthetic mineral fibres (SMF), lead, crystalline silica, cement dust, formaldehyde, 
wood dusts, organic solvents, isocyanates, polychlorinated biphenyls, environmental 
contaminants, welding fumes, sealant chemicals, metals in solder and pipe paste flux, 
confined space gases, viruses and bacteria.
62
 
63
 Workers suffer from body stressing 
through manual handling and mechanical hazards, effects of noise and vibration, 
exposure to electrical and radiation hazards. Psychological stressors include poor 
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working conditions, exposures to the hazards already mentioned and organisational 
hazards, such as over work, inadequate management, workplace bullying and 
violence.  
National fatality statistics 
The industry is characterised by high levels of fatalities. In Australia, between 1989 
and 1992, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) 
reported the deaths of 234 persons fatally injured in the construction industry, that is, 
10 deaths per 100,000 workers, and double the death rate for all industries whose 
average rate was 5.5 deaths per 100,000 workers.
64
 Numbers of deaths remain 
constant over time as shown below in Table 2.1. From 2000–01 to 2008–09, the 
number of compensated fatalities in the construction industry ranged between 49 and 
55 for all fatalities, and between 21 and 35 for traumatic injury fatalities, at a national 
level. 
Table 2.1. Number of compensated injury and disease fatalities by mechanism of injury/disease 
(Australia) – Construction, 2000-2010 (2009-10 are preliminary figures). (Source: Safe Work 
Australia data and Analysis Team)  
  00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09 09-10p 
Total traumatic injury fatalities 35 26 25 28 21 28 30 29 29 27 
Being hit by moving objects 10 12 8 5 6 3 7 4 9 9 
Biological factors    1       
Body stressing 1       2   
Chemicals and other substances 1 1 1      2  
Falls, trips and slips of a person 7 3 4 9 4 8 4 4 9 3 
Heat, radiation and electricity 4 1 9 3 5 4 2 4 3 7 
Hitting objects with a part of the body 2   1      1 
Mental stress         1  
Other and unspecified mechanisms of 
injury 
10 9 3 9 6 13 17 15 5 7 
Total disease fatalities 14 21 23 25 27 17 25 13 10 14 
Biological factors 1 1      1  1 
Body stressing   1 1 1      
Chemicals and other substances 9 15 19 16 23 16 24 11 10 12 
Falls, trips and slips of a person 1   1  1 1    
Heat, radiation and electricity     1      
Mental stress  1 1 3       
Other and unspecified mechanisms of 
injury 
3 4 2 4 2   1  1 
TOTAL FATALITIES  49 47 48 53 48 45 55 42 39 41 
The preliminary national data for 2009–10 showed that there were 41 fatalities, 
which were the highest number of fatalities of all industries. This corresponds to a 
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fatality rate of 5.9 fatalities per 100 000 employees in 2009–10, which is almost three 
times the rate for all industries of 1.9. The most common causes of traumatic injury 
fatality were vehicle incidents, which accounted for 13% of fatalities, and falls from 
a height and contact with electricity, each accounted for 11% of fatalities.
65
 
NSW fatality statistics 
Injury incidence rates for the construction industry in NSW are high at 22.4 per 
1,000 compared to the state average of 14.0 per 1,000 for 2006/07.
66
 Those 
occupational diseases reported in the NSW compensation statistics defined as 
resulting from repeated or long-term exposures are less easy to quantify, especially 
those that have long latency periods, and they may not be counted in compensation 
statistics. ‘Own account’ or self-employed construction workers are automatically 
excluded from NSW compensation statistics, and given the high numbers of persons 
working in this category, and the problems associated with sham contracting, the 
actual incidence of injury and disease is likely to be much higher. In the eleven-year 
period from 1997 to 2008, there were 267 deaths in the New South Wales 
construction industry alone. Averages calculated from the WorkCover Statistical 
Bulletins 1997/1998 to -2007/2008 showed an average incidence rate of 12.2 workers 
per 100,000 dying as opposed to the incidence rate for all other work related fatalities 
of 5.7 per 100,000. This places the construction industries among the four industries 
with the highest fatality and injury rate in the country.
67
 Figure 2.1 shows numbers of 
fatalities in the construction industry compared to numbers of traumatic injury 
fatalities in all industries in NSW. As can be seen, while the numbers of deaths for 
all workers show a downward trend, the numbers of deaths among construction 
workers remain relatively stable. 
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Figure 2.1. WorkCover NSW fatalities 1997/1998 to 2008/2009 (Source: New South Wales 
Government WorkCover New South Wales Workers Compensation Statistical Bulletin 2006/07, 
(WorkCover NSW:2008)) 
It is difficult to ascertain the true toll in workplace injury, disease and death due to 
differences in the data gathering protocols of Australia’s state, territory and 
commonwealth regulators. Most information about workplace injuries, disease and 
fatalities are obtained from workers compensation claim data whose purpose is to 
measure compensation scheme performance and which has been acknowledged as 
underestimating by half the amount of workplace injury and fatalities in the 
workplace.
68
 The data also does not account for those dying from occupational 
disease, estimated at four times that of persons dying from occupational accidents
69
 
The NSW data does not record incidents pertaining to the self-employed, to 
employers or to members of the public. It excludes data on deceased individuals 
where funeral claims were not made, even if the deceased was covered by workers 
compensation and in cases where the decedent had no dependants to whom the death 
benefit could be paid. The data makes no differentiation between those deaths 
occurring within the responsibility of an employer or outside of it. It also excludes 
Commonwealth employees, and those dying from dust diseases, excepting 
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coalmines.
70
 There are time lags in the data, an ongoing problem that was noted by 
Gunningham as far back as 1984.
71
 The paucity of data collection was criticised by 
the NSW General Purpose Standing Committee
72
, which recommended that 
WorkCover address inadequacies as a priority, and also recommended the 
establishment of a comprehensive national database. Although there are a numbers of 
agencies that collect data, ranging from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the 
National Coronial Information System, university research centres and regulatory 
bodies
73
there has been little advance made in garnering information about 
occupational disease from medical practitioners and hospital recording systems. In 
the British context, Tombs and Whyte commented that reporting and data collection 
systems filter out an unknown amount of workplace injuries, diseases and deaths. 
This filter effect is increased if investigations are not made and if prosecutions are 
not initiated, thus many safety crimes go undetected, or if detected, are likely to be 
filtered out.
74
  
Regulatory framework, enforcement and prosecution 
In 1983, New South Wales was the first Australian state to adopt a Robens approach 
to OHS with the introduction of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. 
Although South Australia in 1972, Tasmania in 1977 and Victoria in 1981 had 
revised their acts along Robens principles, the NSW OHS Act of 1983 was much 
closer to the Robens model.
75
 This meant that the former prescriptive legislation 
governing different aspects of industrial endeavour (shops, factories, construction 
and so on) gave way to a self regulatory, performance based approach with a general 
duty of care imposed on employers and to a lesser extent, on employees.  
Six years after the promulgation of the OSHA 1983, the WorkCover Authority of 
New South Wales (WorkCover) was established in 1989 and was the first regulatory 
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authority in Australia to integrate its various roles as a provider of services to the 
community and government in the areas of occupational health and safety and 
workers compensation including rehabilitation and injury management. Specifically, 
its OHS functions consisted of promoting compliance with OHS legislation through 
providing education, information and advice, licensing hazardous equipment and 
activities and defined premises.  Its inspectorial functions included workplace 
inspections, incident and complaint investigations, dispute mediation, issuing of 
penalty notices and prosecution.   
The Robens approach was based on the belief that too much ‘paternalistic and 
punitive regulation’ had failed in its objectives, and had ‘...exerted a narcotic effect 
on employer activism in regard to the issue [of OHS]’76). The presumptions behind 
self regulation were that the punitive approach had neither succeeded, nor could ever 
work; that apathy was the ‘single most important cause of industrial accidents’; 
workers and employers should bear the main responsibility for workplace safety, and 
that, unlike the industrial relations arena, workers and employers would have a more 
common interest in maintaining healthy and safe workplaces.
77
  
These are contested presumptions as it has been argued that there is little 
commonality of interests between workers and employers, since the latter’s attention 
are centred on ownership and control, capital accumulation and profit, conditions 
which run counter to workers’ interest, and which often contribute to poor health and 
safety outcomes.
78
 Furthermore, as there has been no comprehensive evaluation of 
the Robens approach in this country, many of these assumptions are yet to be tested. 
In the 1990s, the state Labor government moved to increase the WorkCover NSW 
inspectorate and to strengthen their powers. Consequently, inspectors could enter 
workplaces without prior notice, and at the same time, unions were extended this 
right, in that authorised union officials could enter workplaces to check on health and 
safety matters and take remedial action where appropriate. It targeted high-risk 
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industries for particular attention, with construction one of the top five. It established 
the WorkCover Construction Industry Consultative Committee to develop codes of 
practice and guidance notes in eleven key construction areas. In appealing to 
employers, WorkCover pointed out that a more pro-active managerial approach 
could reduce costs and improve productivity, reducing overheads and making 
businesses more competitive. In terms of state projects, construction companies were 
obliged to enter into a mandatory management system requirement, the OHS and R 
Management Systems Guidelines for government capital works programs.  
In 1996, the government established the Legislative Council Standing Committee on 
Law and Justice,
79
 which enquired into a range of matters concerning health and 
safety, and particularly focused on death and injury at work. Its final report called for 
a review of the 1983 OHS Act, and recommended the consolidation of numerous 
existing regulations. The reviewed Act would also incorporate the Construction 
Safety Act and Regulations and the Factories Shops and Industries Act and its 
Regulations.
80One of the government’s amendments to the 1983 Act placed a greater 
responsibility on company directors who were obliged to demonstrate due diligence 
in preventing workplace health and safety incidents, and in February 1996, the 
maximum fines for workplace health and safety offences were increased, as well as 
increases for penalties related to provisional improvement notices and prohibition 
notices.
81
  
OHS legislation is developed within the economic and political tensions and 
contradictions inherent in liberal capitalist democracies. On one hand, government 
intervention imposes financial costs on industry in an attempt to reduce harms and 
risks to public health and well being, thus reducing the profit margin, but on the 
other, if they do not act to protect the public (including workers) and the 
environment, the legitimacy of the system as a whole may be threatened.
82
 
WorkCover NSW, as the state OHS regulator, faced these contradictions, as it tried 
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to appease capitalist businesses, while attempting to reduce the rate of illness, injury 
and death. WorkCover NSW has a major role as the prosecutor in breaches of 
occupational health and safety legislation, through its Strategic Investigative Unit but 
its emphasis is on compliance with OHS legislation,
83
 rather than deterrence, which 
is one of the aims of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (at s3A). 
However, its compliance efforts have not been translated into significant numbers of 
prosecutions, as evidenced in a numbers of studies from 1984 onwards, with 
Braithwaite and Grabosky
84
 commenting on the low rate of prosecutions for 
workplace safety and health offences. Four years later, Maconachie 
 argued that from their inception, local inspectorates had adopted a culture of non-
prosecution
85
 a point made by Carson who observed that inspectors in the 19
th
 
century were dissuaded from bringing prosecutions because of the non-cooperative 
attitude of magistrates, resulting in inspectors adopting a more educative or 
persuasive stance in their dealing with employers.  
Carson
86
 was of the view that health and safety offences were so universal, and 
inspectors so overwhelmed that rather than try the impossible, they developed 
strategies that excused non-prosecution. In this scenario, only the most serious 
crimes were prosecuted, with the rest being seen as ‘customary’ and thus escaped 
prosecution. Consequently, a convention was established which, through a complex 
process, 
...allowed for the development of elaborate notions of intent to distance causal 
connections, and so make enforcement less immediate...[with legislation seen 
as]...performing a symbolic role which not only headed off the growing 
challenge of organised labour and legitimated the separation of OHS from 
industrial relations, but also helped to build a myth that traditional concepts of 
criminal law were inappropriate for infringements of OHS legislation- a myth 
which became a foundation plank of the Robens Report.
87
 
Additional to these factors, organisational limitations played a part, including the 
finite numbers of available inspectors, increased workloads, and legal difficulties, 
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such as ‘...the refusal of courts to inflict severe penalties on employers violating 
statutory requirements’.88  
In the modern context, Johnson demonstrated the uncooperative nature of Victorian 
magistrates, reflecting their underlying ideological views of the ‘careless worker’, 
and commenting on the persistent notions about the non-criminality of workplace 
harms.
89
 Although Robens believed that criminal sanctions were not the answer to 
improving working conditions, the point here is that the historical and ideological 
notions which informed his view have continued on into the present, and are 
demonstrated in Work Cover’s policies and practices, which emphasises the primary 
role of information advice and assistance as its preferred mode of action, in line with 
its compliance pyramid. 
90
 
The tenor of its television and cinematic advertisements has emphasised these 
principles, with the most recent examples highlighting employee responsibilities to 
‘come home safely’, exemplified in its ubiquitous slogan ‘Work Safe: Home Safe’, 
which places responsibilities for safe and healthy workplaces on employees. 
WorkCover now makes ‘quality control’ phone calls to employers who have been 
visited by its inspectors to ensure that they, the employers, have been treated well by 
inspectors.
91
 The extent that this policy may (or may not) undermine the authority of 
inspectors is unknown. 
Anecdotal evidence from senior members of the judiciary, members of Parliament 
and union OHS officers, indicates that in 2006, WorkCover management was 
instructed by senior levels of the Labor government to ‘go easy’ on business, that is, 
to concentrate more on advising and educating business, rather than taking more 
stringent action. The numbers of prosecutions undertaken by the agency for incidents 
involving death and/or serious injury demonstrate that there was a marked decrease 
in prosecutions in the year following, as shown in Table 2.2.  The IRC’s Annual 
Report 2008 noted that this decrease ‘remains to be explained’92 but it hoped that it 
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was a consequence of successful programs initiated by all relevant parties. If this is 
the case, it appears that the improvements did not follow through for the years 2008 
and 2009. 
Table 2.2.
93
  NSW IRC prosecutions for death and/or serious injury 2004 to 2009. 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
IRC 186 174 193 93 185 131 
Not only are the number of prosecutions scant when the totality of injury, illness and 
fatalities in NSW are considered annually,
94
 but the average penalties imposed for 
workplace offences are low as this thesis demonstrates.   
The social democratic view that a commonality of interest exists between employer 
and employee in their pursuit of safe workplaces, is questionable in current 
ideological and economic conditions. Tombs and Whyte
95
 suggest that the Robens 
‘advise and persuade’ technique (favoured by WorkCover NSW), fails to grasp ‘that 
nearly all incidents are the inevitable result of unsafe working systems which could 
themselves be made safe by the employers, by a combination of hazard analysis, 
planning, training and supervision’, and it must be added, their willingness to do so. 
The construction unions argue that the duty of employers in NSW to consult with 
workers on safety and health matters requires representation of workers through a 
trade union in order to obtain effective and meaningful consultation without fear of 
intimidation and/or retribution, particularly in the light of the precarious nature of 
many workers in the construction industry as a result of complex contracting 
arrangements.
96
  
Furthermore, the nature of work has undergone change since the Robens Report was 
drafted in the UK in 1972. In Britain and Australia, the stability of the workplace 
environment with a largely full time workforce, strong trade union participation and 
job security was thought to justify the Robens approach to OHS – an approach which 
sought to simplify the layers of prescriptive legislation, introducing consultative 
arrangements between employers and workers, thus placing responsibility firmly in 
their joint hands in a spirit of mutual cooperation.   
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[The Robens recommendations were] ... based upon unspoken assumptions that 
there would be a vigorous trade union movement covering almost half the 
workforce and that this union movement would play its role in the consultative 
process. Another assumption was that its machinery...would be funded amply 
by government.
97
  
By 1998, social and economic changes in Britain saw these assumptions evaporate. 
When the Robens approach was first mooted for NSW in the early 1980’s, social and 
industrial conditions were similar to that of Britain in the 1970’s, with ‘a strong and 
vigorous trade union movement, a highly-regulated labour market, large-scale 
employment, full-time employment, and government with deeper pockets...’ 98 
McCallum’s view was that by 1998, the decline in the conditions of workers in 
Britain, the underfunding of government departments, the increase in contingent 
work and the ‘vertical disintegration’ of the labour market in which large 
corporations outsource and contract out services, saw a rise in accident rates along 
with a decline in trade union membership.
99
 
Walters and James
100
 argue that in the U.K, the Safety and Health at Work Etc. Act 
1974 and the preceding Robens report ‘were based on a particular view of both the 
social relations of production and of the consequences for health and safety, 
influenced by a socio-political and economic situation whose characteristics have 
become increasingly less relevant to the 1990s.’ In other words, social democratic 
principles had been supplanted by neo-liberal Thatcherite doctrines and the incoming 
New Labor government was in no mood to overturn all of its economic and political 
policies.  
In NSW, the review of the 1983 OHS Act led to the promulgation of the OHS Act 
2000, followed the next year by its accompanying Regulation 2001. The OHS Act 
2000 particularly emphasised employers’ obligations to consult with their workforce 
on OHS matters and to require employers, manufacturers of plant and controllers of 
premises to undertake risk assessments, including identifying, assessing and 
controlling workplace hazards. It stipulated a requirement to appoint a principal 
contractor on construction work. It required persons leasing, hiring, registering, 
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designing, or selling plant to ensure that it was without risk for industrial and public 
safety.
101
 In addition, the new Act imposed higher penalties, effectively doubling the 
maximum fines for employers who failed in their various OHS duties. This meant 
that penalties at the time were the highest in Australia, with maximum penalties 
shown in Table 2.3 below. An amendment in 2006 (s.32A) introduced increased 
penalties for persons causing a workplace death due to reckless conduct, and 
included the provision for a five year term of imprisonment, but to date, no one has 
been charged under this section.  
Table 2.3. Changes in penalty rates for breaches of the general duty of care provisions NSW OHS Act 
1983 and NSW OHS Act 2000.
102
 
Year Act Section Penalties 
1983 NSW OHS 
Act 1983 
15 and 16 $50,000 corporation 
$5000 individual 
30 June 1987 
Penalty units increased 
from $100 to $110 
As above As above  $100,000 corporation  
$10,000 individual.  
1991 
Amended 1 March  
As above  As above $250,000 corporation 
$25,000 individual 
1996  
Amended 1 February  
 
As above  
 
 
As above  
 
$500,000 corporation 
$50,000 individual 
(Additional penalty for second and 
subsequent offences s51A of $250,000 
corporation and $25,000 or 2 years 
imprisonment 
After 1 September 1997 
(penalty unit increased 
from $100 to $110) 
As above 
 
As above 
 
$550,000 corporation  
$55,000 individual 
(see s51 A increased to $255,000) 
2000 to present NSW OHS 
Act 2000 
ss8 and 9 (penalty see 
s12) 
 $550,000 corporation  
$55,000 individual 
Second and Sub offence $825,000 
corporation and $82,500 or 2 years 
imprisonment 
2006  NSW OHS 
Act 2000 
Part 2A s32a 
introduced reckless 
conduct causing death  
$1,650,000 corporation  
$165,000 or 5yrs imprisonment or both 
In NSW, once the regulator decided to launch a prosecution in the case of a fatality, 
the matter was heard in the NSW IC. This Court had its genesis in the Industrial 
Relations Commission of New South Wales (IRCNSW), established by the 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1901. Its central function as a body exercising arbitration 
and conciliation functions remained essentially the same throughout the decades of 
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the twentieth century. In 1908, the Industrial Court was established by the Industrial 
Disputes Act with a Supreme or District Court Judge appointed for a seven-year 
term, with jurisdiction to hear matters concerning industrial disputes and to arbitrate 
and prosecute in industrial matters.
103
  
By 2010, the major functions of the IRC NSW concerned conciliation and arbitration 
of industrial disputes, setting industrial awards, approving enterprise agreements and 
hearing unfair dismissal claims. The Commission was administered by the New 
South Wales Department of Justice and Attorney General and exercised both an 
administrative civil role as the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) and a criminal 
role, through judicial responsibilities of the Industrial Court of New South Wales 
(NSW IC). In this form, the Court had status equivalent to the Supreme Court, 
making it a ‘superior court of record’.104 The unique nature of the NSW IC was in its 
specialist role. Judges became familiar with the features and dynamics of OHS 
offences, as well as other industrial cases because these were the regular matters 
being heard. However, it will be shown that judges were constrained by sentencing 
rules and legislation, but at the same time, failed to exercise more innovative 
sentencing options.  
Less serious offences under the New South Wales Occupational Health and Safety 
Act (2000) which did not involve fatalities were usually heard at local levels in the 
Chief Industrial Magistrates Court (CIM), but in 2010, its functions in relation to the 
NSW Industrial Relations Act 1996 and the NSW Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 2000, were referred to the Industrial Court, thus relieving Industrial Magistrates 
and Local Courts of their duties in relation to this legislation. The Bill for this 
amendment
105
 was introduced into the NSW parliament in 2009. The rationale for 
these changes was that the introduction of the Commonwealth Workplace Relations 
Act 1996 under the conservative Liberal-National Party (LNP) coalition federal 
government, had reduced the workload of the IRC, as the Commonwealth assumed 
the dominant role in industrial relations. This lesser load continued even after the 
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introduction of the Fair Work Act 2009 by the federal Labor government.
106
 In 2010, 
there were 10 members of the judiciary in the NSW IC, including the President, Vice 
President and three Deputy Presidents presiding over matters relating to OHS 
offences, and other industrially related cases.  The NSW IC had the confidence of the 
Labor Government, and with the approaching state elections in March 2011, the then 
Opposition Coalition Shadow Attorney-General also stated his party’s intention to 
maintain the status quo in respect of the IRC’s and the IC’s function. However, as 
Chapter Seven shows, after the election of the Coalition government in 2011, the 
status of the NSW IC as an independent court changed. 
Industry associations 
There are numbers of peak bodies representing the various trades and allied 
industries in the building and construction sector, only one of which, the Master 
Builders Association (MBA), is considered here because of its role in day-to-day 
operations. Its major responsibility is representing employers’ interests in the 
construction sector. Its traditional role in industrial advice and dispute resolution was 
expanded during the 1990s and into the 2000s as the federal LNP government moved 
to more vigorous de-regulation of  Australian industrial relations. Medium to large 
companies typically seek the MBA’s advice where union work stoppages occur, 
including those concerned with OHS, and it usually represents employers where 
OHS disputes escalate to the industrial court (NSW IC). The association has a 
partnership agreement with NSW WorkCover for improving workplace safety and 
injury management across the construction industry. The aim of this collaboration 
with the MBA was ‘...to deliver practical, cost effective solutions...’with WorkCover 
being aware of ‘...the difficulties employers, particularly small businesses face in 
addressing safety and injury management issues.’107 However, as the data show, the 
numbers of fatal incidents at building sites has not fallen significantly over time.  
In such a dangerous industry, the assistance of the building unions in monitoring and 
inspection of site safety is both economically beneficial to the State and contributes 
to the health and safety of its members and other workers. However, the imperatives 
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of capital gain is the prime concern of employers, as pointed out by one of the main 
Australian employer associations the Australian Industry Group who have stated: 
‘...(I)t is often suggested that OHS should be the top priority. While this is a worthy 
ideal every organisation should strive for, the reality is that making a profit will 
always be the highest priority of a business’.108   
Rearranging these priorities in the workplace is a necessary, though insufficient, 
condition to secure a safe and healthy workplace and an effective way of doing this is 
to have unionised work sites, with union appointed HSR’s.109 A number of studies 
have examined the relationship between union presence at the workplace and safety 
outcomes, confirming that unionised workplaces are safer than the non-unionised.
110
 
A study by the London School of Economics concluded that work injury rates were 
24% lower in unionised sites.
111
 
Nichols et al
112
 suggest that it is difficult to ‘disentangle’ the impact of union 
involvement at work because of two factors. Firstly, workplaces with a strong union 
presence are likely to have greater awareness of OHS issues, which may increase 
OHS incidence reporting. Secondly, ‘adverse conditions of work may bring trade 
unions into workplaces in the first place’.113 Studies by Reilly114 in 1995 and more 
recently by Nichols et al
115
 (2007) concluded that participative arrangements in 
conjunction with union involvement are effective and produce positive safety 
outcomes. Reilly’s study for example, found that: 
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[e]stablishments with joint consultative committees exclusively for health and 
safety — and with all employee representatives chosen by unions — have, on 
average, 5.7 fewer injuries per 1000 employees compared with establishments 
where management deals with health and safety matters without any form of 
worker consultation.
116
  
Further support for the positive role of unions in the OHS process was confirmed in a 
2002 Canadian study. The study, commissioned by the Ontario Workplace Health 
and Safety Agency, found that: 
…78-79 per cent of unionised workplaces reported high compliance with health 
and safety legislation with only 54-61 per cent of non-unionised workplaces 
reporting such compliance.
117
  
The beneficial role of unions in OHS consultation was also pointed out by Saksvik 
and Quinlan,
118
 who suggested that unions can vet OHS internal control 
systems/management systems in ways that inspectors may not be resourced to do. In 
addition to union support at the enterprise level, other elements in effective 
participation include the local statutory framework and support of the regulator, as 
well as management’s recognition of HSRs participation. However, without active 
support of the union in health and safety improvements, high union density in itself is 
not enough to have a positive effect. Eaton and Nocerino
119
 suggest that it is not just 
high union density that improves the performance of employee participation 
programs ‘but whether or not the union has taken an active role in that program’.  
In the case of the NSW CFMEU C and G Division, there is a strong emphasis on 
health and safety, with the union running in-house training programs for its 
organisers and delegates, as well as providing information in a range of different 
languages to accommodate a multicultural workforce. Organisers also attend 
extensive training programs run by WorkCover NSW, and the union is active in 
seeking outside professional help and advice on building sites of 
concern.
120
However, in line with all other trade unions in Australia, there has been a 
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decrease in union membership over time and union density in the construction 
industry dropped from 34 per cent in 1994 to 17 per cent in 2008.
121
 Anecdotally, 
density appears to be higher in major construction projects and on those work sites 
where union enterprise bargains have been negotiated.   
 The ability for unions to attend worksites for health and safety reasons was enabled 
by the state Labor government through an amendment to the New South Wales 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 in 1995, allowing trade union authorised 
officers entry to workplaces ‘for the purposes of investigating any suspected breach 
of the occupational health and safety legislation’. These powers were similar to those 
granted union officials in the NSW Industrial Relations Act 1996 allowing them to 
access to workplace to investigate suspected breaches of industrial conditions.
122
 In 
contrast, the federal LNP government opposed what it saw as the unfettered right of 
unions to enter work sites, and the right of entry was severely restricted under its 
WorkChoices industrial legislation promulgated in 2005.  
There was a fall in industrial disputes in the construction industry from 371 in 2003-
04 to 30 in 2006-7, representing a greater drop (91.9%) than for all other industries 
for the same period. A corresponding percentage drop of 92.2% was observed for 
working days lost to industrial dispute, again greater than for all other industries. The 
ratio of numbers of days lost per employee was also lower, with ratios of 1.15 days 
per employee in construction compared to 1.2 days in all other industries.
123
 This 
period corresponds to the introduction of the LNP federal government’s Australian 
Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (ABCII) 2005, which 
targeted building unions, and made formerly lawful industrial action illegal.
124
 This 
Act was to have negative consequences for health and safety in the industry, as union 
action around these issues was curtailed, and as union officials, delegates and 
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members were threatened with imprisonment and heavy financial penalties under the 
powers of its enforcing agency, the Australian Building and Construction 
Commission (ABCC). 
Labour and capital – contested terrain 
The building and construction industry is no stranger to contests between labour and 
capital that began some 160 years ago, when, in the 1840s, carpenters and joiners 
formed an industrial association. This action was immediately attacked by the press, 
with the Sydney Gazette’s editorial declaring that workers’ plans to form a union 
were ‘mad’, that workers were not of an ‘honest and honourable character’ and that 
they would bring suffering to their families. It continued ‘...it may not be generally 
known that the Law has wisely provided a very severe penalty for the punishment of 
the crime of Combination...for months they (workers) may be incarcerated within the 
walls of a prison’.125 Building workers continued to press for their rights for an eight-
hour day over a six-day week, and were eventually successful. Stonemasons won a 
44-hour week in the 1870s, a campaign not too vigorously opposed by employers 
because of the comparatively young mortality rate among workers in this trade due to 
exposure to silica dust, usually about 35 years of age,
126
 making employers conscious 
of the need to maintain the workforce as far as possible.    
It was not until the 1920s that building workers won working hours commensurate 
with the stonemasons, with the Sydney Morning Herald giving prominence to the 
view of the employers association, the Master Builders, that the community would 
pay, later echoed by the Daily Telegraph’s assertion that housewives would suffer 
and that the life or death of industries was at stake.
127
 Years later, the Sydney 
Morning Herald attributed the 44-hour week as a ‘grave factor in the depression’ of 
the 1930’s. In 1920, building workers in Melbourne (‘apostles of laziness’, as 
described by the Argus) agitated for a further reduction of working hours to 40 hours 
per week. Campaigns for a 38-35 hour week commenced in the late 1950s and 
although the result was still not fully achieved by 1980, the Daily Telegraph was 
moved to describe the renewed push for a 35 hour week as ‘...a policy of deliberate 
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sabotage.’ 128   Other union campaigns for holidays, long service leave, workers’ 
compensation, amenities, site allowances, picnic days, minimum wage, sickness 
benefits and Green Bans have been the subject of further newspaper criticism and 
condemnation. 
129
 
During the 1970’s union militancy saw improvements in building workers’ wages 
and conditions during a period of low unemployment and high inflation, which 
encouraged wage demands, and provided high job security in an era of building 
boom. Large developers and multinational construction companies were increasing, 
and workers were abandoning their former loyalties to small scale and cottage 
industry employers. The proliferation of sub-contractors was also causing poorer 
industrial relations because of their dubious business practices, which reduced 
labourers’ job security, as they became more casualised.130 
While workers were becoming more unified, the opposite was happening in 
employer groups, with the Master Builders Association representing smaller and 
middle size builders, and larger companies choosing not to join. The Building 
Workers Industrial Union (BWIU)
131
 had traditionally represented the trades, but 
about this time, there was an increase in the numbers of labourers on site, due to 
technological changes in materials, their use and manufacture. Concrete was 
replacing brickwork, and more demolition, excavating and general construction work 
was required. However, some of the new building techniques enabled the union 
representing labourers, the Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (BLF) to use its powerful 
industrial tactics of placing bans on concrete pours to force concessions from 
builders. Tensions were high between the two unions, caused by different views 
around industrial organising and tactics and different ideological positions taken by 
the unions’ leadership. By the mid 1980’s, the federal Labor government had 
deregistered the BLF at a national and state level, and in 1992, the BWIU and the 
BLF merged.
132
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The rivalry between the two unions was pronounced.
133
 Apart from the political and 
ideological differences, building unions approached industrial action from quite 
different standpoints, with the BLF adopting a more militant stance in opposition to 
the BWIU’s united front approach. Union leaders had a definite, though limited, 
influence on industrial relations through their strategic and ideological attitudes and 
stances, however, the structure of the industry itself was of crucial importance. Even 
the then head of the Australian Federation of Construction Contractors was reported 
as saying 
My view is that the biggest problem in the industry is that we expect people to 
get out of bed at 5.30 am in the morning, do a shit job for 11 hours a day in an 
unsafe environment for six days a week and whinge when they won’t do it on 
Sunday and act surprised when they spend as much time in the shed playing 
cards as they can’134  
The structure of the industry created low levels of employer loyalty, due to the nature 
of short term, sub-contract work, under capitalisation among many employers, and 
heavy work with high injury rates, which lent itself to union organising.
135
 
The Australian labour market went through a deregulation process in the 1990s, but 
the construction industry, unlike most other sectors was not so affected, with market 
driven enterprise bargaining principles, weakened arbitration and the control of union 
influence in industrial relations. Job instability, which affected other sectors was 
always a feature of the construction industry, which was able to ‘ride’ this 
deregulated effect more easily. However, it did not escape wage decline.
136
 In 
Australia, the years of the LNP government from 1996 to 2007 saw neo-liberalism 
assume greater heights, with its sights set on the trade union movement, and in 
particular, those unions it deemed to be the most militant and hostile. These included 
the Maritime Union of Australia and the CFMEU C and G Division. Some of the 
industrial legislation that it passed was inherited by the incoming federal Labor 
government in 2007, which appeared reluctant to abandon some of the former 
conservative government’s political and economic policies. The following chapters 
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will demonstrate how some aspects of these policies were detrimental to workers’ 
health and safety, partly because of the impacts made on the ability of unions to 
monitor safety at construction workplaces.  
This chapter has shown that the construction industry is highly productive and valued 
by both State and private interests. Its importance to the economy of the nation is 
such that any threats to productivity, such as that allegedly posed by trade union 
activity, is harshly dealt with. It is characterised by precarious working conditions 
with high levels of sub-contracting and micro business arrangements, Its mode of 
production leaves the industry vulnerable to illegal or dubious employment practices, 
and these social relations of production contribute to poor health and safety 
outcomes. This is demonstrated by the fact that the industry is one of the country’s 
most dangerous, with high levels of traumatic injury fatalities and serious injury.  
The following chapter sets out the theoretical constructs that are used to understand 
and unravel the complex relationships shown, in the conceptual model in Figure 1. 
Among other things, it discusses theories of the State, the ‘war of position’ engaged 
through hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles. Social harm theory is also 
considered as a useful conceptual device to explain the many facets of harm 
experienced by those who are victims of workplace safety crimes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Theoretical Perspectives and Literature Review 
…any adequate understanding of the vast scale of harm that affects people from 
the cradle to the grave must be understood in terms of political imperatives and 
the economies of the neo-liberal paradigm. They cannot be explained by a focus 
on individual acts or omissions. The vast majority of harms are structurally 
determined…individuals are responsible at some point, but they act collectively 
following the dictates of the neo-liberal paradigm.
1
  
Introduction  
There are many complexities underlying the problem of workplace deaths in the 
construction industry. These include consideration of causes; the regulation of work, 
health and safety; the leniency of penalties for workplace fatalities (as will be shown 
in chapter 4); the effectiveness of deterrent measures; and the perception of OHS 
crimes. In trying to appreciate these intricacies, this research draws on neo-Marxist 
theories, which in turn are informed by classical Marxism, one of the ‘grand 
theories’, characterised as a comprehensive and broad view of human society and 
behaviour.
2
 This approach privileges the role of social relations, wherein the 
concepts of history and ideology are employed to gain a better understanding of the 
nature of inequality in human endeavours. The importance of an historical 
perspective is emphasised to show how social relations of production change over 
time, but in which class relations and associated ideological positions remain 
constant. 
The model in chapter 1 identified the state and its instruments as interacting together 
to produce a particular regulatory, social and political context for the treatment of 
workplace harms. It displays the state as a mechanism of ideology and hegemony. 
This chapter explores the theoretical literature that has been used to develop this 
view of the state. It discusses the state as a hegemonic force that provides cohesion 
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among diverse and autonomous institutions. It then changes focus to examine the 
prevalence and influences of neo liberalism as an ideology to show how this ideology 
frames the treatment of OHS and injury, illness and death at work. 
Its empirical analysis of court judgements for traumatic workplace fatalities is 
grounded in an examination of the State and its agencies. It assesses legislative, 
judicial and regulatory changes over a timeframe primarily reflective of the study 
period, that is from 1988 to 2008, and which have shaped the social, economic and 
political milieu that has implications for the health and safety of the workforce. Of 
central interest is the literature that directly or indirectly, relates to perceptions of 
OHS crimes. When offences against OHS legislation are considered equivocally, 
there are implications about the effectiveness of deterrent measures, and this thesis 
argues that perceptions such as these are ones fostered by an economic system that 
privileges capital. This approach differs from other research, because while questions 
about OHS, punishment and deterrence has been examined by regulatory theory, 
critical criminological and sociological perspectives, this thesis positions workplace 
fatalities as the microcosm through which we can gain a better understanding of the 
dominance and constancy of particular ideological positions, in this case, that of neo-
liberalism.  
The economic policies and ideological constructs of neo-liberalism gained ground in 
Australia during the 1980’s and are still evident. This was also the time that saw the 
introduction of Robens style OHS legislation with its objectives of self-regulation 
and self-determination, concepts that sit comfortably with the neo-liberal paradigm. 
Australian  Labor and conservative governments directed a range of economic 
reforms, which saw an upsurge in policies of privatisation of state owned resources 
and utilities, diminution of public sector services and financial de-regulation, and 
other ‘reforms’ designed to strengthen capitalism and weaken the strength of the 
labour movement.
3
 A fundamental contradiction of the capitalist State lies in its 
attempts to manipulate social tensions between the interests of capitalism and the 
excesses of capitalists, because it is in the interest of the State to maintain itself, to 
promote social harmony and to reproduce the means of production. Neo-Marxists 
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argued that the state needed to exercise relative autonomy from class based interests, 
in order to exercise these checks and balances.
4
  
Following Gramsci, this thesis conceptualises the State as reflective of power 
relations in society,  
...for it should be remarked that the general notion of state includes elements 
which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that 
one might say that state = political society + civil society, in other words, 
hegemony protected by the armour of coercion.
5
 
Society is not a unitary static formation, but a complex structure with differing 
influences exerting pressure at one point or another, pressures that include 
ideological and cultural forces. This chapter explores some of these forces and 
pressures that exist in and between the elements of the model and identifies the 
concepts that are used in exploring the subject of this thesis. 
The classic Marxist view of the State is that it is not an external power forced on 
society, but as Engels observes, it is instead 
... a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that 
this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that 
it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But 
in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic 
interests, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it 
became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that 
would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; and this 
power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more 
and more from it, is the state’.  
The state is both produced by, and expresses the conflict inherent in class 
differences. The state arises in response to these differences and in doing so, proves 
the irreconcilable nature of class antagonisms.
6
 Later neo-Marxist theorists sought to 
expand and refine this characterisation by defining the state as an instrument that 
reflects the dominant interests of capital, but also reflects the fact that there are 
different fractions of capital, and consequently the state retains a degree of autonomy 
from those fractions. There is a ‘...dialectic between state and society, not a 
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separation’.7 Moran maintains that Gramsci and Poulantzas saw the state as one 
wherein ‘class struggle is reproduced within the state apparatus itself’, with Gramsci 
viewing the state as a factor of class cohesion ‘... the capitalist class is not a unity 
outside the state’ and the state maintains the ‘cohesion and form’ of the capitalist. 
The state operates as a ‘collective capitalist’ to represent the long–term interest of the 
capitalist class as a whole, under the hegemony of one of its fraction. This fraction 
today is monopoly capitalism. It is the structural characteristics of capitalism and not 
the class origins or powers of individuals therefore, that determines the class nature 
of the state.
8
  
The state is central to the analysis here, as it is from the state that the mechanisms 
that ultimately affect human lives flow. At the very least the state can be seen as an 
agent of control, but the extent to which that control is exercised by different 
agencies, and explanations of what its functions are, are multifold.
9
 There is also 
debate about the institutions that constitute the state. While Weber saw the state as 
the bearer of legitimate force within its given territory, Marx theorised the state as 
the instrument of the ruling class; Gramsci emphasised the ideological control 
exercised by capitalists through the state, while Althusser discussed the roles of the 
state in terms of its repressive (armed forces, police etc) and ideological (religion, 
media, education etc) apparatus.
10
  
For Gramsci ideology is the force that shapes a shared worldview. Ideology ‘...[has] 
a validity which is ‘psychological’; it ‘organises’ human masses, [it forms] the 
terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc’.11 
Ideologies are part of the hegemonic process, which Gramsci conceived of in several 
ways. It applies not only to the question of leadership of the proletariat but also to the 
rule of other classes in other historical periods. It is that ‘cultural, moral and 
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ideological leadership over allied and subordinate groups [that]...is identified with a 
new ideological ‘terrain’ with political, cultural and moral leadership and with 
consent’.12 Gramsci links hegemony in ‘...a chain of associations and oppositions to 
‘civil society’ as against ‘political society’, to consent as against coercion, to 
‘direction’ as against ‘domination’. The importance for Gramsci is that ‘though 
hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on 
the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of 
economic activity’. Hegemony is dynamic, in contrast to notions of a static dominant 
ideology thesis in which the actors are submissive recipients.  Hegemony 
‘presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups 
over which [it]  is exercised’13. So hegemony is created, achieved, and sustained 
through the state apparatus. 
This emphasis on the role of ideas, of ideology and its influence on the outcomes for 
society, is one that Althusser grappled with some forty years ago. He saw, like Marx, 
that capital relies on the reproduction of labour power to sustain itself and wages are 
the means through which this occurs. However, skills are also necessary and are 
increasingly being provided outside the job in other institutions, where workers learn 
social rules, norms, mores- the rules of the dominant class.
 
These rules result in 
workers submitting themselves to the rules of the hegemonic social order, and at the 
same time, the children of the ruling class acquaint themselves with the tools to 
‘...manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and 
repression’.14  
In Marx’s view, the dominant ideas in any society are those of the ruling class. 
Althusser, however, was interested in explaining the ‘relative autonomy’ of the 
superstructure and its reciprocal action on the economic base. He wanted to move 
from what he termed ‘descriptive’ Marxism to one that would understand the hidden 
determinants of social action, and ideology is central in this search. For Althusser, 
depending on the historical circumstances, another structure other than the economic 
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base (the superstructure) could be dominant, but the economic base would always be 
the determinant of that domination.
15
 
Although Marx believed that the bourgeois State was inherently repressive in its 
functioning, Althusser introduced the notion of the State Repressive Apparatus 
(RSA) and State Ideological Apparatus (ISA). These two sets of social sites 
condition the capitalist mode of production. The State Repressive Apparatus includes 
the government, administration, armed forces, police and courts. It ultimately 
functions through violence, though repression can also be expressed in non-physical 
forms.
16
 The idea that most attracted Althusser was how the Ideological State 
Apparatus played a parallel role in maintaining capitalist class structure (Wolff, n.d). 
ISA’s are found in religious and educational institutions, mass communications, 
cultural institutions and artefacts, and trade unions. It is difficult for the ruling class 
to exercise complete control over these ISA’s and there is therefore a continuing 
struggle for hegemony in this arena. The ISA’s function primarily by ideology and 
secondarily through repression, and so there is a ‘very subtle or tacit combination’ in 
the interplay of the ISA’s and RSA’s.17  
Michael Burawoy
18
proposed a Sociological Marxism that privileges society 
concurrent with, but distinct from the state and economy. He maintains that the 
convergence of the ideas of Gramsci and Polanyi, following different Marxist 
traditions, independently contributed to the thesis of Sociological Marxism, which 
holds that ‘...the dynamism of ‘society’, primarily located between State and 
economy, is a key to the durability and transcendence of advanced capitalism...’.19 
Gramsci was a critic of bourgeois sociology, objecting to crude positivism in 
sociology but also in Marxism, and his great contribution was to ‘...bring culture and 
ideology to the centre of political analysis.
20
 He argued that ‘civil society’ was the 
new terrain of struggle connecting the state to everyday life, through the media, mass 
education, political parties and voluntary associations, assisted by ‘a more elaborated 
and more interventionist state.’21  The importance to Gramsci of political parties, 
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ideology and the state were fuelled by the failure of revolution in the West and the 
rise of fascism in Italy. A new form of domination was on the rise, which he termed 
hegemony. 
The ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary 
regime is characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each 
other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the 
attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of 
the majority.
22
 Force is ever present, but in different guises, waiting in the wings ‘to 
be mobilized against individual deviants and in anticipation of moments of crisis’.23  
Pearce and Tombs
24
 study of the companies in the American chemical industry is 
illustrative of these broader forces. The authors described the ‘passive revolution’ 
that the industry underwent to adapt itself to the globalised economy, particularly in 
the areas of production and regulation. Although it adjusted due to social pressures, it 
was only in ways that sustained its power, influence and interests.
25
 It did so be 
forming a ‘hegemonic block’ or class coalition   and as a class fraction was able to 
exert most power over the extraction of surplus value. As such, class fractions can 
convince other, allied forces to accept their moral and political leadership and 
contribute to their mode of governance and in doing so, expect that subordinate 
classes or fractions will fall in with the interests of the dominant ideology. 
Hegemony involves ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities within 
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to 
win the active consent of those over whom it rules’.26 Therefore, although a society 
may be composed of numbers of varying groups and interests, the ruling ideology is 
that which represents them all.  
For Marxists, human minds, and the ideas which shape them are the ‘…products of 
historically developing social relations’. As Marx put it ‘[T]he human essence is no 
abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of 
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social relations’.27 For Gramsci, ideology is ‘...a conception of the world that is 
implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of 
individual and collective life’.28 Not just concerned with ideas, ideology also works 
on the level of praxis – the inspiration of attitudes and the means to action. People 
must have some rules of conduct or orientation, and ideology therefore becomes ‘the 
terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc’.29  
Gramsci argued that in order to undermine advanced capitalist societies, and lay the 
ground for socialism, a ‘war of position’ (an analogy to World War 1 trench 
warfare), must be undertaken, rather than the full frontal attack of a ‘war of 
movement’ such as that which occurred in the Russian revolution. However, 
hegemony is never ‘complete’ and there is always a shifting of terrain between the 
dominant and counter- hegemonic forces. While Gramsci saw two such forces – the 
dominant and the sub ordinate, Pearce and Tombs 
30
argue that there may be a 
number of ‘autonomous and counter hegemonic principle…and movements’.31 In 
examining the issues surrounding the social forces, movements and behaviours that 
have a bearing on court processes, including sentencing, and in thinking about the 
factors that have a bearing on the maintenance of workplace safety, counter 
hegemonic actions and principles are revealed. A ‘war of position’ occurs on the 
terrain of health and safety that demonstrates not only the gross struggles between 
dominant capital and sub-ordinate labour, but also the bearing that civil and political 
society brings to the arena.  
The political debate in Australia is one where the dominant discourse is currently 
situated within a neo-classical economics, which is value laden and functions as a 
‘technology of power’, which orders and re-orders social life. 32  It produces a 
particular form of social order and social relations - ‘a society constructed and 
animated in accordance with the logic, rules and values of the neo-classical 
narrative’.33 The power of neo-classical economics lies in its ability to ‘codify bodies 
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of knowledge as true or false’; it maintains social order though privileging certain 
forms of conceptual and discursive possibilities and denying others, and thus 
structures our thoughts and actions. This occurs through a series of ‘hegemonic 
moments’, which, as Gramsci showed, allows a class alliance or bloc to obtain 
‘...economic, ideological, political, and cultural control through a combination of 
consent and coercion’. 34 
The ideological constructs of neo-classical economics and neo-liberalism were those 
that accompanied the changes in OHS and industrial relations legislation during 1988 
to 2008. That is, the ideology and practices of neo-liberalism had become part of the 
Australian zeitgeist as the country adopted economic rationalist policies in the 1980’s 
under a Labor federal government that had also embraced enterprise bargaining 
(single employer bargaining) and moves toward de-regulation.
35
 This also provided a 
basis for the self regulatory policies of Robens style OHS legislation. These aims 
were further advanced when the conservative federal government of John Howard 
rationalised the introduction of regressive industrial relations legislation during his 
term of office 1996–2007, on the grounds that it allowed employees and employers a 
greater degree of choice and flexibility, a rhetoric which masked the inherent ‘power 
and dependency in the employment relationship.’36 In particular, the government was 
ideologically opposed to trade unionism, and moved to stamp out collective 
bargaining, as well as weaken the union movement in many respects.
37
 These actions 
were supported by some business sectors and by different states and at various times. 
The amount of de-regulation (which in fact, resulted in massive re-regulation and 
intervention), had a profound effect on workers as individuals and as a class and the 
introduction of very conservative industrial legislation was a major factor in the 
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decline in union membership from 31 per cent to 19 per cent from 1996 to 2007.
38
 
The effects of de-collectivisation, and the attacks on what conservatives termed 
‘union monopoly’, saw particular emphasis placed on militant unions. 39  Those 
particularly targeted were the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and CFMEU C 
and G Division, with the latter coming under the scrutiny of the Royal Commission 
into the Australian Building and Construction Industry (the Cole Commission) and 
the subsequent introduction of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement 
Act 2005 (BCII Act); which as shown in Chapter Six was equipped with exceptional 
powers of investigation and enforcement that were almost solely directed at the 
building trade unions and their members.  
These government initiatives, couched in a rhetoric of reducing union power and a 
rhetoric of competitiveness, productivity and efficiency as ensured though the 
operation of the 'market' had OHS ramifications given the importance of a trade 
union presence in maintaining safe and healthy working conditions. The introduction 
of individual agreements designed to replace collective union bargaining, and a 
process of reducing conditions contained in industrial awards to a limited number of 
‘allowable matters’ under the ‘award simplification’ of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996, had a flow on effect for workplace health and safety. This was because the 
former award system had assisted workers to participate in the regulation of areas of 
work that affected health and safety, as until the mid 1990’s federal awards regulated 
working hours, rest breaks, safety facilities, consultative arrangements and OHS 
training.
40
 
The impact of the Workplace Relations Act affected the workforce generally, but 
particularly in non-unionised areas. Negative consequences included lower wages, 
less job security, work intensification, less disposable income for necessities, less 
representation at work and poorer health outcomes.
41
 Peetz argues that the 
government’s ‘WorkChoices’ industrial legislation (which amended the Workplace 
Relations Act in 2006) ‘...introduced a large number of restrictions on industrial 
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action that make most forms of industrial action illegal [and that] the decline in 
industrial conflict is ...one manifestation of the lower level of power that employees 
have under WorkChoices’.42 
At the same time, the conservative government was also looking at OHS laws and 
workers compensation regulations, with the aim of moving them to the federal arena 
away from state control and reshaping them to suit its neoliberal ideology.
43
 The 
implications of the anti-union stance of the government meant that workers’ 
conditions became riskier, as matters to do with consultation about OHS hazards 
became less common, and advances made through union campaigns were diluted. 
44
 
While neo-liberalism informed the direction of labour market regulation under both 
Labor but more so conservative federal government in Australia, its ideological 
position which emphasised the individual as opposed to the collective, placed great 
weight on workers responsibility for health and safety, shifting focus away from 
employers. This construct percolated into state policy with respect to health and 
safety. 
45
 Although the NSW OHS legislation of 1983 and 2000 set out defined 
responsibilities for employers, there was an increasing trend in the media campaigns 
by WorkCover NSW to emphasise the common partnerships of workers and 
employers in the health and safety enterprise.
46
 These representations of health safety 
as a mutual responsibility reinforced the existing reluctance of some employers to 
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accept statutory responsibilities, arguing that poor workplace safety outcomes lie at 
the feet of unsafe, disobedient and irresponsible workers.
47
  
The State determines social policy through a variety of means depending on its 
particular political formation. The policies will reflect the interests of the dominant 
class in that society and there will be opportunities for other classes to act upon it, to 
a greater or lesser extent. For example, in the UK, it is argued that the New Labour 
administration of Tony Blair presided over a ‘continuing, regressive redistribution of 
wealth, income and life chances for most groups of people’48 as it embraced the neo-
liberal platform established by previous conservative governments. One outcome 
was the criminalising of behaviours and practices previously seen as anti social, 
deviant or simply undesirable, and laws were instituted for the benefit of community 
safety.
49
  
At the same time, this allowed the focus to be shifted away from those individuals 
and organisations engaged in corporate crime.
50
 The major events affecting most 
people in advanced capitalist societies are produced through an ‘increasingly 
complex state-corporate network’ 51  and harms need to be understood within the 
framework of public-private enterprise, characterised by adherence to free market 
policies and ‘small’ government. The state has always played a role in capitalist 
economies, of whatever form. The activities of states ‘are preconditions for the risk-
taking of entrepreneurs’52 Furthermore, they 
… help to constitute capital, commodity, commercial and residential property 
markets, produce different kinds of “human capital” and constitute labour 
markets, and regulate the employment contract. Further, the state plays a role in 
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constituting economic enterprises through specifying rules of liability and 
possibly specifying rules of incorporation.
53
  
Although seemingly to contradict the rhetoric of ‘free market’ ideology, the State 
therefore, is involved in all forms of market creation, development and coordination, 
and laws are crucial to these endeavours, not least of which is the regulation of health 
and safety. This in itself is a contested area, because the making of laws around OHS 
regulation is also subject to the dominant ideas of the time and not the least of these 
are social perceptions of the nature of OHS crimes and the ways in which OHS 
legislation is framed and then actioned by the state. 
When is a crime not a crime? When it is an OHS offence  
Kit Carson adopted the critical framework, which positions the State and politics as 
‘the sites for absorbing and trying to deal with the contradictions and crisis 
tendencies that Marxism diagnoses in capitalism.’ 54  The structural contradictions 
inherent in capitalism are reflected in the ambiguous response of regulators to white-
collar crime, and are predicaments that appear in the economic, political and 
administrative arenas.
55
 This ambiguity around perceptions of safety offences as 
criminal acts or regulatory infractions is evident in a Finnish study of police 
investigations into safety crimes.
56
 The researchers
57
 Alversalo and Whyte, showed 
how safety crimes are marginalised by the media, policy makers and academic 
research on crime and criminal justice. Corporate crimes are viewed as outside the 
scope of criminal law or are subject to lesser sanction. Safety crimes are not 
perceived as ‘real’ crimes and a number of assumptions underscore this perception. 
In the first place, health and safety crimes are constructed as ‘accidents’, wherein the 
notions of unforeseeability, unpreventability and unknowability are pre-eminent.
58
 
Secondly, it is seldom senior management or directors of corporations who are 
targeted as perpetrators, but rather workers lower in the organisational structure, who 
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may be blamed on account of their supposed incompetence or accident proneness. In 
the third place, safety crimes do not fit the picture of mainstream analyses of 
‘violence’ and the result is ‘that the dominant conceptions of violence imply inter-
personal as opposed to structural forms of violence, produced as a result of ongoing 
power relations’.59 The final point is that these assumptions lead workers and/or their 
families to believe that they are not victims of crime and thus they ‘may not demand 
a criminal justice response to their victimisation’.60  
There are some structural and procedural differences, but also similarities between 
the Finnish system and that in NSW. Firstly, the construction of safety crimes as 
accidents has some resonance, particularly as seen in Johnstone’s study of Victorian 
magistrates’ courts and almost certainly in popular thought. This thesis shows that 
corporations and employers are targeted for prosecution, with fewer examples of 
lower level managers being actioned against. This is probably because in the 
construction industry there are fewer layers of management, especially in the SME 
structures. Perceptions that OHS crimes do not fit the ‘violent crime’ model are 
common in Australia. Finally, if NSW workers are aware of their rights under OHS 
law (and not all are) then they understand that they do have recourse under relevant 
legislation, but whether most would see that as a ‘criminal justice response’ is 
unknown. However, in the unionised sectors of the construction industry, there is a 
greater awareness of employer duties and acknowledgment that legal sanctions can 
apply. At a local community level, there was resistance to the ideas of OHS ‘non-
crime’ through the formation of support groups in NSW and Victoria advocating for 
better state responses to workplace deaths and appropriate legal response to OHS 
crimes.
61
 
The legal principles of the need to establish a guilty mind (mens rea) and an intention 
to harm (actus reus) are central tenets in criminal law, giving primacy to the idea of 
motive, which is difficult to apply when considering offences caused by 
organisations. Inability to explore motives in the context of safety crimes makes it 
hard to see how the crime might fit with the ‘broader goals or aims of the employing 
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organisation that might be responsible for the crime’.62 Although cost and profit 
often feature as motives in safety offences, they remain in the ideological realm of 
non-crime, and are viewed consensually as ‘accidents’.63  The idea that financial 
pressures and profit maximisation are actually discovered as causes for industrial 
deaths in the New South Wales context is challenged in this thesis, as it is rarely, if 
ever, discussed in judgements of the industrial court.  
Financial crimes that ‘subvert’ market function threaten capitalism more so than 
other economic or corporate crimes, and so are subject to harsher penalties, including 
imprisonment.
64
 Alvesalo and Whyte believe safety crimes have fallen between the 
categories of violent crime and economic crime, despite the extensive social harms 
caused by them.
65
 Work safety offences in Finnish law are constituted as distinct 
criminal offences and violations of the regulations are considered criminal offences. 
However, the law only allows for the prosecution of individuals, not corporations, 
because the legislative process was unable to construct corporate fault. However, 
even if the principle of mens rea does not apply to corporations, sanctions can be 
applied to them in the absence of individual offenders being found.   
…if a safety crime is committed in the framework of a corporation… it is not 
possible to find the corporation guilty, but it is possible to impose a fine on it. 
This is an interesting and original formulation in the context of the ongoing 
preoccupation with the contradictions thrown up by concepts of corporate mens 
rea in many other jurisdictions. 
66
 
Here, the letter of the law can be applied flexibly in terms of liability of corporations 
and individuals and in determining the criminality of workplace safety violations. 
While the designation of workplace crime is unequivocal in Finland, and involves 
direct police presence, the contradiction is that police were not comfortable in 
criminalising health and safety offenders. In NSW, the criminal nature of the OHS 
legislation is nullified by its association with the regulator, that is, it is seen more in 
terms of rule breaking, than law breaking. A recent study of OHS prosecutions in 
NSW and Victoria found that, for many employers 
...prosecution was accompanied by disapproval and hostility at having their 
responsibility for the occurrence of a serious injury or death in their workplace 
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deemed a criminal offence for which they were directly culpable. In NSW, in 
particular, many were incredulous about the responsibility imposed on 
employers by OHS legislation and resented the court proceedings, judgements 
and fines that they were required to accept. 
67
 
These views were echoed more strongly by small employers who were ‘bewildered’ 
by being responsible for employees whom they thought of as negligent or 
incompetent, or that the incident was an act of fate.
68
 Small and some large 
employers believed that prevailing legislation and consequences were unjust and that 
they were deemed guilty from the start.69 Because they did not believe that their 
actions caused the incident, they rejected both responsibility and the ensuing 
criminality of the offences –how could they be criminals when there was no criminal 
intent on their part?
70
 Some of these opinions were voiced in a broadsheet column 
written soon after the election of the NSW conservative government in 2011. 
Cheering its victory, the columnist declared that WorkCover must be ‘truncated’, and 
that it, ‘working in tandem’ with the NSW IC, had delivered ‘bastard justice in case 
after case of wretched precedent.’ The statistics were ‘disgraceful’, with NSW 
having five times more prosecutions and convictions than other states’ and in NSW 
there was ‘a formal presumption of guilt for employers’.71 The State is interested is 
seeing a stable capitalist economy. It is not in its interests to criminalise productive 
capitalists, nor does it wish the flow of capital to be impeded. On the other hand, it 
must be seen to be protecting its workforce. This contradictory position results in 
ambiguity about the nature of crime and its application in the health and safety 
context. 
The classical theory of crime is one based on the notion of rationality and the rule of 
law. Crime is that which violates the law, and the rights of individuals. The focus of 
classical theory is on the criminal act, which is: 
...primarily a matter of making the wrong choice, by violating the 
law...[i]ndividuals are held to be responsible for their actions...[thus] crime is in 
essence a matter of free choice. The source of criminality lies within the 
rational, reasoning individual. Crime is the result of individuals either making a 
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calculated decision to do wrong (by weighing up the potential rewards and 
negative consequences) or engaging in what might be seen as irrational 
behaviour (by not using their reason adequately or properly). 
72
  
This definition does not sit well with health and safety crimes, as it places weight on 
the acts of the individual, giving rise to the principles of mens rea and actus reus. 
Health and safety crimes are usually the result of a multiplicity of causes, not all of 
them rational decisions, though employers will make choices based on their 
economic imperatives. 
Functionally, law may be seen as repressive, ideological and facilitative.
73
 In this 
formulation the repressive function is directed at the working class; the facilitative 
function aids the exchange of commodities and the maintenance of profit, through ‘ 
[F]ormal rationality, the contract and contractual freedoms...’ and capitalists are 
‘...given a framework...to orient their conduct’.74 Ideologically, there is an emphasis 
on freedom and equality for all, if the rule of law is to be obeyed,
75
 a notion that is 
consistent with neo-liberal ideology. However, the bourgeois State cannot simply 
direct all its repressive power at the working class and in fact does act against 
capitalists through laws designed to protect capitalists’ interest, or more correctly, 
different fractions of capital. This seeming contradiction is seen in laws pertaining to 
the environment, anti-monopoly laws and health and safety, because within an 
economically competitive framework, they ensure a ‘level playing field’ for 
capitalism by weeding out undercutting firms, that is those entities that either drive 
down profit or threaten the ‘good character’ of capitalist activity.  
The interest of traditional criminologists in attempting to explain the behaviours of 
the ‘lowest classes’ overlooked hegemonic interests. It took a challenge to colleagues 
by an influential American academic, Edwin Sutherland,
76
 in 1939 to spark a focus 
on white-collar crime or corporate crime. Fifty years later, an American conflict 
theorist, William Chambliss,
77
 focused on the problem of ‘state-organised crime’. 
Thus, for the United States, it was only relatively recently that attention was turned 
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to crimes falling outside the province of the ‘usual suspects’, drawn mainly from the 
working class and the lumpenproletariat. Since then, other criminology theorists have 
contributed to the discussion. These included perspectives from radical, neo-
Marxists, critical, left realists and feminist writers.
78
  
Whereas accepted forms of regulation and conventional criminological theory are 
informed by causal relationships between sanctions and resulting effects, critical 
criminology takes its epistemological stance from a number of different radical 
approaches. In defining crime, it focuses on ‘structural forms of oppression’, such as 
that engendered by race, gender, class. Its focus of analysis is on the state, ideology 
and political economy, and has demonstrated the harms caused by the powerful, such 
as white-collar and corporate crime. ‘A consistent focus of this research has been to 
label these acts criminal, and to call for their inclusion as quintessentially criminal 
acts, to be dealt with accordingly’.79 Are ‘crimes’ only those things which have been 
successfully prosecuted? If an offender is not found out, has the offence been 
committed, or is it just that a criminal has not been found and convicted? In 2004, 
Tombs noted that there were more than one million workplace injuries sustained 
annually by British workers and approximately 1,000 prosecutions successfully taken 
against offenders, a statistic that raises questions about the discourse surrounding 
‘crime’ and ‘criminality’. Did the other non-prosecuted injuries arise in the absence 
of any other agents or cause? Were there no criminal acts associated with the 
injuries? If the injuries were, for example, by incidents involving modes of transport, 
with a similar lack of prosecution, would they be seen as falling outside the realm of 
the criminal? The differences found in prosecution in the British workplace data, 
have conceptual, theoretical and political implications insofar as how such data can 
be conceptualised.
80
  
Another problem that arises in cases of health and safety crimes is the concept of the 
guilty mind (mens rea) in its importance as a test of criminal intent. It is usually, but 
not exclusively, applied to the individual. In some case, the failure to act is 
blameworthy and can be counted as a crime, however it is arguable that this and 
                                                 
78
 Freidrichs D, Schwartz M. ‘Editors’ introduction: on social harm and a twenty first century 
criminology’.  Crime, Law and Social Change (2007) Vol.48, 1-7  
79
 See especially Tombs S and Whyte D, Safety Crimes, (Willan Publishing, 2007).  
80
 Hillyard and Tombs above, note 53 at 13. 
 71 
other tests of criminality are an ‘artifice’.81One cannot read another’s mind and 
therefore cannot judge their intent. Therefore, this occurs through proxy, where the 
person’s behaviour is examined and assumptions are made about the likely actions of 
an idealised person. The complexity of the law in terms of defining crime has an 
‘individualising effect’ extending ‘beyond the notion of intent per se’. Citing 
examples of prosecutions for corporate manslaughter where intent is not at issue, 
Tombs and Hillyard argue that this individualising ethos has ‘militated against 
successful prosecutions’ and that manslaughter charges have then been raised against 
individuals involved in the incidents, but employed at a lower corporate level.
82
 
Reiman
83
 draws a comparison between the motives and moral culpability of the 
intentional murderer and the ‘indirect harms’ inflicted by the ‘absentee killer’ whose 
acts of omission (failure to invest in safe equipment, for example) or commission 
(falsifying documents, illegal environmental acts and so on) result in fatal incidents. 
Most people who murder intentionally focus on one or more individuals, with no 
intention to harm others. The corporation and /or its representatives who murder in 
absentia and the individual who murders intentionally have different and distinct 
moral culpabilities. The corporate killer does not seek to harm particular persons, but 
knows that the consequences of their actions would/could be fatal to someone, who, 
once harmed, becomes someone in particular. ‘There is no moral basis for treating 
one-on-one harms as criminal and indirect harm as merely regulatory’. 84 By doing 
so, the corporate killer poses more of a generalised threat than the intentional 
murderer does and indifference can be seen as culpable as or more culpable than 
intention and should be treated as such by the criminal justice system. ‘Yet the 
greater moral culpability that is attached both legally and popularly to acts of 
intention can also allow those implicated in corporate crimes to rationalise away the 
consequences of their actions’.85  
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‘Harms’ rather than ‘crimes’? 
It was within the frame of a revitalised critical criminology that calls for thinking 
about a broader approach to social harms were examined. Social harm theory had its 
genesis in UK theorists’ critique of the discipline of criminology and the approach 
that the majority of criminologists took in their writings. Specifically, social harm 
theorists argued that critical criminology, with its emphasis on a functionalist 
epistemology and questioning of socio-political agendas was past, and that the 
discipline had returned to ‘its old empiricist orientation as an applied science’ with 
agendas set by contemporary political imperatives and economics.
86
 Orthodox 
criminology, the argument goes, is an intellectual discipline whose view is ‘distorted 
and distorting’, because it ignores so much of the damaging and destructive harms 
wrought on people by the state, by economies, religions and social structures and 
concentrates instead on what are trivial harms. It will remain a ‘suspect discipline’ 
while it concentrates on matters defined hegemonically by nation states, the 
organisations which cause the majority of social harms.
87
  
On the other hand, unlike criminology, ‘social harm... provides a theoretical 
framework for examining the effects of unintended harms…’ 88  Furthermore, an 
analysis shaped by the theoretical frame of political economy could uncover the 
harms caused by neo-liberal globalisation that is characterised by concentrations of 
economic power, increasing de-regulation, and hegemonic control. Essentially, this 
approach took a broader view than ‘standard’ criminology, in that it scrutinised the 
social, political, economic and cultural landscapes in which ‘crime’ in its many 
guises, was situated. In this regard, the approach is not novel, being one that critical 
sociologists have long recognised, for example, Carson’s 1982 study of health and 
safety in the offshore oil industry was couched in a multi-disciplinary framework of 
sociology, safety science, corporate crime and regulatory analysis.
89
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Hillyard and Tombs
90
 argue that many are harmed in differing ways throughout their 
life through local and State activities and through corporations (inadequate housing, 
food or health provision, poverty, human rights violations and victimisation). A 
social harm approach examines ‘deleterious’ actions towards differing social groups, 
or even differing geographic locations, and does not merely focus on the individual, a 
tendency in orthodox criminology. Social harm encompasses physical harm, (death 
or serious injury through numerous causes, including workplace deaths); financial 
harms (poverty fraud, misappropriation of funds and so on). Emotional and 
psychological harms are more difficult to quantify, but evidence exists to 
demonstrate that these harms, in particular contexts, are ‘significant’.91 This evidence 
is reinforced by recent Australian studies on families affected by workplace 
traumatic injury. Workplace deaths deprive family, friends and the wider social 
networks of a participant and social affiliate. Importantly, the deceased immediate 
family often suffer ongoing, intergenerational harm through psychological and 
economic privation. Psychological harm may also be experienced through the state’s 
inadequate handling of the case, as well as the resulting measures (prosecutions, 
penalties) being seen as less than delivering justice for the offence.
92
 A social harm 
approach can reveal aspects of cumulative damage and such a perspective is 
significant for this thesis, in that it can situate these impacts within a new framework 
for dealing with occupational fatalities. 
Social harm theory can chart and compare social harms temporally, like crime, but 
unlike orthodox criminological studies, it can generate comparisons with other 
harmful events, such as that caused by adverse social policies.
93
 ‘A comparative and 
broader picture would allow a more adequate understanding of the relative 
significance of the harms faced by different groups of individuals’. 94  Thus, if 
workplace fatalities and injuries were to be viewed in this light, focus can be turned 
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on persistent events, rather than isolated occurrences, which could throw light on 
endemic unsafe and illegal practices. A broader understanding of social phenomena 
could generate the production of more rational social and regulatory policies. 
Although such policies could be beneficial to states (as well as individuals), Hillyard 
and Tombs warn that they could also pose a potential threat to states, as their 
activities (or lack thereof) could be then seen as sources of harm.
95
 A study of harm 
can also broaden the scope of investigations into what caused the harm, moving from 
‘individualistic notions of responsibility or proxy measures of intent’ (mens rea) 
which are demanded by the process of criminal justice. Instead a focus on harms ‘... 
allows consideration of corporate and collective responsibility’96 and can also turn 
attention to state responsibilities. 
There is a disjuncture between the individualist approaches taken to offences by 
mainstream criminal justice systems and attempts to prosecute those cases where the 
individual is subsumed by the collective actions of a corporation or state. Thus, 
...we have here attempts to squeeze into a discipline organised around 
individualistic notions of actions and intention harms – both chronic and acute- 
caused by routine practices, Standard Operating Procedures, lines of 
organisational responsibility and accountability, general modus operandi, 
cultures of fear, indifference and thoughtlessness and so on, on the part of 
bureaucratic entities which are not reducible to the actions, motive and 
intentions of the individual human agents who constitute them. 
97
. 
The effect, insofar as prosecutions for workplace health and safety offences are 
concerned, is that the harm caused by the company per se may go unpunished and 
better deterrent policies may remain unexamined and unexplored. 
Proponents of social harm theory are well aware of the political cast of their view. 
They see the perspective as one that can move from the academic into the realm of 
praxis- ‘a field of study with clear humanistic concerns at its core’ which will be 
better able to ‘document and intervene within the harmful organization of capitalist 
society’, to ‘provide analyses and articulate challenges to the systemic harm 
produced by this mode of organisation’.98 Whether or not criminology as a discipline 
stands or falls, is not the subject of inquiry here. Rather, it is argued that the concept 
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of social harm couched as it is in the discourse of critical sociology, is considered to 
be a constructive way of considering the role of the state and its apparatus (law, 
courts, justice systems) in relation to its treatment of workplace death, punishments 
and deterrent effectiveness.  
Does self-regulation really regulate? 
The dominant ideology of neo-liberalism sat comfortably with the individualist 
tenets of self regulation and self determination inherent in Robens’ approach to OHS 
introduced in Australia in the early 1980’s and which underpinned the New South 
Wales Occupational Health and Safety Acts of 1983 and 2000. It was based on the 
premise that the main elements of protection against workplace harms are the 
responsibility of employers and employees, with the State playing a lesser role. As 
Tombs 
99
 points out, an ‘enormous onus’ is placed on the power relations between 
labour and capital at the level of both the workplace and in policy making. In the 
former, power principally resides in the presence and strength of trade unions, and in 
the latter, although policy is formulated through a tripartite structure (as it is in 
Australia), the inherent conservatism of the policy makers tends towards an employer 
centred approach. This was especially noticeable when the Australian federal 
Liberal-National Party government downgraded worker representation on its national 
health and safety body in 2005.
100
  
Self-regulation is also based on ‘credible’ enforcement techniques, which should 
employ sanctions on escalating severity where required, that is, a principle of 
deterrence should apply. However, credibility is the key point here; the state must 
maintain a minimum level of control and inspection to ensure that compliance is 
enforced and that faith in the system is maintained by those with most to lose, 
employees. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) increasingly called for 
movements ‘away from external control’ or intervention by the state authorities’.101 
According to Tombs, the HSE was inconsistent in its application of enforcement, 
investigation and prosecution measures; there were substantial numbers of cases 
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which were not investigated; three quarters of ‘near misses’ were not investigated, a 
fact at odds with the HSE’s stated aim of preventing injury and disease. Moreover, 
financial restraints made the prioritisation of activities very difficult, for example, 
increased investigations led to decreased inspection rates that is, resources were 
shifted to investigation and away from inspection.
102
  
Pearce and Tombs
103
 believe that companies are ineffective self-regulators in the 
occupational health and safety context. They argue that OHS regulators were 
established precisely because industry was incapable of self-regulation. Further, 
under conservative governments in both the US and UK, the incidence of 
occupational serious injury and death rose in both countries. This occurred in the 
context of wider deregulatory and neo-liberal policies and was a ‘key element in the 
shifting balance of power among capital, regulators and labour…’104 Moreover these 
scholars noted: 
Where pressures upon corporations …to attend to occupational safety are 
weakened, performance…deteriorates. [Though] calls for greater self-regulation 
continue to be articulated [this] says less about the efficacy of self-regulation, 
more about the class and social power of corporate capital.
105
  
Does self-regulation deter offenders? 
In considering whether self-regulation as perceived by Robens is effective, some 
mention of ‘classical’ deterrence theory is necessary. In 1985, Braithwaite 106 
proposed a ‘compliance’ pyramid, as a means of enforcing regulatory controls. Most 
regulatory action aimed at persuasion formed the pyramid’s base. If persuasion 
failed, the non-complier was to be warned in writing. If compliance was still not 
forthcoming, a civil penalty would be applied. The next escalation was to criminal 
prosecution, then to shutdown of the operation or temporary suspension of a license 
to operate and finally permanent licence suspension. Braithwaite’s argument was that 
regulators would be less likely to resort to the most punitive sanctions. Although 
Pearce and Tombs
107
 are essentially in agreement with a model of escalating 
punishment, they doubt that companies will self-regulate, arguing that lesser scrutiny 
                                                 
102
 Ibid at 174. 
103
 Pearce and Tombs above, note 24. 
104
 Ibid at 88. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Braithwaite, V and Braithwaite, J. (n.d.) ‘An evolving compliance model for tax enforcement’. 
http:/www.vab.anu.edu/pubs/1/anevolvingcompliance.pdf (14/9/09).  
107
 Pearce and Tombs above, note 103 at 97. 
 77 
of organisations leads to lesser compliance. McQueen
108
 is more scathing in his 
rejection of the ‘gentle pyramid of penalties’ as a means of giving employers the 
‘space to exercise virtue’, as capitalists have had more than enough time to 
understand and observe their lawful (and indeed, social) obligations. 
Furthermore, Braithwaite’s proposals that regulators should move to goal oriented 
rather than prescriptive legislation (as is the case in Australia) has not resulted in 
greater levels of compliance. Goal based regulation has two disadvantages. It enables 
individual corporations to argue for the lowest standards and secondly, it enables 
trade associations ‘to impose definitions of what constitutes feasible compliance’.109 
Once prescriptive legislation is removed, and replaced by goal-oriented 
requirements, such as those tied to notions of reasonable practicality, then it lays the 
field open to ‘direct contest by powerful corporate actors’.110  
One rationale for a regime based on self-regulation is that is consumes minimal 
scarce State resources, it may appeal to the ‘better nature of people’, and self-
regulation strategies provide incentives to industry to show ‘good faith’.111 However, 
this tactic must be reinforced with realistic penalties, because minor infringement 
notices and low penalties are not likely to encourage compliance. Hopkins argues 
Braithwaite’s persuasion model is ‘class biased’, commenting ‘who ever heard of 
police trying to persuade conventional criminals to become law abiding citizens!’112 
It is not just the ‘class biased’ nature of Braithwaite’s analysis that is in question 
here. Hopkins argues that the ‘synergy’ between productivity and safety is finely 
balanced. If certain safety measures initially result in lower productivity, the firm 
might choose to increase profit by increasing labour. This in turn would mean that 
more workers are exposed to hazards, or there is more labour output from the 
existing labour force, thus rendering the workplace less safe. Employers can then be 
in a position where their decision ‘…places a morally acceptable limit on the extent 
to which safety should be allowed to interfere with productivity’.113 According to 
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Ellis, companies in Australia are increasingly outsourcing their OHS obligations, 
rather than maintaining in house OHS practitioners. Combined with decreases in 
unionisation, this is an ominous situation for workers, as the influence of the 
employer, is left unchecked.
114
 The ideological and economic environment in which 
health and safety is played out is not, and cannot be, one that provides equal 
outcomes for employers and employees. 
The social, political and economic conditions relevant to the construction industry 
were discussed in the preceding chapter and this thesis shows that the numbers of 
workplace fatalities have remained relatively constant over time, with some recent 
increases in numbers of traumatic deaths, which raises questions about the 
effectiveness of deterrence in the construction industry. The activities that lead to 
occupational health and safety crimes are usually produced by the ongoing 
conditions of work and thus their detection and correction should be less arduous 
than policing one off crimes, for example street crimes. However, successful 
detection is reliant on sufficient resources and neo-liberalism is characterised by 
‘small government’ policies. In practice, this is manifest by diminution of state 
resources for inspection and prosecuting OHS offences. Seen another way, self-
regulation is less of a drain on state resources, therefore the regulatory agency 
require fewer of them.  
In the UK, deterrence, both specific and general, has had a bearing on improvements 
to workplace health and safety.
115
 Pearce and Tombs noted that ‘…some 
corporations have urged the operationalisation of this principle as central to their 
demands for the equalisation of the conditions of competition’ 116  which is an 
especially important factor in the highly competitive environment of the Australian 
construction industry. Thus, they are not necessarily opposed to deterrence as long as 
it does not harm their competitive advantage. Corporations also acknowledge that 
regulation and deterrent measures are a necessity in enforcing compliance, as 
voluntary compliance would not be forthcoming. Corporations are economic 
rationalists, as well as being ‘amoral calculators’117 and as such, are likely to comply 
with effective forms of deterrence, as these are part of their ‘conditions of existence’. 
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In other words, ‘the existence of a likelihood of detection and credible sanctions 
following successful prosecutions makes it possible for corporations to obey the 
law’. 118 
Deterrence can also assist those who work for safety within the corporation, giving 
them a voice that is frequently overlooked by senior management, and in this sense, 
it can be ‘facilitative and productive’119 rather than being perceived negatively. It is 
not, however, sufficient to rely solely on deterrent mechanisms. Companies may not 
act ‘rationally’ and other controls need to be in place. It is not so much the actions of 
individual capitalists that shape the nature of OHS regulation, but rather the 
projection by the State of a hegemonic ideology that confuses the place and status of 
OHS harms that prevails. This in turn has implications for the way in which the 
activities or behaviours that produce them are dealt with. This thesis shows that 
deterrence, both specific and general, has not appeared to be effective in reducing 
workplace traumatic mortality in the NSW construction industry, because the 
physical mechanisms of death remain as ongoing causative factors.  
The argument of criminal deterrence theorists rests on the idea that punishment 
should fit the crime such that it satisfies community values about justice, fairness and 
due process. Crime will be reduced if there is a high probability of conviction and if 
the severity of the punishment is seen to be adequate, with the certainty of 
punishment being more important than severity.  
As Kennedy
120
 puts it, the implicit promise of deterrence is that a crime-free society 
will be attained ‘provided that the right combination of law enforcement techniques 
and tools are employed’. The ‘economic model of the rational actor’ stems from 
Jeremy Bentham’s beliefs about the conscious rational decisions made by the 
actor/individual. Putting a cost-benefit analysis in place would allow the actor to 
decide whether or not the action would be undertaken, that is, would the risk be 
worth it, in effect. In reality, this is precisely what occurs in modern OHS risk 
assessment, where the risk of harm is weighed against the cost of control measures. 
As noted above, adherents to the criminal deterrence model of utility maximisation 
are of the view that crime decreases in inverse proportion to the probability of 
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conviction or severity of punishment, with probability being seen as more important 
than severity. ‘[S]everity only has a deterrent impact when the certainty level is high 
enough to make severity salient’.121 Certainty of punishment is a better deterrent than 
severity of punishment.  
The question remains, however, whether objective certainty is critical to 
deterrence, or whether subjective certainty suffices. Researchers agree that the 
effectiveness of deterrence depends more on the perception of certainty than on 
the objective reality of certainty. Some, however, contend that no punishment 
can deter unless the punishment is perceived as being severe. But again, the 
perception of risk more than the actual risk seems to be important, and the 
subjective probability of punishment is a greater deterrent than its subjective 
unpleasantness.
122
  
In addition to the notions of certainty and severity, deterrent effectiveness also 
requires that the threat is credible and capable of being communicated. In other 
words the potential offenders need to believe that punishment will be forthcoming, 
and the message must be clearly conveyed. ‘Personal experience and police presence 
apparently have the greatest impact on perception of credibility’.123 The ‘objective 
probability of apprehension’ is enhanced by the numbers of enforcers present, as well 
as increasing the ‘perceived credibility’ of threat in those who have personally 
experienced arrest. 
124
 However, if the offender believes that punishment will not be 
forthcoming because of the inability or unwillingness of the legal system to impose 
the sanction, then it will neither act as a deterrent or will minimise the potency of the 
threat. This result ‘…is even more probable if short or otherwise lenient sentences 
frequently are imposed on offenders…’125 Proponents of deterrence believe that it is 
effective where the credibility of the regulator is high and where a sound basis for the 
punishment is given.  
Deterrence might fail if social conditions are such that the transmission or reception 
of the message is undermined. Personal experience may undermine the intention of 
the message if it is in opposition to one’s own experience, for example, where 
publicity campaigns are not followed through with the publicised punishments. In 
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these cases, ‘...Publicity without substance may decrease the general credibility of 
law enforcement threats’126  
 ... deterrence is based on the psychological assumption that the subjective 
certainty and unpleasantness of punishment discourages the community from 
engaging in criminal behaviour. The social stigma attached to a conviction is 
part of the punishment and, in some instances, may have a greater deterrent 
effect than the term of imprisonment itself.
127 
 
Nonetheless, critics argue that the ‘rational actor’ economic model on which it is 
based is unrealistic, in that it supposes that actors always behave rationally.
128
 While 
some crimes might be impulsively committed (and therefore deemed irrational), 
others may still be committed but with careful planning and forethought (thus 
making them rational, as with some corporate crimes for example. Ponzi schemes). 
In this sense, strong commitment to the commission of the illegal act is not likely to 
be deterred by threats of punishment.  
Kennedy
129
 argues that, at least for the early 1980’s, deterrence theory has not been 
proved to be successful, yet continues to be promoted. Then, as now, the increased 
numbers of prisoners in the general prison system testifies to the theory’s impotence. 
Another obstacle to the effectiveness of deterrence is its lack of a ‘sound moral 
foundation’.  By this, Kennedy130 means the ‘social legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system’. In researching the effects of deterrence, the empiricist instrumental 
methodology used by deterrence theorists does not account for the effects of the 
broader socio-political environment on actors, nor does it employ a moral dimension. 
In this way deterrence theory can be associated with excessive punishment regimes, 
such as mandatory sentencing for relatively minor offences and capital punishment, 
and it must also be based on a ‘deliberate threat of harm’. 131  The model is 
paradoxical in that the deterrent effect is removed once the crime is committed. That 
is, the threat of punishment has failed to deter the commission of the offence, the 
crime cannot be undone by punishment and therefore ‘judges may be inclined to 
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impose less punishment than the legislatively authorized maximum because the 
benefit to society ‘…appears to have diminished’.132   
This has been demonstrated in sentencing practices for OHS breaches
133
 and 
although judges in the NSW IC subscribed to the principle of general and specific 
deterrence and specifically addressed penalties to those principles, penalties 
remained low. The paradoxical nature of deterrence is shown in that persons who are 
the least deterred are the ones who most need deterring, and vice versa. 
134
The 
chances of discovery of illegal actions are as important as the offender’s reactions to 
discovery. Compliance is a doubtful outcome if offenders are not remorseful and if 
they displace responsibility by blaming others for the incident.
135
 Deterrence is 
‘...based on a narrow theory of motivation.’136 The offender is punished through 
‘manipulating’ his/her environment, through ‘gains and losses’, but this ignores the 
person’s internal values, which differ from self-interest.137  
Do people obey the law because of the perceived respect and legitimacy of the social 
order? If this is so, theorists could concentrate more on methods to strengthen this 
perspective in those inclined to criminal behaviour. ‘[E]xperience suggests that 
perhaps most members of society are law abiding because they recognise the benefit 
of social order and not because they fear apprehension and punishment for the 
violations of the criminal law’.138 It is arguable that in the case of workplace health 
and safety offences, there is rarely an actual intent to do harm. For the construction 
industry, fatalities occur in the context of an extremely complex economic, social 
and political environment that determines health and safety outcomes for the 
workforce. The thesis returns to matters of deterrence in the following Chapters, 
where Court considerations of general and specific deterrence are discussed, and 
questions raised about the effectiveness of sanctions imposed under them. 
This discussion has emphasised the contradictions faced by the State and the State 
ideological apparatus of the OHS regulator, the courts and judiciary, in its attempts to 
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balance the opposing interests of labour and capital. This is not a straightforward 
process and sometimes alliances are formed between different fractions of capital 
and labour, for example, the construction union may move against corporate capital 
to protect the interest of small sub-contractors; small business may group together 
against the State and big capital, and so on. The existence of different fractions in the 
State make it hard to conceptualise, because of the independence of these fractions. 
However, in the last analysis, the State and its institutions still reflects the interests 
and ideas of the dominant ideology and in this case, it is the ideology of neo-
liberalism.  
Based on neo-classical economics, the ideological positions of neo-liberalism saw 
movements toward de-regulation, which assisted in weakening the strength of 
organised labour, and, in turn, reduced unions’ ability to protect workers’ rights, 
including OHS protections. Although there was an historical resistance to seeing 
OHS crime as criminal conduct, business associations and sections of the media 
became more vocal in condemning OHS laws in NSW as too onerous and unfair. The 
incapacity of classical criminology to capture the essence of white-collar crime, and 
perhaps particularly OHS crime, caused contradictions in its regulation. That is, what 
is criminal conduct is regulated through laws administered not by the police, but by a 
statutory authority. The disjuncture between mainstream legal approaches to acts of 
individuals (‘standard’ criminal action) and to those of corporate entities makes for 
an uneasy fit, and contributes to the notions of OHS offences as not criminal. It is 
possible that these underlying ideas were partly responsible for the imposition of low 
penalties and no penal sentences for OHS crimes heard in the NSW IC that are 
revealed in Chapter Four. Researchers have proposed alternative models for thinking 
about crime and deterrence and social harm theory is one that is very appropriate in 
considering OHS crime, as it encompasses the broad range of harms caused by 
workplace fatalities. An understanding and acknowledgment of the physical, 
psychological and economic harms caused by these incidents would enable a broader 
research perspective than is currently the case in mainstream regulatory theory and 
that recognises the essential inequalities in capitalist societies.   
The regulation of health and safety in NSW since 1983 has played a part in de-
regulatory and self-regulatory environments. The State has mediated the demands of 
capital and labour, with both sides gaining advantages when either Labor or 
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conservative governments have been in power. That is, each side has made some 
gains, for example by increasing penalties or removing the absolute care provisions 
on employers, but there has no change to the essential regime where the ambiguous 
criminal nature of workplace injury remains fixed. 
However, neither side has completely captured the agenda, and the State has ensured 
that what it sees as the economic imperative of the moment is satisfied. That is ‘class 
struggle is reproduced within the state apparatus itself’. The State is a factor of class 
cohesion and the state maintains the ‘cohesion and form’ of the capitalist class.139 
Accordingly, the state cannot be an instrument of one particular class. Rather, it 
operates to represent the long-term interest of the capitalist class as a whole, under 
the hegemony of one of its fraction, which is monopoly capitalism. 
The elements that make up the model in Chapter One shows the dynamic movement 
within and between the institutions of worker organisations, the legislature, the 
regulator, and the judiciary which were mediated through ideology, and its central 
driver, the capitalist economy. It does so to show how behaviours that contributed to 
death at work were contested, and to demonstrate the ‘war of position’ that occurred 
among different political and civil elements of the State over workers’ rights to safe 
and healthy workplaces.  
The literature on crime reviewed here suggests that activities and behaviours are 
examined in terms of commissions rather than omissions. Health and safety offences 
are caused by omissions – failure to act in specific and defined ways to ensure the 
health, safety and welfare of persons at a workplace. By concentrating attention on 
those specifics, the broader causes of workplace deaths in the construction industry 
are ‘silenced’. The circumstances are individualised rather than contextualised. This 
thesis argues that the decontextualisation of events surrounding workplace traumatic 
deaths at the point of prosecution is driven by the perception that OHS offences are 
regulatory rather than criminal. Other factors are due to the ways in which the events 
are ‘pulverised’ during the court proceedings and the system of regulatory and 
judicial rules governing prosecutions. These features result in the imposition of low 
penalties and judgements are unable to explicate the wider social harms that these 
offences cause.  
                                                 
139
 Pitelis on Gramsci in Pitelis C ‘On the Nature of the Capitalist State, Review of Political Economy, 
(1994)Vol. 6, No.1:72-105 at 89. 
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The deterrence literature suggests that predictability of prosecution is more important 
than severity from offenders’ perspectives. This thesis argues that that employer 
actions (or inactions) related to workplace fatalities in the construction industry are 
not particularly influenced by predictability of punishment (because offenders do not 
see themselves as possessing a guilty mind), nor of its severity (because of the low 
penalties imposed, or in a few cases, the non-imposition of penalty). This in itself 
reflects the ambiguous treatment of activities that lead to injury and illness at work.  
This chapter sets out the conceptual basis for the State as represented in the model 
seen in Chapter 1. The dominant or current ideology that provides some unity in state 
action has been described as neo-liberalism, which influences, but does not 
determine the shape and nature of state activity. The way that OHS has been framed 
in this ideological context shapes the approach adopted by particular institutions, that 
is the judiciary, regulator, legislature, industrial organisations, and impacts on actual 
regulation that constrains their activities. The following chapters take up the actual 
outcomes by examining particular institutions, that is, the judiciary and regulator in 
Chapters Four, Five and Six and returns to re-address the industrial context in 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Empirical Findings and Judicial Sentencing 
The end of punishment, therefore, is no other, than to prevent the criminal from 
doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like 
offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought 
to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impression on the 
minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal.
1
  
Part 1 of this chapter presents the analysis of the empirical data collection relating to 
127 decisions of the NSW IC from 1988 to 2008 in relation to the industrial deaths of 
76 building workers. It confirms conclusions drawn from previous studies that show 
penalties imposed by courts for workplace deaths are low in comparison to 
maximum available penalties. Part 2 begins to identify reasons for these lenient 
penalties by describing the social rules and social norms which affect and influence 
judges and their decisions in the general courts, particularly the District and Supreme 
Courts, but which can be extrapolated to the NSW IC.  This discussion is further 
advanced in Chapter Five, where the argument is situated at the level of State 
structures and State apparatus.  
Existing studies of penalties 
Studies have shown that the average penalties imposed by courts in cases where a 
breach of legal obligation has been found to have led to workplace fatalities or 
injuries, are well below the maximum allowable. This thesis shows that the same 
conclusion can be drawn in regard to prosecution penalty outcomes for traumatic 
injury fatalities in the NSW construction industry. Richard Johnstone’s extensive 
historical work examining OHS prosecutions for injury and death in Victoria
2
 
demonstrated that, between 1900-1919, the fines imposed for all prosecutions in the 
magistrates’ courts averaged 25 per cent of the maximum fine and in the following 
                                                 
1
 Cesare Beccaria (1767) quoted in White R and Haines F, Crime and Criminology (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) at 30.  
2
 Johnstone, R  Safety, courts and crime, Working Paper 6, National Research Centre for OHS 
Regulation ANU (2002) 
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six decades, averaged between 10 and 15 per cent of the maxima. The average fine 
imposed by the Victorian magistrates’ courts for all offences during the 1980s and 
1990s was just over 21 per cent of the maximum available fine. The data in the 
following section demonstrates that penalties for workplace fatalities in the NSW 
construction industry from 1988 to 2008 were less than those for all offences in the 
Victorian context.  
Fooks, Bergman and Rigby
3
 considered intervention and sentencing strategies used 
by some international state bodies to ensure compliance with health and safety laws.
4
 
Using statistics on fines for industrial fatalities compiled by the NSW Judicial 
Commission, the report found that penalties under OSHA 1983 were consistent with 
those found in the other jurisdictions studied, and, as Table 4.1 below shows, the 
majority of penalties were markedly below the maxima possible.  
Table 4.1. Percentage of penalty amounts in fatality decisions, NSW OSHA 1983.
5
 
Per cent of decisions Per cent of maximum penalty 
23 per cent 5 per cent or less 
48 per cent 10 per cent or less 
75 per cent 20 per cent or less 
9 per cent 50 per cent or more 
No cases 80 per cent or  more  
Fooks at al. report that the average amount of fines for workplace death in NSW 
during 1996-2005 was $16,934. They believe this ‘under-sentencing’ can be 
explained by courts’ reluctance to ‘radically’ increase penalties on appeal, and 
WorkCover NSW ‘lack of urgency’ to extend opportunities to victims’ families to 
make victim impact statements.
6
  
In a 2004 advisory report to WorkCover NSW, McCallum et al
7
 analysed 225 court 
decisions for workplace fatalities, from 1983 to 2003, and reported that, in most 
cases, the penalties for all NSW workplace fatalities ranged from 10 per cent to 20 
                                                 
3
  Fooks, G,  Bergman D, and Rigby B, ,International comparison of (a) techniques used by state 
bodies to obtain compliance with health and safety law and accountability for administrative and 
criminal offences and (b) sentences for criminal offences, Report to the UK Health and Safety 
Executive, Centre for Corporate Accountability, (London: HSE Books, 2007). 
4
 Jurisdictions observed for the study were the USA; Canada: Australia; the Netherlands: Germany: 
Italy: Sweden (only some jurisdictions were observed for the first three countries). 
5
 Fooks above, note 3 at 369. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 McCallum R, Hall P, Hatcher A and Searle A. Advice in relation to workplace death, occupational 
health and safety legislation and other matters, Report to WorkCover Authority of NSW (WorkCover 
Authority of New South Wales, 2004) at 7. 
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per cent of the maximum allowable. They also found that actual penalties had not 
increased proportionally to the statutory increases, and it was ‘apparent’ that 
WorkCover NSW and the community were concerned about a ‘pattern of lenient 
sentencing’.8 The Report of the 2006 Statutory Review of the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 2000 (the Stein Report) 
9
 found that, in 2005, the average fine for 
offences against the general duty of care provision (s8) was $25,000 and that 
between 1999 and 2004, 79% of cases incurred penalties of 20 per cent or less than 
the maximum. Notwithstanding the significant increase in maximum penalties in 
2006, the proportion of penalties that were less than 20 per cent and 50 per cent of 
the maximum actually increased.
10
 McCallum et al noted that ‘...even in cases where 
all or nearly all of the most serious objective factors are present, the penalties 
awarded are still nowhere near the maximum’.11  
In 2006 when penalties in the OHSA 2000 were increased, the President of the NSW 
IC said that the intention of the enabling legislation was to ensure that courts would 
‘sharply’ increase sentencing patterns, however, the Court of Criminal Appeal later 
said that increases in maximum penalties would not ‘...automatically mean that all 
penalties to be imposed ...should increase by the same proportion as the increase in 
the maximum.’12 In its deliberations on an environmental matter, the Court said, in 
part 
It remains necessary to address the facts of the particular case, with due regard 
to the current maximum penalty and the seriousness of the offence and to the 
need for deterrence thereby indicated together with all other relevant matters.
13
 
McCallum et al argue that though each case should be judged on its merits, it 
remains the fact that the maximum penalties for OHS offences have increased 
fourfold since 1983, and that the intent of the legislation must be that penalties 
should ‘very significantly increase’. 14  The authors point out that the ‘essential 
purpose’ of penalties for OHS offences is that of general deterrence. For workplace 
deaths, the authors doubt that this has been achieved, and state that for the decade 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 WorkCover Authority of New South Wales, ‘Report of the 2006 Statutory Review of the NSW 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000’,(WorkCover NSW Publication No.5625) at16. 
10
 McCallum et al above, note 7 at 8. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid at 9. 
14
 Ibid. 
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prior to the issuing of their report in 2004, convictions for workplace deaths have 
remained reasonably constant. Thus, it can be said that general deterrence is failing. 
Given that offences under the occupational health and safety legislation are 
generally a result of individual negligence or systemic dysfunction (or a 
combination of both), then deterrence ought to be much more effective in this 
area than in the area of deliberate criminal behaviour.
15
 
The pattern of sentencing for OHS matters ‘...is indicative of the inherent difficulty 
associated with assessing the appropriate penalty for a strict liability offence, where 
conviction is not the result of individual criminal liability in the normally-understood 
sense.’16 The Report recommended that members of the IRC in Court Session receive 
more statutory guidance in sentencing procedures when considering OHS offences.
17
 
Other advice considered the merits of instituting a new offence pertaining to 
workplace deaths; which were the appropriate courts to hear OHS offence matters 
and appeals; and, if the law relating to the duties of directors and managers should be 
enhanced.
18
   
Following the Report, in 2006, amendments to the OHSA 2000 saw the introduction 
of s32A, dealing with offences concerning workplace deaths. Under this provision, a 
corporation or manager of a corporation was guilty if their conduct caused the death 
of a person at work for whom they owe a duty of care, and who was reckless as to 
the danger of death or serious injury to that person. No person was ever convicted 
under this provision, and the new set of health and safety laws introduced nationally 
in 2012 did not include a similar provision. There are no special provisions for 
workplace deaths in the new national legislation, but rather 
 ...a graduated enforcement of duties ...exposing corporations or their officers to 
the severest penalties where their non-compliance with the duty in question 
involves high culpability (such as recklessness) and where there is a serious risk 
of harm (such as death). This approach effectively removes the need for a 
separate workplace deaths offence in OHS law.
19
 (emphasis added). 
Given that the proportion of penalty amounts has not risen in line with penalty 
increases, there is no guarantee that the even higher penalties proposed under the 
new national legislation will act as a deterrent.  
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid at 10. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid at 3. 
19
 NSW Law Reform Commission Report 122 Workplace deaths (July 2009) at ix. 
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Fatalities in the NSW construction industry 1998-2008 – background 
As Chapter One indicated, one phase of data collection was to quantify information 
related to the identified fatality cases. The following section presents empirical data 
related to the cause of death of the deceased and their age and occupations. It is 
followed by an analysis of the numbers of prosecutions launched in the NSW IC and 
the relevant sections of both OHS Acts (1983 and 2000) which were cited in the 
prosecutions. It describes the amount of penalty imposed for these breaches and the 
category of defendant, that is, a corporation or an individual. It shows particulars 
about the type of business conducted by offenders, and particulars about judges 
presiding over OHS prosecutions in the NSW IC, with a description of the amount of 
penalty and discounts allowed by each judge.  
Cause of death 
As shown in Table 4.2 below, most fatalities were caused by crush injuries, sustained 
through collapse of walls or trenches, collapse of plant such as cranes or being 
caught between objects. Death resulting from falls from heights and workers being 
struck by moving objects (usually vehicles or plant) were the next most frequent, 
with other fatal incidents caused by electrocution, burn injuries and drowning. These 
causes of death and the magnitude of the rates are typical of the national and state 
workplace fatality statistics as discussed in Chapter Two.  
For example, in 1998, the National Occupational Health and Safety Commission 
(NOHSC) reported
20
 that the main mechanisms of fatal incidents were firstly, those 
involving vehicles; secondly, being hit by moving objects (mainly falling objects and 
pedestrian incidents; followed by falls, electrocution and drowning. In this sample, 
the mechanism of injury categorised as ‘crush injury’ included those where workers 
were fatally injured by collapsing walls or trenches, or were trapped between or 
under objects. Fooks et al
21
 noted that falls from height in the construction industry 
were predominant in the UK; and Safe Work Australia’s Notified Fatalities 
Statistical Reports consistently specify falls from heights as a principal mechanism of 
injury. 
                                                 
20
 National Occupational Health and Safety Commission, Work-Related Traumatic Fatalities in 
Australia, 1989 to 1992 Summary Report, (Commonwealth of Australia, 1998) at 14. 
21
 Above, note 3 at 2. 
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Table 4.2. Cause of death (n=76) 
Cause of Death Number of fatalities 
Burns 1 
Drowning 2 
Electrocution 11 
Struck by moving object 14 
Falls from height  16 
Crush injuries 30 
Unknown 2 
Ages and occupations 
Ages of the deceased ranged from 16–69 years and their occupations included 
electrician, plumber, carpenter, rigger, dogman, demolition worker, labourer, plant 
operator, concreter, plasterer, linesman, traffic controller, fitter, bricklayer, 
scaffolder, painter and apprentice. 
Fatalities in the NSW construction industry 1998-2008 – penalties 
Prosecutions under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 and NSW 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
From 1988 to 2008, OHS prosecutions in cases of fatality in the NSW construction 
industry have been brought under the general duty of care for the health, safety and 
welfare of persons at work section in the relevant legislation. Figure 4.1 below shows 
that, for cases breaching sections of the 1983 OSHA, most cases (n=29) attracted 
charges under s15 of the NSW OHSA 1983. Fifteen defendants were prosecuted for 
breaches of s16, which required employers and the self-employed to ensure the 
health safety and welfare of persons other than their direct employees. In these cases, 
the deceased workers were sub-contractors. In seven cases, charges were laid against 
the employer for breaches of both s15 and s16. Three charges were laid under s17, 
which required persons in control of workplaces, plant and substances used by non-
employees to ensure health and safety. Section 50 relates to offences by corporations, 
s49 refers to time for instituting proceedings against the offence, and s51 refers to 
persons aiding and abetting in the commission of an offence.  
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Figure 4.1. Prosecutions for offences under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 
(n=60) 
Similarly, Figure 4.2 below shows that in prosecutions for cases brought under the 
NSW OHSA 2000, the majority (39) were for breaches of s8, that is, the general duty 
of care provision. Eleven prosecutions were laid under s10, which penalises the 
controllers of work premises, or of plant or substances, for failing to provide safe 
premises or places of work, and failing to provide safe plant or equipment. Three 
prosecutions were laid under section 9 which refers to the duties of self-employed 
persons; one under s20 referring to the duties of employees, and eight under s26 that 
refers to offences committed by corporations.  
In summary, more than two thirds of all cases found employers guilty of failing in 
their general duty of ensuring that premises under their control were safe, that plant 
and substances, systems of work and the work environment were safe and for failing 
to provide appropriate information, training, supervision and facilities to employees. 
Section 8(1) of the OHSA 2000 and s16 of the OHSA 1983 also require the employer 
to ensure the health, safety and welfare of others at the place of work, for example 
contractors or visitors.  
29 
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Figure 4.2. Prosecutions for offences under the NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 
(n=67) 
An analysis of the prosecutions and the sentences imposed shows that the average 
penalty was $79,242, which represents an average of 17.96 per cent of the maximum 
penalty applicable. The courts allowed an average of 15.2% discount on penalties, 
ranging from 5 per cent to 35 per cent. Where repeat offenders were concerned, the 
court had discretion to impose terms of imprisonment, but offenders have never 
served a penal sentence in NSW since the inception of Robens legislation in 1983. 
One defendant was sentenced to two years imprisonment but the sentence was 
suspended and a two-year good behaviour bond imposed. 
22
In another instance, the 
offence was proved but no conviction recorded and the matter was dismissed,
23
 and 
in a third case, the matter was dismissed because of the judge’s view that WorkCover 
NSW’s risk assessment procedures in relation to granting of demolition permits was 
in error.
24
  
Particulars about the type of business conducted by offenders 
Table 4.5 shows that 51 medium to large corporations were prosecuted, with 58 
prosecutions initiated against micro and small businesses, including nine 
prosecutions in the cottage sector. Generally, the literature suggests that workers in 
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 Inspector Batty v David Smith t-as David Smith Roofing and Guttering [2009] NSWIRComm 203.  
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 Inspector Vierow v LBJ Crane and Rigging Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 358.  
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smaller businesses are at higher risk of injury or death,
25
 while this data shows a 
lesser disparity. Micro businesses in this sample comprised a one or two person 
operation, often a sole trader and spouse responsible for administration tasks.  
Table 4.5. Business size by numbers of employees. 
Micro <5 Small 5-19 Medium 20-99 Large 100+  
37 21 8 43  
Judges and the penalties and discounts they impose 
Table 4.6 below shows the number of cases heard by individual judges, and their 
affiliations with either labour or non-labour law chambers.
26
 Of the seventeen judges 
who presided over the prosecutions, eleven had a background associated with labour 
law, and the remaining six had no labour association.
27
 The table also shows the total 
averages of all monetary penalties each judge imposed on corporations and on 
individual directors, and the percentage amount of the prescribed penalty that this 
represented. It also shows the average percentage of the discount that the judge 
allowed for mitigation purposes on corporations and on individual directors. Fines 
are expressed as a percentage of the statutory maximum fine. 
As can be seen, judges from labour law firms imposed lower actual penalties on 
corporations than non-labour judges ($98,282 compared to $118,300), but higher 
penalties on individuals than non-labour judges ($10,028 compared to $7,734). They 
granted lower mitigation discounts for corporations (14.5% compared to 17.5%) but 
greater mitigation discounts for individuals (17.5% compared to 12.8%). Thus, while 
labour law judges were more lenient to companies, they allowed lesser discount 
units. Reversing the trend for individuals, they allowed greater discount units, as 
against higher actual penalties. Non-labour law judges imposed higher penalties on 
corporations and lesser penalties for individuals. They allowed greater mitigation 
discounts to corporations than to individuals. However, the overall percentage of the 
prescribed monetary penalty was less for individuals at 15 per cent than corporations 
at 19 per cent.  
                                                 
25
 See Centre for Corporate Accountability, Small isn’t Beautiful: Construction Worker Deaths 
2007/8: Employer Size and Circumstances, (London: nd) 
26
 In NSW, chambers have historically developed along ideological lines, such that those barristers 
with either labour or business affiliations tend to congregate accordingly.  
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Table 4.6. Judge affiliations and penalties imposed. 
No. of 
decisions 
Judge 
Labour/Non
-Labour 
Company penalties Individual penalties 
Av. actual 
penalty ($) 
% prescribed 
penalty 
% av. 
mitigation 
discount 
Av. actual 
penalty ($) 
% prescribed 
penalty 
% av. 
mitigation 
discount 
6 H L 21,667 16.17 0 - - - 
3 G L 16,667 6.67 0 - - - 
3 J L 55,833 37.33 0 - - - 
9 C L 45,313 7.83 10.6 8,250 15 25 
16 D L 59,545 11.6 14.55 7,800 14.18 24 
3 F L 81,667 16.21 10 - - - 
8 I L 113,327 17.72 25.6 - - - 
20 K L 143,500 22.06 18.46 5,333 9.7 14.17 
10 M L 135,714 22.08 17.1 8,950 21.97 31.7 
8 P L 154,100 25.98 18 21,817 39.67 0 
7 Q L 178,667 27.55 21.67 18,000 32.73 25 
TOTAL 93   98,282 18.44 14.52 10,028 19.09 17.50 
11 A NL 97,083 18.76 10 10,668 19.4 18.6 
1 B NL - - - 0 0 0 
6 E NL 63,750 11.93 21.3 2,500 4.64 17.5 
3 L NL 171,667 20.81 13.3 - - - 
10 N NL 138,389 23.31 24.7 16,000 32 0 
4 O NL 119,833 16.85 21.7 3,000 12 0 
TOTAL 35   118,300 19.32 18.90 7,734 15.03 12.80 
The results from this sample indicate there is no strong suggestion that judges show 
particular political and/or ideological affiliations when coming to a decision. Johnson 
maintains that Victorian magistrates were influenced by the ‘...dominant and 
individualistic ideologies of OHS’ in so far as they had internalised ideas about 
worker carelessness, employer worthiness and the inevitability of ‘accidents’.28 But 
analysis of the judgements texts for this research indicate that judges, on the whole 
were less influenced by the ‘careless worker’ thesis and the inevitability of incidents, 
but did give attention to pleas concerning good corporate citizenship. 
The practice of sentencing – why lenient penalties? 
The theoretical model described in Chapter One assists in understanding some of the 
structures which influence the judicial system in a capitalist economy. The model 
addresses the influences of state regulatory legislation; regulatory principles and 
guidelines; judicial principles, and pulverisation techniques within the broader 
                                                 
28
 Johnstone R, Occupational Health and Safety, Courts and Crime, (The Federation Press, 2003). 
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framework of the existing political economy. The agency and discretion of judges is 
bounded by the institutional structures of the state. These structures frame what 
activities of judges and consequently have a bearing on discretionary outcomes and 
provide options for sentence reduction. That is, the way in which sentencing laws 
and regulatory investigative and prosecutorial procedures are structured, can, in 
themselves, provide fertile ground for the de-contextualisation and pulverisation of 
events in cases relating to death and injury at the workplace. 
State OHS legislation 
The State as the promulgator of legislation, specifies those purposes for which a 
court may impose a sentence on an offender, and these are set out in Section 3A, Part 
3A of the NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. The purposes are to (a) 
ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence (note that this 
sentencing principle does not specifically refer to ‘just deserts’ or retribution); (b) to 
prevent crime by deterring the offender or other persons from committing similar 
offences; (c) to protect the community from the offender; (d) to promote the 
rehabilitation of the offender; (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her 
actions; (f) to denounce the conduct of the defender; and (g) to recognise the harm 
done to the victim of the crime and the community (emphasis added).
29
 In summary, 
the purposes of sentencing are punishment, deterrence, community protection, public 
recognition of harms perpetrated, and denunciation of these harms. Under these 
guidelines, offenders should be made accountable for their actions, but there is also 
an element of rehabilitation included in the objectives. 
When determining sentences, the court considers aggravating and mitigating 
factors.
30
 Mitigating factors relevant to OHS offences are consideration of the 
offender’s measures at restitution, good citizenship, the absence of prior convictions 
and the likelihood or otherwise of the offender to re-offend. Aggravating factors 
include the existence of prior convictions, significant injury, loss or damage to a 
person, the committal of offences regardless of public safety, offences involving 
grave risk of death to another person, and the abuse of positions of trust or authority 
in relation to the victim. 
31
 The only subsection of the Crimes (Sentencing 
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 NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, Section 3A, Parts 3A (a) to (g). 
30
 NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ss21-23. 
31
 Ibid s21A(2) 
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Procedure) Act 1999 to which the OHS court decisions was specifically referred was 
that relating to prior convictions and it is not known why judges did not reference 
other aggravating factors. This is not to say that they might not play a part in the 
judge’s own mind when considering sentence, as in the ‘instinctive synthesis’ model 
(see below). It also highlights the fact that these are aspects, which the prosecution 
appears not to consider in fatality or serious injury proceedings.  
The two Acts referenced in this discussion are the NSW OHS Act 1983 (OSHA 1983) 
and the NSW OHS Act 2000 (OSHA 2000). The 1983 legislation, based on the 
Robens philosophy of self-regulation, was innovative in that it removed many 
prescriptive and detailed elements, typical of former laws governing workplace 
health. It imposed an absolute duty of care on the employer, with a defence being 
that it was not reasonably practicable for a person to comply, or that commission of 
the offence was due to causes beyond the control of the duty holder and against 
which it was impracticable for the duty holder to make provision.
32
 This Act was 
reviewed and replaced by the OSHA 2000 and the multiplicities of regulations 
associated with the 1983 Act were replaced with a single OHS Regulation 2001. 
According to the Stein report ‘(c)riminal sanctions were still to be ones of last resort 
but seen as ‘necessary teeth’ to back up consultation, inspectoral warnings, 
improvement notices and prohibition notices’.33  
In both Acts, the primary duty of care of the employer was outlined in some detail, 
requiring them to ensure the health safety and welfare at work of all persons in their 
employ. The duties were to ensure the safety and freedom from risk, of premises 
controlled by the employer; that plant and/or substances in use at the workplace be 
safe and without risk to employees; to ensure that systems of work and the working 
environment are similarly risk free and safe; that employees be provided with 
information, instruction, training and supervision to ensure their health and safety, 
and that adequate facilities be provided.  
These provisions, set out in s8 of the OSHA 2000 were similar to those of the earlier 
Act, except that they placed more emphasis on risk assessment and worker 
consultation, than did the 1983 Act, which was slightly more prescriptive.
34
 While 
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 Stein Report, above, note 9 at18-19;see also s.53 NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. 
33
 Ibid at 21. 
34
 See s15 NSW Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. 
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the detail of these provisions is not in dispute, it will be seen that they necessarily, 
but narrowly guided the court’s deliberations. That is, prosecution charges had to be 
specified according to the exact sections of the relevant parts of the Act (almost all 
being directed to the general duty of care of the employer). Thus, the prosecution and 
the judges were necessarily denied the opportunity to reflect on the broader 
conditions of work, or workplace relations which might have had more bearing on 
the matter.  
WorkCover NSW – compliance policy and prosecution guidelines 
The emphasis of WorkCover NSW’s compliance policy35 is on the achievement of 
successful OHS outcomes without the use of enforcement. Compliance is achieved 
through a range of strategies involving ‘information advice, persuasion, co-operation, 
inspection, verification and compulsion through to deterrence activities.’ The policy 
also seeks to ensure that there will be ‘fair and swift consequences for non-
compliers’.36 Responsive regulation is the means whereby the regulator attempts to 
achieve compliance ‘appropriately’ and ‘effectively’, and its strategies are based 
firmly on the compliance pyramid.
37
  
When considering prosecution the regulator applies the guidelines of the Office of 
the Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP),
38
 which encompass three criteria. These 
are the existence of a prima facie case; a reasonable prospect of conviction, and the 
public interest, which considers, among other things, the seriousness of the offence, 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, need for general and specific deterrence 
and whether the alleged offence is of considerable public interest.
39
 In cases of 
prosecutions for workplace death (s32A of the OSHA 2000), the prosecution 
considers whether there is sufficient evidence to establish if the conduct of the 
alleged offender caused the death; that is, if the duty holder engages in recklessness 
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causing death or serious injury. The prosecutor will also consider the nature of any 
defence available to the defendant.
40
 Prosecutions under this provision could only 
proceed with the written consent of the relevant government Minister or by an 
inspector and in fact, no prosecutions were laid in NSW under this provision.   
While the court is not directly concerned with how WorkCover NSW applies its 
policy in the normal course of inspectorial work, the regulator’s decision to, and 
reasons for prosecution, should have a bearing on judges’ decisions. That is, the 
decision to prosecute corporations and directors or managers occurs ‘when it is in the 
public interest to do so... and particular regard [is] paid to the steps taken by such 
persons to ensure compliance by the corporation...’41 The ‘core concepts’ applying to 
the concept of due diligence by corporations or persons in respect of health and 
safety include ‘...ensuring that the corporation has safe work systems to address 
risks to workplace safety and ensuring compliance with and regular review of the 
safe work measures’.’42 (emphasis added). Safe work systems are part of a broader 
and more encompassing safety management system that is not addressed in the 
policy, so an opportunity to at least consider some structural elements governing 
healthy and safe workplaces is not attended to, and the narrow focus is reflective of 
the particularities of the general duty of care sections in NSW OHS legislation as 
noted above. As Ingleby and Johnstone comment, the ‘...focus is produced by a 
number of reasons, including the convenience of the defence and prosecution 
confining themselves to specific occurrences, and the court procedural 
requirements.’43  Ultimately, these reasons produce narrowly presented cases and 
pulverised verdicts.  
When sentencing, the judge must consider not only aggravating and mitigating 
factors, but also the objective and subjective factors relevant to the charge. Primary 
consideration is given to the objective seriousness of the offence, or what is 
expressed in OHS prosecutions as ‘the nature and quality of the offence’, a principle 
derived from case law in the NSW IC (Lawrence Diecasting (1999) 90 IR 464), 
wherein ‘(A) particular offence is assessed in terms of its relative seriousness in 
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relation to the worst offence for which the maximum penalty is provided’.44 Other 
decisions have established further principles, for example in regard to mitigation for 
guilty pleas, cooperation with WorkCover NSW by the defendant, and safety 
remediation measures performed by the defendant. Good ‘industrial citizenship’, the 
absence of prior convictions and the ‘propensity of the offender to reoffend’ are all to 
be considered when the final decision is handed down. 
45
 
The prosecutor’s role is laid down in NSW Barrister’s Rules, with Rule 71 stating 
that the prosecutor must not try to persuade the court to ‘...impose a vindictive 
sentence or a sentence of a particular magnitude’, but can (amongst other things) 
‘...submit that a custodial or non- custodial sentence is appropriate and ...inform the 
court of an appropriate range of severity of penalty, including a period of 
imprisonment, by reference to relevant appellate authority’.46   
If it is invited, WorkCover NSW may make a submission about sentencing within the 
confines of the principles of sentencing. This may include submissions about the 
range of seriousness of the offence (upper or lower range), but it cannot depart from 
sentencing principles in general.
47
 When commencing a prosecution, WorkCover 
NSW aims to ‘...change the behaviour of the offender and deter future offenders’.48 It 
believes that appropriate prosecution will alert the community to the fact that 
offenders will be punished. Its policy is to prosecute ‘significant breaches, such as 
fatalities and serious incidents. In doing so, WorkCover NSW takes account of 
several factors. Of these, ‘the general public interest is the paramount concern to be 
taken into account ...’49 The sentencing judicial officer considers these elements, as 
well as the facts of the case; the circumstances of the offence; subjective factors 
about the defendant, and sentencing laws.  
Maximum sentences or penalties are designed for a ‘worst case’ scenario, and there 
are no mandatory penalties for health and safety crimes, except for those ‘on the 
spot’ fines which can be imposed on employers by inspectors. There does not appear 
to be a definition of ‘worst case scenario’ in policies or legislation, nor in any of the 
judgements studied for this thesis. Presumably, it might be reserved for cases of 
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recklessness causing serious injury or death, but this category was dealt with in 2006 
with the insertion of s 32A in the OSHA 2000. Whatever the case, none of the 
decisions came close to imposing the maximum sentence, therefore none were 
judged to represent a ‘worst case scenario’. 
Chapter Three referred to the paradox of OHS harms – they are not perceived as real 
crimes. One of the reasons for this lies in the difficulty of proving intent, mens rea, 
on the part of corporations and in cases of strict liability such as OHS offences, the 
prosecution needs to only prove the commission of the criminal act (actus reus). In 
other words, both elements are not required, as they would be in a criminal trial.
50
 
Another factor lies in the involvement of administrative agencies, such as the OHS 
regulator, WorkCover NSW, that operates across different portfolios (advising, 
inspecting, enforcing etc). 
While factory offences have been statutorily described as crime and proscribed 
by law, they have been frequently committed and substantially tolerated in 
practice. Factory offences have been dealt with by administrative agencies ... far 
removed from the normal machinery of criminal justice,’ which lends itself to 
the perception that these offences are not true crimes.
51
  
The Judiciary- sentencing, knowledge, attitudes, beliefs 
Until recently, ‘white-collar’ crimes were also viewed as not ‘real’ crimes. Although 
that perception has changed and corporate crime is now more regularly acted against, 
with almost 130 Australian corporate directors and managers serving anything up to 
10 years imprisonment from 1996 to 2005
52
, the punishment regimes of those 
responsible for workplace death are insignificant. Occupational health and safety 
legislation is grounded in criminal law, so OHS crimes remain invisible within the 
structures in which OHS laws are situated. At best, OHS legislation sits uneasily on 
the shoulders of criminal law. 
Sentencing practices 
The ineluctable core of the sentencing task is a process of balancing 
overlapping, contradictory and incommensurable objectives. The requirements 
of deterrence, rehabilitation, denunciation, punishment and restorative justice do 
not generally point in the same direction. Specifically, the requirements of 
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justice, in the sense of just deserts, and of mercy often conflict. Yet we live in a 
society which values both justice and mercy.
53
 
In the late 1990’s, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal prepared to institute guideline 
judgements for particular offence categories, with the main objective being to ensure 
consistency in sentencing between courts and judges. This approach was seen as 
preferable to that of mandatory sentencing or ‘grid’ sentencing, which are a ‘complex 
framework of sentencing protocols designed to ensure consistency in sentencing.’54 
The idea was not meant to restrict judges, but to allow them discretion to ‘move 
within’ the guidelines, or to move away from them, in which case it was expected 
that judges would explain that departure in sentencing remarks. ‘Sentencing in 
guideline judgements are indicators, just as prescribed maximum penalties are 
indicators of a different kind’. 55  Elsewhere, guidelines set sentencing ranges for 
particular offences and to address relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
Jurists have commented on the dangers of producing sentences that are either too 
onerous or too lenient, if judges adopt a ‘mechanistic approach’ to the guidelines, 
pointing out that, in themselves, they are no more or less, guidelines.
56
  
In 1998, the NSW Chief Justice moved to formulate these judgements in particular 
cases, as noted above. In identifying a starting point, the Court settled on the offence 
of dangerous driving causing death or serious injury because of the history of Crown 
appeals against sentences, indicating a degree of inconsistency among sentencing 
judges. The former Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Nicholas Cowdery, 
pointed out that there was also intense media interest about these cases and 
subsequent growing political interest.
57 
The impact of the guideline judgement that 
emerged from a Crown appeal
58
 was reported as producing greater sentencing 
consistency and penalty increases, with a drop in the number of Crown appeals.
59
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A guideline judgement was also sought for the offence of armed robbery, and in that 
case, sentencing ranges were established, as opposed to a defined starting point. In 
another instance, a guideline judgement was established in relation to the sentencing 
of children, and in that case, the Court said that they were intended to ‘...provide 
benchmarks for particular kinds of offence, by way of guidance, while preserving the 
application of proper sentencing principles which is of general application.’ 60 
Another guideline judgement, this time a quantitative one, set out some parameters 
for determining the amount of discount applying to pleas of guilty. The Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedures) Act 1999, allows the Court to ‘impose a lesser penalty than 
it would otherwise have imposed’61, and said that in general, it should be assessed in 
the range of 20-25% sentence discount. The main consideration here is the timing of 
the plea, because clearly its utilitarian value would depend on how far proceedings 
had commenced, had the party initially pleaded not guilty. Cowdery noted that this 
guideline provided an ‘extremely fertile ground for appeals’.62 
As DPP, Cowdery took a strong stance in maintaining the ‘separation of powers’ that 
is, upholding the independence of the judiciary from the executive arm of 
government. To him, the positive aspect of guideline judgements was in: 
forestalling unreasonable sentencing legislation by the Parliament, directing it 
into avenues that the courts have been able to interpret and manage consistently 
with continuing judicial independence’; providing consistency in sentencing for 
particular offences; providing acceptable guidance to judges; and, increasing 
sentence penalties in some case.
63 
  
The negative consequences, including those pertinent to OHS crimes, have been 
warned against by a range of commentators. That is ‘the prescriptive nature of 
guidelines and the risk of uncritical adherence by judges [and] the fetters they may 
impose on judicial discretion in individual cases...’64 However, Zdenkowski believes 
that guidelines will become part of the ‘sentencing landscape’ because of their 
development from appellate sentencing practices and attempts to improve sentencing 
consistency.
65
 Nonetheless, he also warns that courts face challenges to appropriately 
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take account of public opinion; explain guideline decisions in an easily understood 
way, and to resist ‘the temptation to conflate consistency and severity’.66  
Sentencing: ‘Two-tiered’ and ‘Instinctive Synthesis’ 
Guideline judgements are often cited in OHS cases and are considered here in the 
light of discussion about two differing sentencing styles, that is ‘two-tiered’ 
(sometimes referred to as ‘two-staged’) sentencing and the style known as 
‘instinctive synthesis’. Cowdery observes that guideline judgement ‘regimes’ may 
lend themselves to the more formulaic or mechanical style of two stage 
sentencing’.67 In tier one, the judge considers the seriousness of the crime by looking 
at the objective facts of the offence and in tier two, the subjective elements are 
considered before the sentence is pronounced. In another version, the judge specifies 
a sentence quantum that is proportional to the crime and then by reference to other 
facts, specifies some variable to that amount.
68 
 
A typical example of this occurs when the court states that it is reducing the sentence 
it would otherwise impose by a specified percentage because of an offender’s guilty 
plea, or by reference to an offender’s assistance to authorities or both. ‘This 
procedure is more overtly mathematical (particularly if a discount in the form of a 
percentage is specified)…and, may…be defined as the narrow meaning of two-tiered 
sentencing’.69 In effect, the sentence outcome is arrived at through a staged process 
where weight is first given to some variable and that weighting is then altered 
according to consideration of other variables.
70 
Although there is no clear definition 
for two-tiered’ sentencing, its mathematical approach is exemplified by granting 
specific discounts beginning with a ‘starting point based on the objective gravity of 
the offence’ and then adjusting penalty amounts according to other factors.71  
Whatever else it may mean it does seem to involve the decision-maker arriving 
at one value or type of sentence first and then, either incrementally or in one 
further step, deriving the final sentence that is imposed. A process of sequential 
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reasoning sometime criticised as being synthetic or artificial, seems to be an 
integral part of this approach.
72
 
In OHS Judgements, the events have already been presented in their isolated parts; 
they are considered against mitigating and aggravating factors, which are, in turn 
considered in the light of subjective and objective factors, which are then taken into 
account. 
Instinctive synthesis 
The instinctive synthesis approach allows judges to arrive at a sentence  
…by looking at all the relevant factors and sentencing principles, and 
determining their relative weights by reference to all the circumstances of the 
case. The balancing of all the relevant considerations takes place in a single step 
or synthesis, not sequentially.
73
  
Thus, the sentencing judge ‘instinctively’ synthesizes all the various factors involved 
in a particular case and arrives at a sentence.  
In her study of 31 judges in the Supreme and District Courts of Queensland
74
 
Mackenzie notes that judges typically report that the ‘art’ of sentencing, or the 
intuitive nature of sentencing, lies in their discretionary practices, and these are 
derived mainly from experience, rather than being taught. The view that sentencing 
is an art form or an intuitive skill has attracted criticism, and Mackenzie questions, 
...whether something as complex and with such serious ramifications as 
sentencing can be left to intuition. Even if [it] is based on experience, statutory 
guidelines and precedent, it arguably remains an almost arbitrary process, 
reliant on the intuitive skills and experience of an individual judge. Although 
the system of appellate review provides the necessary checks and balances, 
“sentencing as an art” raises issues of consistency and fairness.75 
What guarantees there are that judges will exercise objectivity, consistency and 
fairness in their deliberations is something the former High Court Judge Michael 
Kirby contemplates arguing that ‘...[i]intuition may itself be the product of 
unrecognised psychological forces, cultural assumptions and social attitudes’.76 
Mackenzie found that judges preferred an instinctive or intuitive sentencing approach 
because ‘consciously or unconsciously, it allows the judge to have maximum 
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discretion in sentencing’. They saw sentencing in pragmatic terms, rather than 
through the lens of theory or justification for offending, a position in accord with 
findings from a study of Victorian judges.
77
 This pragmatism resulted in judges 
adopting a procedural approach to sentencing, involving their response to sets of 
facts. Thus, judges commented that sentencing was the outcome of investigations; 
that it was a means of determining penalties reflecting the ‘criminality of the 
offender’; and that it was the provision of fair procedures.78  
It has been suggested that, by looking at objective and subjective factors separately, 
judges may be helped when there are numerous factors to consider when determining 
sentence. Traynor and Potas suggest that there may be reasons to adopt a two-tier or 
sequential sentencing approach, combining it with comparison from other decisions.  
 They argue that ‘(t)his process of sentencing by analogy is common practice’ and is 
accepted by judges who support either one of the two approaches
79
  
In 2002, a majority of High Court judges found that the two-tier approach should not 
be adopted as it was wrong in principle.
80
 Instinctive synthesis sentencing could be 
modified slightly to permit discounts for certain mitigation factors, such as early 
guilty pleas and assistance given to authorities, a process not favoured by the High 
Court. Traynor and Potas argue that some cases lend themselves more to sequential 
reasoning than others, and this may well apply to OHS cases, where a multiplicity of 
factors are normal. What is important is that decisions are transparent, and while 
two-stage sentencing appears mechanistic, it does allow for reasons for the sentence 
to be given and provides accountability from the Court, while for Traynor and Potas 
intuitive or instinctive synthesis is ‘more mysterious, idiosyncratic and less open to 
analysis’.81 Judges in the NSW IC use both styles of sentencing, and in the following 
case, both elements of instinctive synthesis and two-stage sentencing appear to be in 
operation. The judge in Case 2
82
 was guided by the High Court’s decision in 
Markarian v R (2005) 15 ALR 213, a guideline judgement that figures frequently in 
NSW IC sentencing hearings. In this case, the judge remarked  
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The court, using the “instinctive synthesis” approach, would include an 
assessment of the objective and individual subjective factors, with the 
appropriate weight given to each factor, and could (but not should) give a 
degree of deduction in penalty to some element in the consideration, in such 
circumstances as where it better serves the interests of transparency, which 
element should be narrowly confined (for example, the utilitarian value of the 
plea).
83
  Their Honours recognised the “instinctive synthesis” approach to 
sentencing gives rise to an inevitable tension between the need for transparency 
and adequate reasoning on the one hand, and the need to avoid a mathematical 
approach pursuant to which the sentencing court engages in a “staged 
sentencing process” starting at the maximum penalty and then making 
deductions from it without adequately assessing (even in a provisional way) the 
sentence called for by the objective facts (see Markarian at [32]).
84
 
In a consideration of penalty, the court must consider the objective seriousness 
of the offence or, as has been said, the nature and quality of the offence. The 
Full Bench commented in Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Limited v WorkCover 
NSW Authority of New South Wales (Inspector James Swee Ch’ng) (1999) 90 
IR 464 ad idem with the view expressed in Markarian (at 474):  
. . . in our view, it is important to reiterate that the primary factor to be 
considered when a judicial officer is determining the appropriate sentence to 
impose is the objective seriousness of the offence charged. In case of 
prosecutions under the OHS Act, this proposition has often been expressed by 
saying that the "true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the 
offence" . . .
85
 
The High Court also stipulated that sentencers should pay particular attention to the 
maximum penalties stipulated,; they invite comparison between the case before them 
and the worst case, and so they provide a yardstick, balanced on all other relevant 
factors. The High Court found that the Court of Appeal in Markarian was in error 
because it did not start at the maximum penalty but at another maximum, which it 
used as a starting point.
86
 It appears from the judgements analysed in this thesis that 
judges did not always specifically address the maximum penalty, though it may have 
been in their minds. Others had a starting point of a discounted penalty, which was 
then further discounted for objective and subjective factors, as well as other 
mitigating circumstances. The High Court also pointed out that when maximum 
penalties were raised, then higher penalties should be imposed, because the courts 
are expected to recognise the intentions of the legislation
87
, but this was not evident 
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in the thesis analysis. To take but two examples, in Case 61,
88
 a corporation was 
fined $50,000 of the maximum of $550,000 and the individual party fined $10,000 of 
maximum of $55,000. In Case 40,
89
 the defending corporation was fined $97,500 of 
the maximum of $550,000. In both cases, the defending corporations were large 
companies and the penalties give no indication of the shift to higher penalty rates that 
had occurred in 2000.  
This approach to sentencing in OHS cases gave rise to community disquiet about 
justice, as the disparity between the maximum sentence legislated for and the actual 
penalty imposed was considerable. However, while the more ‘usual’ crimes against 
persons or property are relatively straightforward to prosecute, those relating to OHS 
offences are laid against the relevant section of the Act that is, in almost all cases 
reviewed here, failure to undertake a duty of care. The following remarks made in 
considering the penalty in Case 2 demonstrate the point. 
While the fact of the death of Mr (B) is not the focus of this inquiry, as Hill J 
pointed out in Tyler v Sydney Electricity (1993) 47 IR 1 (at 5):  
The gravity of the damage or injury actually resulting from breach does not, of 
itself, dictate the amount of penalty. However, the gravity or otherwise of the 
potential risk flowing from breach and its foreseeability are clearly relevant as 
are the measure of gravity of the breach itself and the measure of culpability and 
as Wright J, President said in WorkCover NSW Authority of New South Wales 
(Insp Page) v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Limited and Anor (No 2) 99 IR 163 at 
[22]:  
...The gravity of the consequences of an accident, such as the damage or injury, 
does not, of itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of 
penalty. However, a breach where there was every prospect of serious 
consequences might be assessed on a different basis to a breach unlikely to have 
such consequences. The occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the 
degree of seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety.
90
 
This example of the sentencing approaches in the NSW IC demonstrates the 
difference in approach to that of murder/manslaughter, where the amount of damage 
or injury has a direct bearing on the final penalty.
91
 It is also difficult for the victims’ 
families, or the community, to come to terms with the legal position that the gravity 
occasioned by a death determines neither the seriousness of, nor the penalty for, the 
consequence.  
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The perception and experience of judges 
There is little research about the judicial sentencing process from judges’ 
perspectives, for a number of reasons, not least of which is the difficulty in obtaining 
access to judges, and the ‘...perceived or actual reluctance ...of the potential judicial 
subjects to reflect on their perceptions and experience, let alone participate in the 
debate’.92 Some insights into NSW judges’ perceptions of their role is gained through 
a series of broadsheet articles written in 2010 and based on interviews with 22 judges 
and magistrates of the Local, District and Supreme Courts of NSW.
93
 A similar series 
had appeared in the same broadsheet some 25 years before, but at that time, judges 
would only speak off the record. The series did not include the judges and 
magistrates of the Industrial Court and the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court, that is, 
that part of the judiciary responsible for workplace injuries and fatalities, despite the 
potential for these incidents to be either summary or criminal statutory breaches. It 
could be argued that this omission lends weight to the perception that OHS harms are 
not perceived as true criminal events. 
In relation to sentencing, judges’ main concerns related to increased workloads, and 
worries that their decisions would be overturned on appeal. They noted that the 
bench was becoming less monocultural, with an expanded base of members from 
divergent socio-economic, cultural and gender backgrounds. As one judge put it ‘less 
formal, less hierarchical, less Anglican and less school tie,
94
 This may account for 
the lack of sentencing differentiation seen in the decisions of labour law and non-
labour law judges in the NSW Industrial Commission. Political pressures from ‘law 
and order’ proponents had increased workloads in all jurisdictions, and particularly at 
Local Court level.
95
 Judges rejected the idea that politicians directly influenced them, 
but were irked by the ‘more subtle pressures-the willingness of politicians to climb 
aboard populist law and order campaigns regardless of the impact on the standing of 
the courts and the state’s prison population’. 96 Judges also thought that they had lost 
the support of the state’s Attorney–General (AG).97 In New South Wales, there had 
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been an uneasy relationship between the DPP and its AG’s Department in the state 
Labor government,
98
 which was accelerated by the actions of the incoming NLP 
government in 2011, discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.   
The influence of political pressure on the judiciary was exemplified in the criticism 
made of a NSW Supreme Court judge by a former NSW Premier over his perception 
of her leniency in a rape case. While the judge agreed that the sentence was light, she 
argued that it ‘followed the prevailing range of rape sentences – as judges must, 
‘because that’s equal justice’. 99 In response to public criticisms of judges’ decisions, 
suggestions had been made by the judiciary to make judgements more accessible and 
intelligible to the layperson. These included ways to make decisions, more 
transparent provision of information, sessions explaining the criminal justice system 
and workshops for judges to help them communicate with laypersons.
100
 In the face 
of the level of confusion, misunderstanding and family trauma that can arise in 
regard to workplace fatality cases, the adoption of policies like these would be 
welcome. 
101
 
The ‘art’ of sentencing 
The essence of sentencing is the balance of interests within the framework of 
the law... (these are)... the community, the accused, the accused’s family, the 
victim and the victim’s family. The balance is...constrained by the framework of 
the law – this is the public misconception of the process...’102 
Judges find sentencing difficult because of the conflictual nature of the adversarial 
system, the need to adapt to, and be competent in applying rapidly changing laws and 
in applying the law to diverse situations, and the emotional and physical drain they 
experienced. The imperative to balance conflicting interests demanded consideration 
of prior case law, the requirements laid down in sentencing legislation, and the 
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interests of all key parties. However, in actual terms, the interests of the parties are 
often irreconcilable, and thus achieving a balanced reconciliation is impossible.
103
 
...many of the judges said that personally they did not support deterrence as a 
sentencing objective, they tended to use it routinely in their sentencing remarks. 
The fact that...judges tend to see sentencing in fairly practical terms as a 
response to a set of facts in front of them supports the conclusion...that 
sentencing philosophy and the theories of punishment do not form a large part 
of a judge’s deliberations on the choice of sentence.104 (emphasis added) 
That sentencing is seen so instrumentally means that the community (in this case, the 
families of the deceased) may not be able to gauge whether or not justice has been 
served as far as fairness and consistency is concerned. The Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s report into sentencing in 1988 concluded that ‘judicial education in 
sentencing was necessary [due to] the complexity of the sentencing task, the need for 
consistency and ... that... most judicial officers learnt about sentencing once on the 
bench...’105 Insofar as specialisation is concerned, increasing worry about correct 
judicial practice and accountability necessitate a ‘re-examination’ of the role of 
specialisation, which is already occurring ‘...in areas such as planning and 
environment law. There are valid arguments why criminal law ... in particular is a 
specialist and difficult jurisdiction, and may merit distinct specialisation in the 
courts.
106
 The changes brought by the state LNP government in 2011 in removing 
serious OHS matters from the NSW IC (to be discussed in Chapter Seven) was a 
move away from specialisation and the outcomes are yet to be identified. 
Despite criticisms about inconsistency in sentencing due to the discretion allowed 
judges, they believed judicial discretion to be a necessary part of the sentencing 
process because of their experience and knowledge, and they also believed that there 
was no ‘undue disparity’ in sentencing,107a view that supports the consistency in 
judgements shown in this thesis. The concept of judicial discretion has been 
challenged in the last decade, largely because of the populist notion that sentencing 
should be harsher and political agendas of government to be seen as ‘tough on 
crime’. Sentencing regimes have seen the introduction of mandatory sentencing, 
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judicial sentencing guidelines and the use of sentencing grids
108
 There have been 
calls for sentences to be mandatory for OHS crime
109
, but Zdenkowski shows that ‘,,, 
although there is considerable doubt as to the efficacy of the mandatory sentencing 
regime, there is no unequivocal evidence either way to date, but there is significant 
evidence elsewhere that mandatory penalties do not have the hoped for effect of 
crime reduction’110  
Range of sentencing options 
Judges in Mackenzie’s study believed that imprisonment was neither a satisfactory 
option in many instances, nor an effective deterrent. For example, they believed that 
the offence of dangerous driving did not warranted a prison sentence, but felt that 
public pressure demanded it. In NSW, there is no apparent community or media 
pressure to have repeat OHS offenders imprisoned, and it is doubtful if the public are 
even aware of the provision.  
Judges reported that they found sentencing a difficult task. They also believed that 
some members of the public, radio hosts and politicians tended to be critical of 
perceived lenient sentencing, and that the deterrent effect of sentencing was reduced 
if people believed that judges were more lenient in sentencing than they actually 
were. This view is in contrast to that of employers, who, as seen in Chapter 3, 
believed that frequency of prosecution was more likely to be effective than severity 
of penalties. 
 A Chief Justice commented that ‘[T]he media would enhance the deterrent effect if 
they reported it more fully or more accurately’.111 The Chief Justice of the NSW 
Supreme Court said that judges make inevitable errors due to the complexity of 
sentencing, which has occurred due to ‘...past law and order election campaigns. 
There are unnecessary complexities in it. The Court of Criminal Appeal...frequently 
just has to allow appeals because some technical relationship in some structured 
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sentencing exercise was overlooked.’112 A retired Supreme Court judge said that the 
sentencing rules were not the problem, but rather the drafting of the legislation, and 
the inexperience of some judges in applying it.  
In NSW, Supreme Court sentences tend to be the highest and sentencing options are 
quite straightforward. District Court sentencing provides more options to the judge, 
for example, a prison term might be replaced with some other option. Judges rely on 
guideline judgements, test cases and appeal outcomes, as well as the sentencing 
legislation to determine their sentences. There are inconsistencies in discounting for 
guilty pleas, where judges might give large discounts for pleas lodged at the 
beginning of a trial, whereas to take advantage of mitigatory circumstances, guilty 
plea should have been lodged at a much earlier stage. 
113
 The judgement analysis 
here shows that, on occasion, judges discounted for guilty pleas even where the plea 
was lodged later in the proceedings. 
This discussion has attempted, in part, to explore some of the social, political and 
cultural undercurrents in which the judiciary arrive at sentencing decisions. The 
legislative, policy and judicial rule requirements are part of this environment. That is, 
judges are bound by both social rules (sentencing legislation, guideline) and social 
norms (community expectations, professional expectations, customs, attitudes and 
beliefs). Judges may be overworked and feel pressured by political campaigns and 
opportunisms, and criticism. Judges were seen to be influenced in their sentencing 
styles by case law established in the appeals process. Though theoretically able to 
take advantage of wide sentencing options, they tended to a conservative approach, 
staying within the boundaries of established penalty ranges. Except in rare cases, the 
judges in the NSW IC did not avail themselves of penalty options other than 
monetary ones, thus more creative and possibly more effective means of deterrence 
were not explored.  
There is a tension here between  structure and agency, that is, the tension that exists 
between the judiciary as discretionary social actors and the institutional structures 
that are imposed on them. The relative constancy in the low penalties given to OHS 
offenders suggests that, despite the talk of discretion, judges (intentionally perhaps) 
take a conservative view because of the requirements of sentencing and the concern 
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about having their decisions appealed. The case where penalties are increased 
through legislative changes, but with no ‘real’ effect seems to illustrate this internal 
regulation by the judiciary; that is, the importance of judicial norms in reinforcing 
certain judicial behaviours. 
Overall, there are no surprises in observing the conservatism of the judiciary, as the 
law is essentially a conservative institution. It is claimed that society has two fears 
about judicial decision-making. On the one hand, if judges acted completely 
independently they would threaten democracy because it is the parliament’s right to 
make legislation, and on the other, the rule of law demands predictability.
114
  These 
precepts in themselves contribute to a conventional stance. Furthermore, the 
ambiguity of OHS crime and its situation in the administrative arm of government 
(WorkCover NSW) may also contribute to the continuation of conservative and 
unrealistic sentencing in OHS matters.
115
 
The following chapter examines extracts from the judgement focusing particularly on 
how events are decontextualised. It is contended that this focus on the events 
surrounding fatal incidents serves to depoliticise the contributing circumstances 
because it fails to capture complex interactions leading to the incident. What is 
interesting is to see if this conservatism, interacting with other social institutions, 
produces punishments for industrial deaths that are both ineffective as deterrents and 
unjust to victims and families. This discussion follows on from that presented here 
because it looks at how judges have articulated and rationalised their decisions, that 
is, how they justified their judicial discretion and how they were influenced by social 
rules, in the form of judicial guidelines.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Decisions of the New South Wales Industrial Court 1988 to 
2008 
Legal decisions do not inscribe a class bias in the law; rather, those legacies are 
the coagulations from the centuries of conflict. Because class struggle keeps one 
class dominant, not omnipotent, the relative autonomy of the law is understood 
best as an unstable consequence of the relative strengths of contending 
classes...OHS laws resulted from the growing power of labour. In extracting 
internal coherence, the courts crafted a rationality of their own, which... is not 
always logical. 
1
 
In coming to a decision on punishment for cases where a workplace fatality has 
occurred, judges are confronted either consciously or unconsciously with a complex 
array of facts, opinions, case law, judicial rules and peer expectations, state 
legislation and regulatory policies. These elements contribute to the construction of 
formulaic judgments, which ‘silence’ the economic, social and political relations of 
production that play a large part in influencing workplace health and safety 
outcomes, policies and practices. Chapter One presented a model to demonstrate the 
dialectical relationship between the state and civil society. In this chapter and the 
next, the emphasis is on the judiciary (Industrial Court) and the regulatory body 
(WorkCover NSW). The question then, is do the formal requirements of NSW state 
legislation
2
 and regulatory requirements,
3
 together with informal judicial mores or 
modes of sentencing, and influenced by the de-contextualised or ‘pulverised’ version 
of events presented in court, result in decisions that are ineffective in addressing and 
redressing the structural causes of workplace fatalities?  
If it is beneficial to hide the circumstances surrounding an event, then it ‘becomes 
important for the representatives of the activity to pulverize the relationships which 
people begin to see.’4 An effective method of pulverizing revealing relationships is to 
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isolate the event which was the point of departure from the rest of the activity of 
which the event is part ‘…so that the sentencing process plays a similar role in OHS 
prosecutions.’5 This series of rhetorical and process driven mechanisms or devices 
together help to de contextualise behaviour, which as Chapter One explains, Thomas 
Mathiesen (2004) calls pulverisation. While the notion that these are intentional 
devices is a contentious one, the elements identified by Mathiesen are useful in 
analysing judgements. 
‘Pulverisation’ is a useful set of categories that assists in deconstructing the 
sentencing process in courts.  It uncovers the contradiction inherent in state 
regulation of OHS, that is, the necessity to reproduce and protect the workforce 
versus the necessity to produce commodities. These contradictions are a 
manifestation of the dominant ideology and pulverisation is a way to interpret 
complex social behaviour. 
This Chapter considers the institutional processes that decontextualise decisions 
through the process of ‘splintering’ the events that occurred at the workplace, thus 
isolating the events from their context and obscuring the true nature of labour 
relationships and overall risks to health and safety.
6
 This chapter makes use of the 
elements proposed by Mathiesen (later adapted by Johnstone
7
) to explore one aspect 
of the prosecution process as revealed in the judges’ summation of the cases. 8 
Chapter Six extends this examination by considering the penalties in the light of the 
formal requirements of the state and informal socio/cultural influences on the 
judiciary. 
The discussion that follows shows how the prosecution, defence and judges 
themselves use the different pulverising techniques, wittingly or unwittingly. That is, 
the actual process of presenting evidence, considering evidence and sentencing is 
embedded in the structures imposed by other forces, a combination of legislation, 
judicial policy and rules and regulatory strictures. In turn, these have been produced 
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through complex interactions between the elements of the model seen in Chapter 
One. Table 5.1 below sets out the different pulverising techniques used in case 
prosecution and the number of cases in which each technique was used. It should be 
noted that most cases combine different elements of the pulverisation typology and  
the table picks up on multiple strands which might run through the same case. 
Table 5.1. Pulverising techniques and number of cases in which they were applied 
Pulverising technique  Number of cases 
Anthropomorphising the defendant 8 
Blaming the worker 12 
Blaming others 22 
Good corporate citizenship 17 
Individualising the event 14 
Isolating in the present  7 
Isolating present from the future 5 
Normalising the event  7 
Relegating the event to the past 21 
Elements of pulverisation 
Temporal isolation: the past, the present and the future 
When attempting to understand the totality of circumstances leading to a particular 
occurrence, it is necessary to understand the past and present history surrounding it 
and to speculate about the possible future consequences. Conversely, isolating and 
separating events from the past effectively prevents the development of a thorough 
understanding of causes.
9
 There is some overlap in the cases between these temporal 
elements, especially in relation to post incident rectifications. 
Relegating the event to the past 
An event can be isolated from its context ‘...by relegating it to a more or less 
outdated past.’10 While this technique is similar to that of isolating the event in the 
present, in which the defendant’s positive response in rectifying matters post the 
incident is emphasised, it places greater weight on showing how the past was of little 
concern or consequence to the defendant’s ‘...current or likely future behaviour, and 
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untransferable to other parts of the work process’. 11  Judges in the NSW IC 
considered what available measures there were prior to the incident occurring as an 
indication of the foreseeability of the incident, but also took into account 
improvements made post the offence, which might operate in mitigation of the 
penalty. Improvements most typically involved recruitment of safety personnel or 
engagement of safety management systems experts or auditors
12
, improvements that, 
in case 41 concerning the deaths of two men through a wall collapse, led the judge to 
remark 
I believe the Company now has in place the necessary expert personnel, safety 
systems, procedures (and implementation) and on-going monitoring to ensure 
that there is never a repeat of the safety failures that lead to the tragic deaths of 
[D]and [M] in December 1997. 
13
 (emphasis added)  
Isolating the present from the outdated past was a method used in 21 prosecutions by 
the defence in the NSW IC, which sometimes appeared to sway a judge toward the 
defendant’s case. For example, in the Case 40 14 , concerning the death of an 
electrician, one company ‘... adopted a new procedure for an electrician to attend a 
property first to isolate and knock out the power...[it] also purchased testing wands 
for testing whether electrical wiring contains live power’. Another company involved 
in the same incident ‘...held a toolbox meeting after the incident and informed its 
sub-contractors to make sure all bare wires are made safe by an electrician 
immediately and not to presume that power to sites has been switched off.’ The judge 
commented ‘I am ... satisfied that both defendants have taken steps to address the 
risk that arose at this site in order to ensure that it would not again occur at their 
workplace.’ 
Further examples are seen in Case 2
15
 where the company director re-trained himself 
to meet modern safety requirements and standards. In Case 5
16
 the decision contained 
a lengthy documentation of the defendant’s efforts after the incident, to demonstrate 
the improvements to its system including the introduction of comprehensive safety 
management systems that encompassed managerial responsibilities, increased 
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regional supervisory personnel, enhanced training, improved information and 
communications, and ‘upskilling’ of contractors. The judge’s view was that 
...having regard to the length of time it has been directly involved in the 
construction industry, the Department's record is to be considered a good record 
notwithstanding the seriousness of this breach. It had significant safety systems 
in operation prior to this accident but almost inexplicably, they were not 
enforced in relation to this project. The Department then undertook a thorough 
review of this type of work and generally its safety systems and made a large 
number of alterations to those systems, both in direct recognition of avoiding a 
recurrence of this type of accident as well as making better provision in the 
future for safety. There is, however, merit in the prosecutor's submissions that 
the revised contractual provisions may not necessarily be as effective as the 
Department believes and there is good reason, in light of these comments, for 
those matters to be revisited to ensure their effectiveness.
17
 (emphasis added) 
This demonstrates several isolation factors. The judge exonerated the defendant by 
alluding to behaviour that is so out of character as to be ‘inexplicable’. Despite the 
‘seriousness’ of the breach, the defendant had a ‘good record’, implying that the 
incident is out of character, and is an individual, ‘one off’ occurrence. However, the 
judge was not entirely convinced by the defence’s argument, and agreed with the 
prosecution that the improvements undertaken may need reviewing, but by who is 
not made explicit.  
Other cases employed the tactic of relegating unsafe practices to the outmoded past, 
referring to descriptions of new methods to be employed ‘from now on’,18 or the fact 
that the offending company had now appointed a new safety manager and had 
learned lessons from the fatal incident.
19
 The offending company in Case 12
20
 ‘fast 
tracked’ the installation of reversing cameras on its vehicles, and encouraged its sub-
contractors to do the same, and here the prosecution reinforced the defence’s 
submission about its redress of prior ‘shortcomings’. The judge conceded that ‘the 
extensive measures put in place by both defendants after the incident indicate that 
there is less likelihood of either defendant re-offending under occupational health 
and safety legislation’, and safety measures implemented post incident ‘will be taken 
into account in their favour in mitigation of penalty.’21 All defendants in the sample 
cases submitted details about improvements to their systems in some form or 
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another, some being very extensive and others quite limited, for example, the 
purchasing of small items of safety equipment, and implementation of information 
sessions.
22
 
In Case 9
23
, the company employed an OHS manager six weeks after the accident, 
who conducted extensive reviews, made improvements to the risk management 
system and brought in external experts to assist. This medium size company had 
been brought up to ‘a ‘tier one standard’, that is, a standard expected of a major 
construction company’.24 In another prosecution25 concerned with the same fatality, 
the company employed a full-time engineer to ensure that design plans were in 
accordance with the applicable standards, and provided re-training for senior 
personnel and sub-contractors. In Case 12, the Court found that another company’s 
‘post-incident safety measures...attest to its acceptance of responsibility for its 
actions as well as its acknowledgement of the fatal injury caused to Mr [C]’.26  
In Case 2,
27
 the defence was successful in convincing the judge that  
the defendant has not manifested, by its commission of this offence, a 
continuing attitude of disobedience to the law or a likelihood that any offence of 
like kind will be committed in the future. The defendant is a first offender who 
has now in place proper safety practice and procedures which ensure there 
should be no risk of re-occurrence.  
Here, the focus, and indeed, the faith of the Court was on the immediate events, the 
rectifications undertaken by the defendant, and the strategy of concentrating attention 
on the positive and pro-active present, succeeded in de-contextualising the incident, 
relegating the events surrounding it to the past. Generally, in most cases the safety 
measures undertaken by the defendants were directed at universal systems, but a few 
were limited to specifics of machine/plant operation,
28
 and where judges relied on 
these measures in mitigation, their attitudes were reflective of magistrates in 
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Johnson’s study,29 where the focus was on technical issues, rather than overarching 
management systems. Judges’ beliefs that risks were minimised or negated given 
improved safety systems is likely unfounded, given the continued recurrence of 
fatalities from common identified causes, such as falls from height, for example. 
Judges are obliged to consider any mitigating circumstances and the defence is right 
in introducing them. However, many of these improvements to safety systems were 
those that should have been in place prior to the incident if the defendant had 
complied with basic risk identification procedures as specified in the OHS 
legislation. The following extract shows that at least the prosecutor in Case 43 had 
raised the point in the Court 
A number of steps had been taken by the defendant after the accident to 
improve workplace safety. There had been a review of all occupational health 
and safety procedures at all of the defendant's sites...[The] prosecutor accepted 
that the defendant was entitled to some credit for these efforts but that the steps 
themselves revealed that they were capable of being taken before the accident 
had a more pro-active approach been adopted by the defendant.
30
 
This was not an issue that was further pursued by the judge nor mentioned in the 
concluding sentencing remarks, and while judges often made much of the 
‘seriousness’ of fatal incidents, the issue of foreseeability was not particularly 
highlighted, (despite the fact that foreseeability was an important aspect of sentence 
decision making. In this case, the judge’s conclusion shows that by relegating events 
to the outmoded past, the offender’s actions are excusable, despite the ‘seriousness’ 
of the offence 
I am satisfied that, on a consideration of all of the evidence, this is a serious 
breach of the Act committed by the defendant. As the Court has noted before, it 
is not infrequent that otherwise diligent employers with quite specific systems 
of safety nevertheless overlook simple and straightforward methods to ensure 
the safety of workers. 
31
 
After applying discounts of 35 percent, the medium size company was fined $78,000 
of a maximum penalty of $550,000 in the traumatic fatal injury of one worker.
32
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Isolating in the present  
This technique was employed in seven prosecutions, is closely related to the previous 
one, and consists of ‘...maximum emphasis [being] placed on the human or 
humanitarian aspects of the case in the present.
33
 This method has common 
characteristics with that of anthropomorphising the offending company by 
emphasising the good character of the defending person. In placing mitigating factors 
before the court, the emphasis by the defence is on the redeeming actions of the 
defendant in relation to the incident. That is, it emphasises the rectifications the 
defendant has undertaken, the assistance offered to the victim’s family, the absence 
of prior convictions and can be closely linked to that of the good corporate citizen 
plea, wherein the defendant’s excellence is emphasised. Attention is focused on the 
defendant’s reputation and good attitude, and is largely predicated on form rather 
than substance.
34
 
In Case 5
35
 wide-ranging defence submissions were made about the extensive OHS 
improvements undertaken by the defendant, a large government department. In Case 
6
36
 numerous affidavit submissions described in minute detail the company’s 
financial arrangements, its corporate history and activities, including its buy out of a 
former government owned enterprise; in which it invited employees to buy shares. It 
described its large client base and its subsequent expansion into an enterprise with a 
22.5 million dollar annual turnover and a staff of 55. The strategy was to impress the 
Court with the company’s corporate responsibility and success. With mitigation for 
pleading guilty, it was fined $71,500 from a maximum of $550,000, arguably a small 
penalty for such a successful enterprise. In this case, the defence had broadly hinted 
that the deceased worker’s actions might have contributed to his death. In Case 1737 
the defendant ‘rehabilitated’ his work methods and practices. He was now ‘extremely 
careful’ about issuing instructions, and ‘is aware that he should immediately voice 
his concerns over any suggested activity that may give rise to occupational health 
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and safety risks.’ He has also ‘acknowledged the need’ to undertake risk assessments 
for all tasks.  
In Case 18, a teenaged worker on his third day at work was killed after falling 
through faulty roof safety mesh. He had received no induction, training or safety 
equipment.
38
The company concerned reviewed and rectified its safe working 
practices, enrolled personnel in OHS courses, and assisted other companies in 
complying with rules regarding safety mesh installation. The Court was not 
convinced by this defence submission and commented 
On the evidence, it is apparent the implementation of such steps prior to the 
accident would have avoided the tragic consequences that arose when [J.E] lost 
his balance and fell from the metal purlin.
39
   
Another defendant
40
 in the same case was a large construction company that had 
contracted the company mentioned above. After the incident, it ‘extensively 
reviewed its safety management systems and policies especially in relation to 
working on roofs.’ It dismissed the subcontractor directly involved in the incident. It 
engaged consulting engineers to inspect the safety mesh on site, and advised that 
senior personnel would henceforth inspect and supervise the installation of safety 
mesh. It had implemented a new management system including a policy on the 
appointment and monitoring of contractors, including polices dealing with young 
people and apprentices on site, requiring strict supervision of these employees and 
suitable training.  In this case, the judge observed that 
It is relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence to consider if there were 
readily and easily available remediation steps which could have been 
undertaken by the defendant before the accident to prevent injury occurring.
41
  
And further remarked 
The steps taken by the defendant to review all aspects of its occupational health 
and safety system ... following Mr [E] death is (sic) commendable. In many 
respects, they were steps able to be implemented prior to [his] fatal fall. As is 
so often the case, Mr [E] death highlights the critical importance of workplace 
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safety and the need for employers to be constantly vigilant in ensuring safety 
standards are consistently reviewed and enforced.
42
 (emphasis added). 
Here, the judge acknowledged that present remediation should not be obscured by 
the fact that there were ‘readily and easily available ‘steps which could have 
prevented the fall. However, this and the fact that he considered that the offence to be 
‘objectively serious’ and that penalty would be assessed on that basis, did not 
significantly alter the final penalty outcome of $178,500 of a maximum of 
$550,000
43
.  
The de-contextualising of events is a powerful force in pulverising sentences, as seen 
in Case 25
44
 in which a trainee rigger was killed while operating a boom lift on a 
construction site. Three companies were prosecuted, one being the direct employer of 
the rigger which had been contracted by another firm, who had, in turn, been 
contracted by a third entity. The judge found that all three parties were culpable, 
commenting that companies cannot sub contract out their responsibilities. The 
penalty incurred by the director of the employing company was $18,000 (from a 
maximum of $50,000) and his company then went into administration. The other two 
companies were fined $180,000 each, from a maximum of $550,000. All received a 
25 per cent discount for early pleas of guilty.   
In relation to mitigating circumstances, the judge took into account the measures 
Company A had developed and implemented following the commission of the 
offence. These included conducting annual external audits; hiring OHS personnel; 
development of an OHS management system; random checks and visits to its sites; 
weekly tool box meetings; preparation of job safety analyses, plant inspections and 
licence checks; monthly OHS Committee meetings; OHS consultation training for 
senior managers; enforcement and updating of its policies and procedures.
45
 The 
judge also listed the many improvements made by one of the other companies since 
the incident that were similar to those for Company A, which ‘...operates in 
mitigation of penalty’.46  
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The cataloguing of these ‘improvements’ in fact demonstrated the lack of a safety 
management system on the part of the company, as well as how poor the company’s 
OHS performance was at the time of the fatality; as all the upgrades detailed to the 
court should be part of the required safety operating policies and practices of a 
building and construction enterprise. This view was put by the state secretary of the 
C and G Division of the CFMEU, in a letter to Unions NSW, the state’s peak union 
body, requesting advice from WorkCover NSW on conducting an appeal against the 
low penalty imposed. The letter stated that despite the Court finding that the rigger 
had been poorly trained, that there had been no safe work risk assessment undertaken 
and that the Court believed that a serious breach had occurred, the objective 
seriousness of the incident was mitigated by reference to the safety systems that the 
defence claimed the companies had in place at the time of the hearing. The CFMEU 
concluded that ‘[G]iven the findings made about the manifest failure to provide a 
safe system of work and the consequences of the failure, such a conclusion is 
difficult to understand’.47 WorkCover NSW did not allow an appeal, but ironically, 
in the circumstances, the defendants appealed on several grounds, including whether 
the judge imposed sentences which were ‘manifestly excessive’.48   
Isolating present from the future 
When the future consequences of an event are not considered, the technique of 
isolating the incident in its immediate present is achieved, and the consequences are 
put off ‘for a more or less indefinite future’.49This was a strategy used by the defence 
in five instances. For Johnstone, the rules and guidelines of sentencing in Victorian 
courts meant that past and present factors were the focus of examination and the 
‘logical future consequences not challenged’.50 However, in NSW, the requirement 
to consider general and specific deterrence is an opportunity for the Court to be quite 
definite about its expectations of the defendant’s future behaviour. The following 
case
51
 shows how the defence submission clearly isolated the incident from the 
future by focusing on the immediate event without consideration of future 
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consequences. The prosecution also contributed to isolating the event by focusing on 
one causal aspect.  
(T)his was not a series of little risks adding up to a big risk. We would ... ask 
your Honour to note the significance of bringing to the court a charge of 
maintenance [safe system of work] only. In this case, we submit that was a very 
appropriate course for the prosecution to adopt. It involved the prosecutor 
making no concession beyond that it was clearly established in the investigation 
and that is, there was a system... the prosecutor [is] properly determining it was 
just a maintenance matter. In the scheme of matters coming to this court that 
puts it in a small category. Where charges under s15 are brought in this court 
the most usual in terms of system is a combination, a failure to provide or 
maintain, not just a failure to maintain [a safe system of work] and in that sense 
it puts this case in a particular category which is right down in the lowest end 
of seriousness, the lowest end of categories of cases your Honour would see. at 
47. (emphasis added) 
The judge found the offence proven, but in a rare instance in fatality cases, 
discharged the defendant without conviction under s556A of the Crimes Act 1900, 
with the prosecutor's costs to be paid by the company. Later, WorkCover NSW 
lodged a successful appeal against this decision and the defendant was fined the sum 
of $50,000.
52
 
The faith of the Court in the future good conduct of the offender is demonstrated in 
Case 12
53
 involving the death of a worker run down by a reversing truck. One of the 
two defendants, both large companies, subsequently fitted its vehicles and plant with 
reversing cameras, and ‘encouraged’ its subcontractors to do the same, although 
there was an acknowledgment that this particular procedure was already known to be 
‘a potential risk’ or a ‘potential hazard’.54 The prosecution conceded in relation to 
both defendants in this case that ‘extensive steps to address shortcomings in its 
occupational health and safety systems’ had been taken’.55 The judge commented 
the Court considers that the extensive measures put in place by both defendants 
after the incident indicate that there is less likelihood of either defendant re-
offending under occupational health and safety legislation.
56
  
While there is an element of future considerations about health and safety in these 
comments the focus on the minutiae highlights the way in which events are 
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decontextualised and the court is presented with ‘a fragmented, sanitised and 
simplified present’.57 
Anthropomorphising the defendant 
Another way to de-contextualise events in prosecutions for construction fatalities is 
to graft the qualities of the individual onto the company, such that it appears as a 
worthy entity, one deserving of the Court’s compassion. There are also overlaps with 
the ‘good corporate citizen defence’ in these submissions, and together these 
strategies were used in 25 cases In one instance
58
 the defendant was depicted as 
exemplifying the successful small businessman, building up the company over many 
years from age 20, after starting his apprenticeship at 15, and was a person with a 
‘fine industrial history’. 59 The judge considered his financial situation, which she 
accepted as being under strain, but that he was ‘not a person of no means.’60 With 
these elements as mitigating factors, along with his age and good citizenship, she 
fined him $30,000 of a maximum of $550,000. WorkCover NSW successfully 
appealed this low penalty, which was then increased to $70,000.
61
   
In Case 5, the defending government department expressed its ‘sincere sympathy’ to 
relatives of its two deceased workers, wrote letters of condolence to the families of 
the injured and erected a memorial on the site of the fatality; they later met with 
families during the Coronial Inquest. It was left to the C and G Division of the 
CFMEU to suggest that the defendant pay outstanding wages and accrued 
entitlements totalling more than $40,000 to families of the deceased and to the 
injured, which was duly done.
62
 A further, extreme, example of anthropomorphising 
is seen in Case 9
63
, where the defence called witnesses to establish the contrition of 
the defendant and his close personal friendship with the deceased. The company was 
a ‘good corporate and industrial citizen with a clear record that had not only 
complied with safety standards in the industry, but had been involved in improving 
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safety standards in this industry’. The company had learned from the incident and 
was overhauling its safety procedures. The sole director of the company had a 
brother who was in a senior management position. The director had a degree in civil 
engineering and was a member of a number of professional bodies in which he was 
active. He and his staff had been ‘heavily involved in promoting the need for and 
then drafting’ a national Code of Practice, for which he had been ‘specifically 
acknowledged’. His company was involved with an international federation, he had 
arranged for experts to speak to staff and other invitees, at his company’s expense.’ 
The company employed 70 persons, all of whom were known to the director, who 
encouraged them in further skill development. He ‘worked closely with the 
WorkCover NSW and with the industry union, and had good working relationships 
with those bodies’.  
In Case 40
64
, the defendant pointed out that his son was friendly with the deceased, 
that he himself was upset by the death and that his company ‘...always tried to have 
good personal relationships with the company's contractors’. His company organised 
counselling for employees and attended the deceased’s funeral. References attested 
to his good character, the close working relationships he had with employees, his 
company’s charitable work and acts of kindness. The defence in Case 2 65  also 
employed the tactic of emphasising the good qualities of the firm, pointing out its 
longstanding service in the construction industry, providing employment for over 50 
years. He had been active in community affairs and the company sponsored a 
football team, an expense that was not tax deductible, and therefore of no financial 
benefit to himself. 
In Case 11
66
 previously discussed where the emphasis was on isolating the 
circumstances of the fatality from the future, the judge felt the determination of 
penalty was difficult, given that 
The defendant's history of no prior convictions, its generally meticulous 
approach to safety, for a reasonably small employer in a relatively dangerous 
industry, its co-operation with authorities, its care and concern for employees 
who were emotionally affected by the accident, its grant of time off for those 
employees together with counselling, all militate in the defendant's favour. The 
defendant's performance has in general been an exemplar of the sort of the 
                                                 
64
 Case 40. Inspector Robert Mayell v William McLean and ors [2006] NSWIRComm93 at 28,57.  
65
 Case 2.Inspector Robert Mayell v D J Gleeson Pty Ltd [2006] NSWIRComm217 at 23, 24.  
66
 Case 11.WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Hopkins v Profab Industries Pty Ltd [1999] 
NSWIRComm289. 
 129 
approach that employers, particularly in the building industry, should take to 
employee safety. 
67
 
The defence in Case 9
68
, attributed many human qualities to the firm. It had provided 
‘a great deal of support’ to the deceased’s wife and family; it contributed to wakes 
and paid all funeral costs. The director supported a number of charities; the company 
had donated monies to an ANZAC memorial; the director was described as an 
‘extraordinary manager of people,’ a ‘rare leader’ and was ‘admired by all with 
whom he came in contact.’ His company factories were described as being 
showpieces of order, pride and ‘workplace conviviality.’69 
The company had a prior record, but considering its length of time in the industry 
‘where the risks of injury are an everyday reality’ the size of its workforce including 
‘considerable number of sub-contractors’ meant, to the Court, that the corporate 
defendant had ‘a good industrial record.’ The judge commented ‘[T]he company had 
significant safety processes and systems ...but regrettably, in this instance, those 
systems were not adequately enforced to ensure the safety of workers.’ Nonetheless, 
‘[T]he good industrial citizenship of the corporate defendant is further demonstrated 
by [the defendant’s] evidence about its support for a number of charities. All of these 
matters will be taken into account in mitigation of the penalty.’70 The company was 
fined $215,000 of a maximum of $825,000 because of a prior offence, and the 
defendant director was discharged and placed on a two-year good behaviour bond 
and ordered to pay the prosecutor’s costs.71 The pulverising technique of normalising 
events was also used in this case as it was put to the Court that ‘the risks of injury are 
an everyday reality’ and reference made in the prosecution of the second defendant 
to the inherent dangers of the industry.
72
 
Shifting blame 
The attribution of responsibility to another party is the hall mark of blame shifting, 
and is based on ‘individualistic notions of causation’, which stem from the way in 
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which prosecutions focus on the ‘minute details’73 of the event and away from the 
broader structural causes of injury and fatality. This technique was used in 13 
prosecutions, however, in the NSW IC, this defence is not always as successful as the 
following cases demonstrate. Case 5
74
 shows how the defence attempted to distract 
the Court’s attention from the culpability of the defendant by attempting to shift 
blame onto others. Thus the defendant alleged the sub-contractor had more control 
over the day to day operations of its work than it had, and claimed that it had no 
responsibility for the ‘creation, provision or maintenance of the system of work 
including the labour, training and provision of equipment’ and was ‘unaware of 
inappropriate modifications made to the scaffolding by BGA and had no involvement 
in that process’.75 Nevertheless, the Court was not persuaded by the argument and 
said 
it is difficult to understand why the Department's project manager did not take 
some steps to address the state of the scaffolding which seemed to breach the 
most elementary requirements for stability and safety. As to foreseeability, the 
project manager appears not to have demanded evidence of the certification of 
the structural soundness of the scaffolding as required under the guidelines. 
That failure, together with the obvious inadequacies of the scaffold on site, 
should have raised concerns at an early stage and the failure to respond to those 
concerns indicates the foreseeability of the risk of failure of the scaffolding and 
the serious injury that might follow from such an event. 
76
 
Another example arose in the prosecution of Case 70
77
, which concerned the collapse 
of a brick wall, causing fatal injuries to two labourers on site. The defence attempted 
to minimise the culpability of the defendant by attributing the wall collapse to the 
failure of others at the work site.
78
. The judge disagreed, observing that 
Notwithstanding the contributing factors set out above, the Company, as 
Principal Contractor, had overall responsibility for the safety of the Site. It did 
not, as it should have, identify the hazard posed by the free-standing wall and 
take immediate steps to neutralise that hazard.
79
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On another occasion, (Case 2),
80
 the Court disallowed the defence’s attempt to 
absolve its client of responsibility by claiming that the worker had had a heart attack, 
with the judge commenting 
I am not satisfied Mr [B] had a heart attack but more importantly the identified 
detriment to safety was a risk of falling (for whatever reason) without any 
secondary restraint available for a man working two metres (approximately) 
above the ground.
81
  
In the same case, the defence submitted that there was no obligation on the defendant 
to supply scaffolding if the working height was less than two metres. The judge 
responded that that proposition did not address the defendant’s obligations to provide 
a safe work environment, and that safe alternatives were available. Despite the fact 
that the judge appeared to disregard the defence, such a light penalty on the 
defendant company was imposed ($30,000 of a maximum of $550,000), that 
WorkCover NSW successfully appealed, and the Full Bench imposed an increased 
penalty of $70,000.
82
 In Case 13, the defence claimed that drawings supplied to the 
defendant company by the builder were inadequate, and that the roof collapse which 
caused the fatality was due to the builder and not the defendant. Once again, the 
Court did not accept this defence stating that the defendant was expert in steel 
construction, should have realised the deficiencies, and had them corrected.
83
  
Several types of blame shifting were evident in Case 17, where the defendant 
attempted to shift responsibility to both the project manager and its own workers. 
The fatality occurred when a worker drowned in a flooded pipeline during building 
works, in which the defendant was the principal contractor, and where four other 
building companies were also working. In mitigation, the company submitted that it 
had relied on its contracted project manager and the ‘skill and experience of the 
defendant's employees to ensure that safety was maintained.’84   
In a separate hearing, the project manager, who was also charged, blamed the 
principal contractor. His defence conceded that the objective nature and quality of 
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the offence was in the moderate to serious range, but that the Court should consider 
the defendant’s belief that he 
‘had no idea that the occupational health and safety requirements under the Act 
were part and parcel of my responsibilities as a project manager’ and believed 
that they were the responsibility of [the principal contractor].
85
 (emphasis 
added)  
The judge did not accept this defence, and observed that ‘(B)eing a civil engineer 
with ten years' experience, it should have been obvious to [the defendant], as the 
person in charge of the project, that the responsibility for occupational health and 
safety lay with him.
86
 
In Case 22, a company director was charged when a concreter received fatal injuries 
due to the collapse of a concrete boom. The defendant blamed the concrete pump 
provider, and the design of the pump boom.
87
 The evidence showed that the 
company’s director was relatively inexpert in operating this type of plant, and relied 
on others to help him. Blame was also apportioned to the industry and the regulator, 
with the defence’s submission stating that little had been done to ‘police the industry’ 
apart from a Code of Practice released by WorkCover NSW in 1994, and an advisory 
document put out by the industry association 7 years previously. The defence 
submitted that ‘[t] here is no strict programme in place, even now in this industry, 
where such machinery has to be inspected by a licensed mechanic and registered 
every year.’ 88  The defence also attempted to cast doubt about the cause of the 
concrete pump defects, implying that they might have been caused when the plant 
was idle in an ‘unsecured yard’. The defence then turned attention to the worker, 
pointing out that had he been wearing his hard hat, serious injury or death might have 
been prevented. The state came in for criticism as well –‘[W]hile there is an absolute 
duty placed upon the defendant, that absolute duty can at times be a little unfair, and 
that is one of those occasions.’89  
Although the defence in Case 75 identified ‘apparent contributing causes by persons 
other than the defendant’, the judge responded that ‘that that does not necessarily 
exculpate any liability of the defendant’. Even if that were the case, the judge 
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reasoned, the defendant failed in their duty of care and did not identify the dangerous 
environment that led to the fatality.
90
 The defendant company claimed that there 
were ‘large numbers of contributing causes to the accident,’91 , but this was not 
accepted by the Court, with the judge commenting that the defence: 
overstated the position and in such a way as to invite error in the sentencing 
process. There can be no doubt, in my view, that in determining the culpability 
of a defendant the role played by other parties is necessary to be considered as 
part of a review of the total circumstances of the case.
92
   
Blaming the worker 
There were specific attempts by the defence to blame workers, and this pulverising 
technique was employed in 12 cases. In Case 15, the defendant acknowledged that he 
had not supervised the work, but he believed it had been done correctly and ‘he 
thought the workmen performing the work knew how to do their job properly as they 
had previously performed this task.’ 93 The deceased in Case 11 was an experienced 
worker who had performed a very familiar task in a risky manner according to the 
defence. The defendant, painted by the defence as an ‘exemplary company’ was 
found guilty of the offence but discharged without conviction.
94
  
The defence had attempted to show that the deceased in Case 71 was negligent by 
failing to wear his seat belt. However, the judge disagreed, pointing out that the seat 
belt policy was very loosely applied by trainers and workers, and that it was a 
‘persistent, industry-wide problem.’ Appropriate risk assessments had not been 
undertaken, the defendant had control; of the operation, which had ‘obvious risks’ 
attached, and that risk management consisting of training alone was inadequate. 
95
 
The judge said 
As the authorities have long observed, employers must also ensure the safety of 
careless or negligent employees. Merely training employees as to the existence 
of safety risks and in how they may be avoided will not necessarily put an 
employer in the position where it has met its obligation to ensure safety. Here, 
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the defendant's failure to enforce its seat belt policy, also confirmed that the 
defence was not made out. 
96
 
The Industrial Court has built up an extensive array of case law relating to health and 
safety In Case 29, when deliberating questions of employer responsibility and 
culpability, the Court referred to previous decisions in considering ‘common risks on 
building sites where numerous contractors are engaged in various capacities,’ 97 
observing that: 
where an operator continues to operate in circumstances that present an obvious 
and known risk to persons working at the site and which constitutes an offence 
under the Act, the culpability of the operator will not be removed by the fact 
that other persons may also have responsibilities in relation to the safety of the 
site generally, or related responsibilities as to a particular operation at that 
workplace.  
And also that 
The duty to be proactive falls equally upon each and every employer or self-
employed person on a particular site, subject, of course, to a consideration of 
whether the risk emanated from the relevant 'undertaking' and 'place of work'. 
However, when determining an appropriate penalty in circumstances where 
more than one individual or legal entity can be said to have contributed to the 
relevant risk, it is important to view the nature and seriousness of the 
defendant's offence by reference to the contribution of the defendant to the 
relevant risk.
98
 
Here, the advantage of a specialist court becomes apparent, as it allows judges to 
familiarise themselves with the particular characteristics of different industries. In 
this case, the complexities of contractual arrangements in construction work were 
readily identified and considered in court decisions.  
A final example of the defence strategy of blaming the worker is seen in the 
following extract and needs no further comment: 
Mr Bonnici (defence) submitted that the way the wall fell on the deceased was 
not clear. His client was in business in a modest way. The company had ceased 
demolition work. It had been doing "extremely well", employing the deceased 
and four casual employees. The deceased had been hired as a bobcat operator. 
Perhaps he had pulled the wall over on himself.
99
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Individualising the event 
Individualising an event isolates it from its context, and creates it as something 
‘unique...incomparable...special, individual and atypical’. 100  The event is so 
exceptional that no lessons can be drawn from it, no ‘far reaching conclusions 
concerning any change of course’.101 This strategy was part of the defence in 14 
cases, and is exemplified in the way the defence presented its submissions in Case 5, 
an incident that killed two men and injured three others. The circumstances were 
presented as an isolated and individualised occurrence, especially in the light of the 
multitude of comprehensive safety systems that the defendant had in place. Part of 
the defence’s case relied on two affidavits, the first of which ran to sixty-seven 
pages, with a second clarifying supplement of seven pages. They contained the 
personal and work history of the Acting Director General (A/DG) of this state 
government department, and his many accomplishments. They detailed the 
department’s exemplary efforts in managing workplace health and safety and its 
involvement in the state government’s construction consultation committee. The 
A/DG was very active in all aspects of construction safety, being personally briefed 
on all safety incidents and following up on further improvements. He made quarterly 
visits to all sites where the department was involved in work. At the time of the 
incident, the Department had a comprehensive system of contractor management.
102
 
These very detailed submissions assisted in obscuring the fact that the defending 
corporation had failed in its supervisory responsibilities to the extent that a 
preventable fatal incident ensued.  
In cases involving middle to large size companies, it is usual for the defence to 
emphasise the extent of companies’ safety systems. Thus, for example in Case 9, 
detailed submissions were made about safety management systems, policy manuals, 
training and inductions, reviews, audits, surveys relating to safety culture, fostering 
of safety culture, annual re-induction programs for sub contractors and employees. 
The Court was informed about the firm’s comprehensive local and national 
communication systems, tool box talks, board reporting mechanisms, annual training 
needs analysis and implementation, the employment of full time health and safety 
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staff, the safety responsibilities expected by all staff, ongoing OHS personnel needs 
analyses, dismissal policies for safety breaches. If this was insufficient, defence also 
supplied a ‘great deal of background information’ about how the company became 
involved in the project. This ran to ten paragraphs of the judgement transcript and 
one thousand eight hundred and twenty eight words (paragraphs 23–32.). The events 
surrounding this fatal incident were unique according to the defence, as the company 
‘had not experienced a failure of the type that occurred in this accident.’103 
The ‘one off’, individual factor for the defence in Case 13 was evidence to show that 
before the collapse of a building the engineering drawings showed that ‘there was 
nothing in the structural steel drawings provided to the Defendant to indicate that the 
structural steelwork needed to be erected in any particular sequence or using any 
particular procedure.’104 The defendant in Case 40 testified that ‘it was the first time 
in his work history that he had ever seen a main electricity switchboard that had been 
tampered with like the one at Dobu Place.’105 This defendant also blamed his prime 
contractor for failing to disconnect power at the dwelling where an electrical fatality 
occurred. In his experience ‘the Corporation cut off the power: that was not his 
obligation.’106 
Case 20 demonstrates the judge’s views of the behaviour of the defendant’s Site 
Safety Coordinator (SSO) as an apparent aberration, not typical of his usual practice. 
He accepted that the SSO performed his job ‘thoroughly and conscientiously’ and 
that his failure to properly check the installation of the safety mesh (which failed, 
causing the death of a young worker) ‘as an oversight in what was an otherwise 
robust workplace safety system at the defendant's worksite.’107 The judge detailed the 
checks and balances the defendant had in place, attesting again to the uniqueness of 
this event. Indeed, prior to the incident, the defendant had been commended by 
WorkCover NSW Authority for its occupational health and safety system as being 
‘mature, robust, well implemented, [with a] continuous improvement culture 
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evident’.108 Furthermore, its Western Australian and Victorian divisions had been 
highly praised for their efforts in safety.
109
These remarks were not challenged by the 
prosecution, who might well have pointed out that the defendant’s practices in other 
states were irrelevant to the incident in hand, and that whatever the company’s 
alleged merits might be, the result proved fatal for a young worker.  
Normalising the event 
The other face of individualising events is the technique of making something seem 
normal rather than abnormal; of transforming it into something ‘repetitive rather than 
incomparable, something general and ...typical, rather than ...special and atypical’.110 
In the Victorian magistrates’ courts, ‘normalisation [occurred] through analogies’, 
which likened health and safety events to normal daily phenomena. ‘Normalisation 
involves emphasising the similarity of features of the event with other events in the 
common experience of the magistracy’.111 The analysis of cases in this thesis did not 
demonstrate that this was a technique used by the defence. This may be because it is 
doubtful that judges would accept that defective health and safety systems were 
‘normal’, as it appeared to be in the Victorian examples, where one magistrate 
commented ’[T]he hazards for man are not peculiar to the industrial field’112  
However, there were nine instances where judges in the NSW IC commented on 
what might be called the ‘structural normalcy’ of the construction industry as a 
hazardous occupation. For example ‘...[T]he defendant operates in an important and 
inherently dangerous industry;’113 ...the respondent was a large enterprise in one of 
the State's more dangerous industries...’;114 ‘... as the accident had occurred in a 
notoriously dangerous industry (the construction industry) and 'fall' accidents 
continued to feature in OHS prosecutions...’; 115  ‘Demolition work is notoriously 
dangerous and when conducted with no effective supervision avoidable risks of 
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serious injury or death can readily occur’.116 Although these remarks were made in 
the context of reprimanding the defendant, it is likely that in acknowledging the 
inherent industrial risks, Courts might be more inclined to give less weight to the 
issue of foreseeability. The Court has occasionally seen the dangerous nature of the 
industry as a reason for lessening the penalty where the large scale of a particular 
corporation and the numbers of employees is seen in mitigation of the offence
117
. 
Good corporate citizenship 
The defence of good corporate citizen is generally considered in relation to the 
subjective factors that the Court considers. Claims made to establish good corporate 
citizenry include: the defendants’ length of time in the industry, the absence of prior 
convictions, contribution to employment, involvement in the community, 
involvement with the industry, contributions to charity, to women’s employment 
initiatives, indigenous employment, health promotions, employee assistance 
programs, study leave for employees, awards for excellence.
118
 The popularity of this 
defence strategy is evident in the 17 instances in which it was used. For example in 
Case 5, the defendant was a state government department, therefore parts of its ‘good 
citizenship’ were directly attributable to its obligations under state public service 
legislation or policies, such as equal employment, provision of varieties of leave 
including study leave, and employee assistance plans. 
119
 
Other examples of company ‘virtues’ tendered in mitigation were the provision of 
counselling services after fatal incidents and establishment of trust funds for a 
relative of the deceased. In Case 6, when considering the question of general and 
specific deterrence, the good citizenship submission meant that the judge considered 
that there were: 
...significant aspects of the case which limit the need to be heavy-handed in 
[respect to specific deterrence]... its creation of the trust for the deceased 
employee's granddaughter, which will act as a constant reiteration to the 
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defendant of its failing in the present matter and thus its need to be diligent in 
the interests of workplace safety.’ 120   
Therefore, in the Court’s view, general deterrence was more significant. 
Notwithstanding, the defendant, who had pleaded guilty under s15 of the NSW 
OHSA 1983, was granted a 35 per cent discount and fined $71,000 of a maximum 
$550,000.
121
 
In a more unusual good citizenship plea, the defendant in Case 9 spoke about his 
close relationship with the deceased and that as he had been a practising Catholic, the 
defendant called a priest to bless the site after the incident and at each anniversary 
thereafter. The local council had approved the re-naming of a street after the 
deceased. The company had sponsored a junior rugby league club to keep 
‘Aboriginal children out of trouble’. It had held a golf day and had raised $60,000 for 
a children’s hospital. The Court commented that ‘in a variety of ways these 
documents spoke of [the company’s] involvement in the community, its charitable 
works and its involvement in safety and the good reputation it generally enjoyed in 
the construction industry and in the community 
122
   
In Case 12, the fact that management attended the site after the incident and 
commenced investigations was put forward in mitigation, although this would have 
been a legal obligation and expected behaviour. The company organised a wake for 
the deceased, paid for his funeral in New Zealand, and for his family to attend. One 
of the defendants supported community initiatives and various charities.
123
 These 
qualities were ‘conceded’ by the prosecutor as attesting to the good corporate 
citizenship of the companies.  
Discussion 
This case analysis has dealt with the issue of prosecution, sentencing and penalty 
outcomes through a textual analysis of judgements in the NSW IC, a superior court 
that has considerable expertise in hearing industrial and serious OHS cases. Thus, its 
institutional machinery differs from that of the Victorian magistrates courts, and 
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consequently some attempts by the defence, or inadvertently by the prosecution, to 
decontextualise issues are not as successful as in the Victorian cases. For example, 
the ‘careless worker’ defence did not sway most judges, and blame shifting was also 
not so successful. The paradoxical issue is that, though judges’ frequently 
commented on the gravity of the offences,
124
 their ultimate decisions were reflected 
in pulverised penalties.  
The technique of isolation was a common defence strategy in the judgements under 
consideration. While judgements, in some cases, reiterated the actual specificities 
leading to the event, the future consequences of the defendant’s behaviour was not 
considered, other than giving regard to specific and/or general deterrence. Given that 
an aim of WorkCover NSW guidelines is to change behaviour and to protect the 
public interest, it is curious that the ability of the court to impose court orders under 
ss112 -117 of the NSW OHS Act 2000 which, among other things, can require the 
offender to make restitution, or to carry out appropriate rectification projects, are 
rarely implemented.
125
 This is an issue explored further in the following chapter. In 
addition, the sentencing guidelines refer to future outcomes, for example, they refer 
to rehabilitation and deterrence, elements that could be factored into improved 
sentencing outcomes through court orders.  
The effort (or otherwise) of the defendant in improving safety on the job is, for the 
court, an important ingredient to consider during the judgement phase. The cases 
show that these endeavours have considerable weight when leniency is being 
considered. Because of the time lapse between the incident and the hearing, between 
3-4 years on average, the judge focuses on any improvements made by the defendant 
during that period. That is, the isolation technique of ignoring future consequences is 
not so evident in the NSW judgements, and the defence is able to capitalise on 
putting the events surrounding the fatality into an outmoded and distant past, which 
has a positive bearing on the decision of the court, and the judgement does not focus 
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on what should have happened prior to, or at the time of the incident but on what has 
happened since.  
The next chapter extends this discussion and proposes that the silencing of events are 
a product not only of pulverisation techniques but are also due to the influence and 
requirements of the formalities of NSW state legislation and regulatory constraints, 
and the more informal customs and practices associated with case law. It is argued 
that it the synthesis of these elements and their antecedents which contribute to the 
production of consistently low penalties for workplace deaths. That is, 
decontextualisation is a process based in the institutions of the state and not just in 
the agency of the actors, the judges, prosecutors and defence.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Silencing OHS crime 
It is often suggested that OHS should be the top priority. While this is a worthy 
ideal every organisation should strive for, the reality is that making a profit will 
always be the highest priority of a business.
1
 
Chapter Five demonstrated the ways in which decisions in the IC could be 
categorised using the Mathiesen typology. It showed the formulaic nature of 
judgements, as they were guided by the inescapable rules of sentencing, as outlined 
in Chapter Four. To reiterate, the NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 not 
only set out the purposes of sentencing, that is punishment, deterrence, community 
protection, public recognition of harms perpetrated, and denunciation of these harms, 
it established those factors that the court must take into consideration when 
considering a sentence. These mitigating and aggravating factors are those that steer 
the outcomes – pulverised sentences. In NSW it is not so much the strategy or 
artifice of the defence, or, as was the case in Victoria, the ‘world view’ of the 
magistracy which contributes to decontextualised verdicts, but the spirit of the state 
legislation itself, that is, ‘the blunt nature of legal rules [which] invariably 
decontextualise complex social phenomena such as OHS’.2 
The interaction of state legislation, regulatory policies and judicial imperatives are 
important features in the production of lenient penalties. However, factors outside of 
these phenomena influence the ways in which firstly, health and safety in principle, 
and, secondly, the harms caused by health and safety crimes, are seen by regulators, 
law and policy makers and the community in general. That is, other methods of 
silencing health and safety harms, either explicitly, as in attempts to remove 
collective protections around OHS harms, or implicitly, as in absenting OHS as part 
of the overall legal framework, are discussed. Ideology guides the way that OHS is 
viewed by those parts of the state involved in the enforcement processes. In this 
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confused and contradictory process, the structural location of the court and its 
process of judicial reasoning reflects the acceptance that OHS breaches are not 
crimes and that the legal framework finds it difficult to accommodate the collective 
aspects of work regulations. 
First, we consider IC decisions to reveal some of the contradictions intrinsic to their 
reasoning. An essential principle that runs through all OHS prosecutions for fatality 
is evident in the following extract, which concerns the death of a 29-year-old 
labourer, crushed by a concreting machine.  
...the crucial consideration is that the true measure of penalty lies in the nature 
and quality of the offence and although due allowance has to be made for 
subjective considerations, it is essential that the Court ensure that the 
allowance for those factors does not produce a sentence which fails to take 
account of the objective gravity of the offence. In assessing penalty, the 
maximum penalty available for the offence reflects the public expression by 
parliament of the seriousness of the offence with a large penalty indicating the 
gravity of the offence as perceived by the community. In those circumstances, 
the task of this Court is to assess the relative seriousness of the particular 
offence in relation to the worst case in which the maximum penalty is provided, 
having been increased to $500,000 shortly before the incident. The approach 
that courts should take in relation to that circumstance is well settled in that it 
requires the existing sentencing pattern "to move in a sharply upward manner". 
The gravity of the consequences of an accident, such as the damage or injury, 
does not, of itself, dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of the 
penalty. However, a breach where there was every prospect of serious 
consequences might be assessed on a different basis to a breach unlikely to have 
such consequences. The occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the 
degree of seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety. (emphasis added). 
3
 
This statement typifies the approach taken in the judgements reviewed in this thesis, 
and is not contested, as it reflects the principles set out in the sentencing rules, and 
higher court authority, by which judges are bound. However, if the maximum penalty 
amount is to reflect ‘the public expression by parliament of the seriousness of the 
offence’ then it is questionable as to why the courts consistently provide sentences 
representing 18 per cent of the maximum allowable, especially in the light of the 
requirement to ‘sharply increase’ sentencing patterns. Are penalties in this range 
consistent with one of the principles noted in the extract, that is, indicative of public 
expectations that a large penalty should indicate the gravity of the offence as 
perceived by the community? Indeed, what are the expectation of the community 
regarding workplace death and disability? There has been minimal research in this 
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area, although as noted previously, several recent studies have canvasses the views of 
persons associated with workplace fatalities, that is, employers and families.
4
 The 
expectations of families are that offenders will be punished for the death of their 
family members, as for example, a criminal law case might prosecute for murder or 
manslaughter, but the reality is that offenders are seen to be punished for a breach of 
regulatory law, one administered by the regulator and not the police. The common 
precept referenced in all cases states that  
...the true measure of the penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence 
and not merely the result. The gravity of the injury actually resulting from the 
breach does not of itself dictate the amount of penalty, nevertheless, the 
occurrence of death or serious injury manifests a degree of seriousness of the 
relevant detriment to safety
5
. 
Of necessity, charges laid by the prosecution have to be specified according to the 
precise sections of the relevant parts of the NSW OHS Act 1983 and NSW OHS Act 
2000, which, in this sample, were mainly directed to the general duty of care of the 
employer; that is, to ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of employees by 
providing safe premises, equipment, substances; by providing training, supervision 
facilities, and providing safe systems of work. Offenders might be prosecuted for 
some or all of these provisions, but because of the compartmentalisation of the 
offences, there was no real opportunity for either the prosecution or the judges to 
reflect more holistically on the organisation of work, and the social relations of 
production that characterise the construction industry.  
For example, although the WorkCover NSW Compliance Policy and Prosecution 
Guidelines June 2010 stated that one of its ‘core concepts’ was to ensure that 
corporations or other duty holders complied with the provision to provide safe work 
systems and reviewed compliance with this provision,
6
 it appears from the 
judgements that the Court did not have these concepts in the forefront of its 
reasoning, and so an opportunity to reflect on the overall management of health and 
safety was not availed upon. This is typified in Case 27 where the judge stated 
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Such a proposition [measures to ensure safe operation of equipment] from the 
prosecution might well be drawn to the industry’s attention. However, it is not 
the role of this Court to design a system of work. The basic failure, in the facts 
as presented, was the failure to ensure the maintenance on the boom pump had 
been properly carried out on this machine to ensure safety of all persons at the 
defendant's worksite.
7
  
Here, the emphasis on technical failures overshadows the bigger picture. Obviously, 
the mere provision of safe work systems does not address the totality of the 
procedures required to ensure a safe and healthy workplace, as more overarching 
measures, which begin at the planning stages of a construction project, must be 
considered.  
The approach adopted in this case is one that also typifies the remarks of the 
sentencing judge of the Industrial Court, who regularly refer to an important 
guideline judgement of the NSW IC Full Bench.
8
 This decision sets out the rules 
implicit in the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, and reiterates the method of determining a 
sentence which, in a legal sense, must accurately and objectively reflect the gravity 
of the particular offence; that the penalty must reflect the nature and quality of the 
particular offence; that the level of penalty must be such as to compel attention to 
occupational health and safety risks so that persons are not exposed to workplace 
risks.
9
  
In Case 27, and again, typifying other cases ,the judge commented that objectively 
the matter warranted a ‘substantial penalty’, mentioned that the maximum penalty 
reflected the ‘public expression’ by Parliament of the seriousness of the offence; that 
it was the Court’s task to assess the relative seriousness of the offender's particular 
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offence in relation to a worst case scenario.
10
 The judge gave ‘significant weight’ to 
general deterrence, and commented that   
‘a small or nominal fine will not satisfy the element of general deterrence, let 
alone the requirement for punishment. The imposition of a small or nominal 
fine, in respect of a serious breach of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 
1983 has little or no effect as a deterrent to other possible offenders.’11  
Although the judge accepted the stated contrition of the company, he noted that there 
appeared to be no ‘evidence of any specific tangible acts confirming that contrition 
which are often found in cases such as the present.’12 In terms of general deterrence, 
he remarked on the need ‘to compel the attention of large operators (including the 
defendant) in the construction industry to the need to ensure that their operations are 
conducted with the greatest regard to safety, as is required by the terms of the Act’.13 
After considering all these factors, the penalty imposed on a very large national 
construction company that failed to provide appropriate safe working methods and to 
insure their implementation was $125,000, which represented 25 percent of the 
maximum fine.
14
 It is questionable whether penalties in this range are sufficient to 
act as general deterrents. It is also difficult to comprehend how a penalty that is one 
quarter of the maximum allowable can be seen as satisfying community expectations 
that punishment in the case of death at the workplace is sufficient and just. The 
discount in penalty reflecting contrition and an early guilty plea in this case, appear 
to be arbitrary, given the judge’s statements, but not unusual when compared with 
other judgements reviewed for this thesis. That is, as Chapter Five demonstrated, 
there was a considerable gap between the Court’s pronouncements and the actual 
outcome.  
Prosecutors cannot seek to sway the Court towards particular magnitudes of 
sentence, but can suggest ranges and severity of custodial or non-custodial sentences, 
with reference to appellate authority. Prosecutors may also suggest ranges of 
discount in relation to mitigation. For example, in Case 41 the prosecutor suggested a 
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discount between 10 and 25 percent for an early guilty plea
15
 and in Case 2, the 
prosecutor’s support for an early plea resulted in a discount of 25 percent.16   
Judgement transcripts showed that prosecutors did not recommend custodial 
sentences, and few suggested a penalty in the upper range. On the other hand, some 
were prepared to propose mitigation factors, normally a defence duty. As prosecutors 
have to rely on appellate authority in suggesting sentencing ranges, it is not 
surprising that more severe penalties were not requested, given that there had been 
no precedent set for the imposition of these penalties. However, it is not completely 
clear why other measures allowed by the OHS legislation were not suggested to the 
court. In addition to any other penalty, the court could impose a range of orders in 
connection with an offence under the NSW OSHA 2000 Part 7 Division 2 s.112 to 
117.
17
 These were restorative orders,
18
 where the offender could be ordered to 
remedy any matters caused by the offence that is within their power to do so; repay 
to WorkCover expenses in relation to the investigation of the incident
19
 and required 
to publicise
20
 the court outcomes, including the nature of the offence, its 
consequences, penalty imposed and any other related matter. 
The court may make these orders in relation to specific persons or classes of persons, 
for example, to publish in relevant trade or industry journals, newspapers, annual 
reports or shareholder information sources. If the offender fails to comply, the 
prosecutor may take action to carry out the order, noting, as well as the required 
information as above, the fact of the offender’s on-compliance. Any costs incurred in 
this case, are recoverable from the offender. The court can also order that offenders 
undertake specified projects relating to general improvements in health and safety.
21
 
Penalties
22
 apply for failure to comply with these orders. The repealed NSW OSHA 
1983 had a provision at s 47A
23
 that allowed the court to impose, in addition, to the 
prescribed penalty, orders to remedy matters that were within the convicted person’s 
ability to do so and in a specified period.  
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However, the IC has made little use of these provisions, though it appears they have 
been used more in the lower court. For example, one case heard in the IC
24
 involved 
a large construction company that was ordered to publicise its conviction, and in 
2004, five cases were heard in the NSW Chief Industrial Magistrates Court (CIMC) 
where publicity orders were made under s115 that required offenders to publicise 
their offences to their employees.
25
 In another case in the CIMC
26
, the magistrate 
ordered the company to undertake an OHS project.  
The uncommon use of these provisions was highlighted by a WorkCover news 
bulletin that reported the ‘unusual step’ taken by a NSW IC judge to order an 
offender convicted of the serious injury of an apprentice worker to advertise the 
details of the case in the print media.
27
 The offending company was obliged to 
advertise in at least one major metropolitan newspaper and two trade journals, in 
addition to a fine of $65,000 plus costs to WorkCover. The apprentice carpenter 
suffered major injuries after a fall from height, a very common cause of death and 
injury in the construction sector. The presiding judge said: 
An illustration of what can go wrong by reference to an actual incident is much 
more effective in compelling attention to a particular matter that the mere 
recitation or incanting of a set of rules or basic principles, most of which people 
in the construction industry will have heard before. Mere repetition does not 
attract attention.
28
  
Why court orders were not more widely used is debatable, even though judicious 
application would seem to be in step with the aims of sentencing legislation. A senior 
prosecuting barrister suggested that court orders were seen as  
...unusual or out of the mainstream or things that really are not what the system 
is about ...it should be about punishment and [orders] are not seen as 
punishment ... I’ve never had instructions from anyone I’ve done prosecutions 
for to seek those orders.
29
 
Prosecutors would not ‘presume’ to tell a judge what to do, although they could 
suggest penalty and discount ranges.
30
 It was doubtful that WorkCover had the 
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administrative resources to monitor procedures associated with court orders. The 
courts and prosecutors attention was on compliance with specific sections of the 
OHS Acts and their more usual punishments, rather than on more inventive ways of 
seeking redress for harms.   
The judiciary have taken the view that it’s a matter for them, to determine what 
orders they impose, but generally they have not taken a position of imposing 
orders ... they are a rarity. We have had a difficult relationship in that regards in 
that some member of the judiciary have taken the position that it’s not for us to 
make representation around orders, but others have done the opposite…there is 
not a lot of informed thinking or experience around these issues. But 
anecdotally... the courts and defendant have probably taken the position that it’s 
imposing a penalty times two, so it hasn’t had a lot of application...[T]he courts 
haven’t really had an informed position in terms of the scope and application of 
project orders, and neither has Work Cover.
31
  
A judge in the NSW IC stated that he would not object to the prosecution suggesting 
penalty options such as court orders, but that as they are not a legal alternative to the 
more usual financial penalties, the courts and the regulator would be are reluctant to 
impose additional cost burdens.
32
 This penalty conservatism is consistent with the 
formulaic nature of the decisions that are influenced by the mode of sentencing, that 
is, ‘two-tiered’ or ‘instinctive synthesis’.  
Chapter Four showed that both regimes have their critics, with the former DPP 
observing that two-tiered sentencing may lead to a mechanistic approach, and 
presumably, a mechanistic outcome. Where ‘instinctive synthesis’ is employed, the 
various case elements and sentencing principles are weighed up in reference to all the 
case circumstances. Mackenzie reported that judges in her study preferred the 
instinctive or intuitive sentencing option, because they believed it allowed them 
maximum discretion. However, decisions for workplace death heard in the IC 
showed that judges applied instinctive synthesis in only eight cases, and of these 
cases, the same judge figured in six instances. While the judges in the sample of 
cases examined appeared to prefer two tier sentencing, they often made reference to 
the principal authority, that is the landmark case of Markarian v The Queen [2005] 
HCA 25: 18 May 2005, where by a majority of the High Court ( Kirby J dissenting), 
generally disavowed the sequential or two tiered approach to sentencing. However, 
this case did not entirely reject the proposition that, in some circumstances, ‘an 
arithmetical process’ would be appropriate. The Court continued  
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... in a simple case, indulgence in arithmetical deduction by the sentencing 
judges should be absolutely forbidden. The law strongly favours transparency. 
Accessible reasoning is necessary in the interests of victims, of the parties, 
appeal courts, and the public. There may be occasions when some indulgence in 
an arithmetical process will better serve these ends.
33
 
This gave judges a rationale for adopting the two-tier approach, which was apparent 
in their discounting methods for penalty pronouncement. Discounts applied for early 
guilty pleas are purely of economic benefit to the state, as the following extract 
shows.  
So, the quantification of the discount commonly applied for an early plea of 
guilty or assistance to authorities is offered as an incentive for specific 
outcomes in the administration of criminal justice and is not related to 
sentencing purposes. (emphasis added).
34
  
In Case 27, a discount was allowed for an early guilty plea, even thought the judge 
observed that had the proceedings been contested, a finding of guilt was virtually 
inevitable. The economic considerations of awarding discounts were also evident in 
this case.  
By virtue of Section 439 of the Crimes Act, 1900 (as Amended), the Sentencing 
Court is specifically required to take the plea of guilty into account in the 
Defendant's favour in assessing the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Where 
appropriate, a plea of guilty should attract a discount for utilitarian 
considerations, sufficient to encourage Defendants to enter pleas of guilty. In 
determining the degree of discount which should apply in a particular case, 
regard must be given to the following factors:  
(a) The strength of the Crown's case;  
(b) Time at which the plea is entered; and  
(c) The savings to the State of Court's time and the saving to the State of the 
costs of a trial.  
3. In addition, a plea of guilty may attract a greater degree of leniency where, in 
addition to the factors set out above, it reflects contrition on the part of the 
Defendant.
35
 
Discounts for early guilty pleas are common in many criminal trials, but in some of 
the judgments considered here, the plea was changed at the last minute, in what 
might be assumed to be an attempt to gain penalty reduction. In these cases, despite 
the late change, the judge still awarded a discount for a guilty plea. Both the state and 
the offender benefit from discounting, but deterrence may lose out. The focus of 
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regulatory agencies is on inspection and compliance, with financial penalties 
applicable when action is taken by them, which are often so lenient that companies 
can ignore the law because it is cheaper than providing required workplace 
conditions.
36
  
Chapter Two described the concern of business about what it saw as the onerous 
provisions of NSW’s OHS laws. 37  There were suspicions that the state Labor 
government had advised the regulator to take a moderate approach when dealing 
with business,
38
 and to focus particularly on the bottom end of the enforcement 
pyramid, that is strategies to encourage and assist duty holders to comply with the 
regulator, based on the provision of information, guidance, education and advice. 
This was to be the preferred approach before moving to the next more directive 
levels of issuing on the spot fines, improvement and prohibition notices, and only 
moving to the final level, prosecution, as a last resort. 
Johnstone
39
 argues that Robens style ‘advise and persuade’ approach in OHS 
enforcement ‘…has become the entrenched regulatory response in Australia to 
contraventions of OHS statutes… it is a historically contingent approach that has 
been taken for granted and until recently in Australia been left largely unexamined’.  
Tombs and Whyte
40
  maintain that the Robens philosophical approach of mutual 
interest between workers and employers does not recognise that employers exercise 
ultimate power in the workplace.  
Beginning with the industrial revolution, the British inspectorates favoured 
persuasion over punishment as the first deterrence measure, and only resorted to 
prosecution if employers remained non-compliant. Now, inspectors are more likely 
to prosecute in the case of serious violations leading to harm but it is claimed that 
this occurs more to satisfy public desire for retribution rather than for deterrent 
purposes.
41
 Regulatory agencies cite lack of resources and instances where 
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compliance is impossible or impracticable, to argue in favour of the persuasive 
approach. Although prescriptive safety regulations were promulgated to protect 
employees, the regulator’s conciliatory approach has lead critics to the view that laws 
designed for those possessing power in the workplace are enforced less rigorously 
than those designed to control other offenders such as traffic violators or petty 
criminals. This conciliatory position has been described as regulatory capture.
42
 That 
is, where regulatory agencies tended to be less punitive if they had a close 
relationship with small numbers of companies or industries, or when confronting big 
business. To be effective, regulators should implement more punitive responses.
43
   
This discussion has centred on the effect of state and regulatory policies and 
legislation that contribute to the pulverisation process, It has examined the 
mechanisms by which the state regulatory agency brings cases before the court; the 
court’s processes in enforcement through its punitive recommendations and the  
contradictions inherent in judicial rationalising of particular penalties. 
We now turn to a broader look at some of the structural reasons behind the 
‘silencing’ of workplace safety crimes. When the prosecution of OHS breaches 
finally reach the courts, their causes are not only situated in the immediate 
workplace, but are also a product of the prevailing ideas about health and safety. If 
these ideas are ones that reflect the dominant ideology that OHS crimes are not real 
crimes, then the ultimate penalties metered out will be affected by the prevailing 
attitudes.  
Silencing OHS crime: absenting OHS crimes from the ‘collective 
conscious’ 
There is an absence in mainstream judicial and criminological discourse about health 
and safety crime. For example, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has no 
OHS material on its web site, concerning itself only with environmental and 
economic crime, including crimes against business, fraud and corporate crime and 
identity fraud.
44
 The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research provides similar 
information, drawing its data from matters heard in the criminal courts at Local, 
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District and Supreme Court level, and providing detailed information about various 
crime categories, including information about victims and offenders, reported by 
locality and state level.
45
 Neither agency collects data on occupational health and 
safety crime, nor does the Judicial Commission of NSW. 
46
The state government 
website which provides information about court structures and systems does not 
mention the Industrial Court, stating that ‘the NSW criminal justice system consists 
of the Lower Courts (Local, Children’s) and the Higher Courts (District, Supreme 
Court (including Court of Appeal), despite the fact that the Industrial Court is, a 
superior Court.
47
  
Most Australian jurisdictions have either specific legislation relating to victims of 
crime or agencies that assist the victims. In NSW, the relevant legislation is the 
Victims Rights Act 1996, and Lawlink New South Wales provides the Victims of 
Crime Advice and Information website
48
, which offers guidance on a range of 
pertinent subjects. These include advice to victims of sexual assault; crimes against 
the person; domestic violence; road trauma and homicide. There is no mention of 
support for victims of criminal harms caused by negligence under the NSW OHS Act 
or Regulation, and it is left to the OHS regulator to provide support to those involved 
in workplace fatalities. 
Generally speaking, most law teaching texts do not specifically address OHS crime, 
though there is a large literature on white-collar crime.
49
 Although persons are more 
likely to sustain an occupational injury than to be victims of conventional violence, 
they remain invisible in either popular discourse or in statutory or institutional 
reportage.
50
 The difficulty of defining white collar crime has given rise to various 
definitions, with some commentators suggesting that the term occupational crime be 
used for those employees committing offences for personal gain, with the term 
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corporate crime being reserved for offences by the firm toward ‘members of the 
public, the environment, creditors, investors, or corporate competitors’. 51 
Occupational health and safety offences are dealt with under the heading of 
‘Offences against employees’ (which also includes industrial relations violations 
(economic offences) and discriminatory practices.
52
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
difficulties of prosecuting corporations for criminal offences stems from the concept 
of mens rea, the guilty mind, which applies to individuals rather to legal entities.  
The power of language and ideology to silence ‘inconvenient truths’ is now a given. 
Offences against health and safety legislation are rarely viewed as criminal, and have 
been dubbed ‘social welfare’ type regulatory offences.53 So, is a regulatory offence a 
criminal act? Are those who contravene regulatory laws criminals? Definitions of 
crime are plentiful, ranging from the narrow to the broad. If too narrow, harms such 
as those caused by corporations can be excluded, and if too broad, then most 
deviations can be labelled criminal
54
. If OHS harms are designated criminal, the state 
can be called upon to deem them as such and deal with them accordingly.
55
 Haines
56
 
notes the shift in the literature that first recognised that crimes committed by low 
status persons were labelled criminal, while those committed by corporations were 
treated as regulatory offences, to calls for the imposition of manslaughter charges to 
be laid for workplace deaths and the ‘recriminalisation’ of OHS laws. Other 
scholars
57
 have argued that corporations are ‘sensitive’ to criminal charges, and that 
these measures directed at high status organisations would be effective deterrents.  
Chapter Three discussed the marginalisation of safety crimes in Finland
58
 and the 
resultant perception of the non-criminality of OHS offences. More recently 
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Australian researchers
59
 found that prosecution had an impact on specific deterrence, 
in that employers took specific remedial action, where incidents of serious injury and 
death had occurred, but significantly, they were reluctant to accept responsibility and 
would not necessarily institute broader, long lasting preventative measures. 
Moreover, employers, whether from large or small companies, ‘strenuously objected 
to the criminalisation of OHS offences’, with employers in denial about their legal 
responsibilities in the workplace. The authors concluded that routine prosecution is 
essential in demonstrating to employers their central role in OHS. ‘To confine the 
role of prosecution to a measure of last resort...[is] likely to send the “wrong 
message” to employers about how the problem of serious OHS offences is 
understood by regulatory authorities and in civil society more broadly’.60  
Sinclair and Haines
61
 studied workplace fatalities in multiple employer workplaces, 
that is, those in which the company had multiple contractual relationships with others 
on the project (much like typical construction work). The research showed that 
companies adopted a multiplicity of defence strategies to minimise their 
responsibility and to lessen their trauma. The strategies were very similar to those 
described as pulverising techniques, that is, denial, blaming others, blaming workers, 
blaming equipment, normalising and splintering the event. These defensive strategies 
resulted in companies taking less than a pro-active stance towards improvements in 
their safety management systems, and were typical of employer responses nearly 20 
years later.
62
  
Employers ‘misdemeanours’? Unions ‘criminal acts’? 
The previous sections and material from foregoing chapters, shows that certain 
activities at work that lead to injury and illness are designated by the state as 
‘criminal’. Except in the regulations, the Robens approach fails to identify 
specifically these activities, leaving it up to the parties and the regulator to do so. 
Interestingly, the specific activities that are ‘wrong’ as set out in the regulation attract 
a lower penalty than the more ambiguous duties set out in the legislation. It is 
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therefore more and more up to the courts (based on the prosecutions brought by the 
enforcement agency, the regulator) to decide what activities are criminal, and as 
noted in Chapter Five, a designation of ‘criminality’ is rarely used in the court 
setting. This thesis has shown the processes that the NSW IC has used to both find 
these activities as wrong but not as criminal; they have generally been downgraded to 
administrative infractions. This is evident that in some cases for multiple fatalities 
and previous convictions, the penalties were never exacted at the highest level nor 
was the legislated provision for imprisonment employed.  
The rest of this chapter examines the treatment by the State of unions in the 
construction industry, as a counter point to the dilution of OHS crime. The last 
decade has seen activities of the construction industry unions, many of which are 
instrumental to ensuring compliance with OHS duties, designated as crimes. While 
the chapter does not look at the judicial processes (as is the case with OHS), it 
highlights how the state has legislated to capture particular activities (that were 
formerly legitimate and remain legitimate in other industries) as criminal. This 
redefinition of behaviour is consistent with the notions of ideology guiding particular 
policy developments and is consistent with a broad neo liberal philosophy. It also 
highlights the ‘contradictions’ related to the designation by the State of behaviours 
that can be designated as criminal in one sphere but not in another, and how the 
legitimacy of activities can be altered over time. 
In NSW, the adoption of the national model of OHS laws in 2011 (NSW Workplace 
Health and Safety Act 2011), under a federal government agenda of harmonisation, 
saw the state LNP government oppose unions’ rights to prosecute for OHS crimes 
and remove OHS hearings from the NSW IC. The harmonised laws also contained 
more stringent provisions regarding unions’ rights to enter workplaces,63 a move that 
directly affected unions’ ability to protect their members. Unions had a legal right to 
ensure that working conditions and arrangements such as changes to shift patterns, 
rosters, staff reductions, contractual arrangements and casualisation were not 
detrimental to workers’ health and safety. In unionised enterprises, officials had a 
role in negotiating appropriate agreements, an important role in sustaining optimal 
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OHS arrangements.
64
 Some large construction companies were willing to cooperate 
with unions in negotiating changes affecting workers’ conditions, including health 
and safety interests. However, some were also not averse to taking legal action 
against unions who imposed work bans or work stoppages because of health and 
safety concerns.
65
  
As Chapter Two pointed out, unions were significant agents in improving health and 
safety in workplaces, and in NSW had an inspectorial role as state authorised 
officers, as well as a right to initiate OHS prosecutions. In the construction industry, 
the regulator provided training to CFMEU C and G Division organisers in risk 
identification and inspection and the union saw itself as central to maintaining good 
OHS conditions on worksites.
66
 However, this role was one of the catalysts for anti-
union sentiment and action by building companies and the NSW LNP government 
and will be more closely examined in Chapter Seven. 
Union action against poor health and safety on construction sites was one of the 
drivers of two Royal Commissions into the construction industry. The first was 
ordered by the NSW LNP Coalition government in 1990 and known as the Royal 
Commission into Productivity in the Building and Construction Industry or the Gyles 
Commission, as it was headed by headed by Roger Gyles, Q.C. The terms of 
reference for the Gyles Commission were solely about productivity and efficiency 
with no reference to health and safety.
67
 Just over 10 years later, in 2001, a national 
Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Commission led by 
Terence Cole QC was instituted by the federal LNP Coalition government, (Cole 
Commission). Like its state predecessor, its formation was announced just before the 
federal government called an election. Again, like the Gyles Commission, there was 
no need for the inquiry and building and construction industry performance had been 
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highly rated when compared to other countries, with Australian productivity and cost 
ranked overall second out of 14 countries.
68
  
The government’s popularity was flagging; it needed to regain political momentum. 
‘Not for the first time, a conservative government opted for a Royal Commission 
focussing on union conduct, to provide some much needed political capital’.69The 
justification for the Commission was based on a short report from anonymous 
sources about the bad ‘behaviour’ of building unions, including criminal activities.70  
While the earlier, state, Gyles Commission found that the BWIU was innocent of 
charges of corruption and intimidation,
71
 employers did not fare so well, with the 
Commission finding widespread corruption and collusive activities and serious 
omissions in respect of OHS and industrial awards. Nevertheless, the Report 
concluded that some of this behaviour was ‘explained by the behaviour of the 
BWIU’.72 Gyles was also of the view that the BWIU’s attitude to the rule of law and 
disputation around agreements was such as to recommend its deregistration at state 
and federal level.
73
 He also concluded that industrial relations were best decided 
through criminal and civil sanctions, rather than arbitration and conciliation, which 
was, in the view of Nyland and Svenson
74
  a ‘giant leap backward’ to the nineteenth 
century systems of work relations’.   
In its Final Report, the later, federal, Cole Commission found 85 instances of 
‘inappropriate conduct’ by the construction unions, and only three by employers.75 
The findings of ‘unlawful’ behaviour on the part of the unions were in the nature of 
breaches of dispute settlement procedures in awards or agreements. The Commission 
did not examine employer breaches of awards/agreements or make specific findings 
about such breaches’ 76  and found only two OHS breaches by employers across 
Australia. There was no evidence of endemic corruption or criminality on the part of 
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unions, nor were unions found to engage in illegal OHS stoppages. Lawyers 
representing unions accused the Commissioner of political bias in calling selective 
witnesses and restricting normal cross-examinations.
77
 
Nevertheless, acting on recommendations made by the Cole Commission, the federal 
government established the Building Industry Taskforce (BIT) in 2002 to deal with 
alleged widespread disregard for the law. The front cover of its first report 
‘Upholding the Law: Findings of the Building Industry Taskforce’ September 2005, 
unlike more usual official government documents, consisted of a bright red collage 
of anti-union headlines taken from tabloid media headlines. At the close of the Royal 
Commission, the BIT was given 52 referrals of ‘serious incidents’, mainly relating to 
unions, and of these 47 were later discontinued.
78
 The BIT also had the power to 
investigate business conduct, but it limited that to occasions where companies and 
the union had agreements for particular matters. For example, in one large enterprise, 
there was a standard procedure for a management-union committee to audit death 
sites, with workers paid while the audit and agreed work was undertaken, however 
the BIT considered this as an illegal industrial action and proceeded to investigate the 
company.
79
 
The Taskforce operated until the establishment of the Australian Building and 
Construction Commissioner (ABCC) on 1 October 2005, under its enabling 
legislation the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act (Cwth) 2005 
(BCII Act).
80
 In the government’s words, the Act ‘redefines unlawful industrial 
action, strengthens coercion provisions and substantially increases penalties to reflect 
the seriousness of the offences’.81 It had wide investigatory and prosecutorial powers, 
operationalised through the ABCC. The Act’s provisions allowed the ABCC to 
oblige persons to provide information relevant to an investigation or to attend and 
answer questions relevant to an investigation. (s52 BCII Act).The Act carried 
criminal provisions under which a person was liable to six months imprisonment for 
                                                 
77
 Williams, G, 2008. The Australian Building and Construction Commission: an appropriate use of 
public power? Forum on Industrial Laws Applying in the Australian Construction Industry. National 
Press Club, Canberra, 25 August (2008); See also Roberts T, An Analysis of the Cole Commission 
into the Building and Construction Industry, (Sydney: CFMEU,2003); McQueen H, Framework of 
Flesh: Builders’ Labourers Battle for Health and Safety, (Port Adelaide; Ginninderra Press, 2009). 
78
CFMEU BIT Backgrounder, n.d. 
79
 Workers Online, Issue 226 25 June 2004 http://workers.labor.net.au/226/news1_hadgkiss.html 
80
Australian Building and Construction Commission n.d. 
81
 Ibid. 
 160 
failing to give required information; produce required documents; attend the 
Commission to answer questions; take an oath or affirmation; or answer relevant 
questions. There was no provision for a civil financial penalty option. Financial 
penalties include fines of up to $22,000 for a person, and $110,000 for an 
organisation. The prominent constitutional lawyer George Williams commented  
It is bad enough to ever give such unchecked powers to a government minister, 
it is even worse to confer them on an unelected body that is not answerable in 
parliament. This represents a concentration of executive power of the worst 
kind...
82
  
Federal Labor government retains the ABCC 
The ABCC had wide jurisdiction with powers to also investigate breaches of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cwth), the Independent Contractors Act 2006 (Cwth) 
and Commonwealth workplace agreements and awards, as well as any building code 
issued by the Minister.
83
 Unions had campaigned before the 2007 federal election for 
the abolition of the ABCC and BCII Act and continued to do so after the Federal 
Labor Party took office. One contentious issue was that the Act and the Commission 
was directed only at the construction industry, and the union movement in general 
accused the government of retaining a discriminatory body. The National Secretary 
of the C and G Division of the CFMEU found it ‘amazing’ that the new Labor Prime 
Minister should ‘care so little’ about workers rights, given that his government came 
to power in 2007 on a promise of restoring ‘Australian’s rights at work’.84 The Labor 
Party was committed to retaining the ABCC until 2010 after which it would be 
subsumed into an office of the industrial regulator, Fair Work Australia. This was not 
without wider criticism from within its own ranks, and in response the government 
established an inquiry into how the new arrangements would be exercised.
85
 
However, it recommended little significant change, including retention of the 
ABCC’s most repressive powers.  
The then federal Industrial Relations Minister and Deputy Prime Minister (later 
Prime Minister) refused to concede that that the Commission’s powers were too 
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capacious nor, she said, would they be curbed. The government found itself being 
praised by employers and condemned by unions, ‘in what has become an early test of 
relations with its caucus and its union base’.86 The Labor government was in tune 
with the Cole Commission’s (unproven) assumptions that union bullies overran the 
industry; and that unions were the main cause of loss of productivity. In the lead up 
to the federal elections of 2007, the Coalition government ran television 
advertisements depicting building workers as burley thugs intimidating cowering 
citizens, and adopting the same rhetoric after Labor’s election, the Deputy PM 
announced that her government would not tolerate union thuggery.
87
 
Since its inception in 2005, the ABCC annual reports show that building unions have 
been overrepresented in mentions and prosecutions. Some of these were for 
industrial actions related to health and safety, but were framed as illegal industrial 
actions. For example, three unions engaged in building and construction work were 
fined a total of $75,000 in breach of s38 of the BCII Act for ‘industrial actions’ in 
2007-2008, in what were essentially stop works over poor OHS conditions.
88
 Union 
organisers were banned from entering worksites for long periods of time, due to 
findings of their making ‘blatantly unacceptable statements’ 89  and for ‘bad 
behaviour’90, that is, for swearing, not an unusual occurrence in a robust masculine 
work culture. In that case, a NSW union official was forced to leave his employment, 
as he was unable to obtain a right of entry permit (ROE) because of his ‘criminal’ 
actions. Two union members were charged for failing to provide information to the 
ABCC when required to do so, and faced a penalty of six months imprisonment. 
Ultimately, both cases collapsed.
91
The fact that the ABCC applied a criminal 
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investigatory model in a non-criminal, industrial context stands in contrast to the 
reluctance of the State to apply such a model to health and safety crimes in a context 
that is both criminal and industrial.  While governments have seemed reluctant to 
enforce OHS obligations through criminal mechanisms, in this case there is evidence 
of the industrial being treated as criminal. It is pulverisation in reverse where 
particular behavioural acts (for example. swearing) are taken out of context and 
prosecuted. 
There are no empirical studies examining the effects on the construction industry as a 
whole, of ABCC activities under the former Coalition government and the present 
Labor government. However, it is likely that the targeting of union officials by the 
BIT and its successor the ABCC had consequences for union operations and safety in 
the industry. Anecdotal reports indicate that workers were less likely to speak up 
about safety issues, and that not all industry sectors were pleased with ABCC 
intervention. Many employers were disgruntled about the time and money expended 
on what they considered unnecessary and overly bureaucratic interference in their 
work.
92
 
The previous section of this Chapter showed the ambiguities and contradictions 
surrounding perceptions of OHS crimes and State and judicial practices 
accompanying its regulation. In effect, OHS breaches are seen more as 
administrative infractions, rather than as serious criminal harms, as in the case of 
workplace fatalities. However, in a reversal of this, the State, through its federal 
parliamentary system, has been willing to treat industrial matters, normally dealt with 
through various commissions and tribunals, as criminal events. While the labour 
movement and its supporters opposed diminution of the protections of IR and OHS 
legislation, employers were urging governments to take a more aggressive stance 
against organised labour, and there was, in this post-Robens environment, less 
cooperation and more conflict around OHS, particularly in the construction sector. 
In Britain and Australia, the stability of the workplace environment with a largely 
full time workforce, strong trade union participation and job security was thought to 
justify the Robens approach to OHS – an approach which sought to simplify the 
layers of prescriptive legislation, introducing consultative arrangements between 
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employers and workers, thus placing responsibility firmly in their joint hands in a 
spirit of mutual cooperation. The Robens’ philosophical approach lay in the belief of 
a commonality of interest and mutual responsibility for OHS ‘based upon unspoken 
assumptions that there would be a vigorous trade union movement covering almost 
half the workforce and that this union movement would play its role in the 
consultative process.’93  
The philosophy that endorsed a legitimate role for unions has no place in the 
ideological position fostered by Australian federal governments since 1996, because 
in the construction industry, union action was portrayed as criminal. A consequence 
of the BCII Act and the activities of the ABCC were to silence union officials and 
workplace delegates that in turn, silenced their activities around health and safety. It 
also silenced other illegal and corrupt activities by employers, identified in both 
Royal Commissions and not the least of which were the ongoing practices of sham 
contracting, phoenix operations and the use of illegal migrant labour. The ABCC’s 
focus on union behaviour allowed attention to these practices to go unchallenged. 
Although federal Labor successfully sought to retain the essential elements of the 
BCII Act, uneasiness among its parliamentary ranks and union pressure saw the LNP 
government’s appointed head of the ABCC replaced by a Labor appointee, whose 
first actions were to announce that it would investigate these illegal business 
practices.
94
  
This discussion has centred on the way in which the State adopted a neo-liberal 
rhetoric and ideological position in its stance toward representatives of the working 
class. It harnessed the powers of governments of both sides of politics and instituted 
repressive forces to silence its opposition. It also demonstrates how certain lawful 
behaviours (unions’ engagement in stopping works over sub standard health and 
safety conditions, investigations of illegal industrial practices and so on) were 
criminalised, while criminal behaviour, of an industrial and health and safety nature 
on the part of employers, went unnoticed.   
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Chapter Two showed how workplace traumatic death in the construction industry has 
remained reasonably constant over time but with a small rise in 2005-2008, the 
period in which the BCII’s provisions came into play. If other standard health and 
safety measures are not delivering a reduction in these figures, it makes sense to 
suggest that curbing union’s actions in affecting better outcomes is not helpful. That 
is, while the deterrent effect of low penalties remains in question, then other means 
of deterrence should be encouraged. The next Chapter discusses in more detail the 
recent changes to health and safety laws in Australia that will have implications for 
workers in NSW. Whether these are beneficial or detrimental changes and whether or 
not the result will be reductions in workplace traumatic fatalities, remains to be seen.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Recent Developments – Further Bricks in the Wall? 
This thesis has argued that the State, while not monolithic, has reflected a hegemonic 
ideology that pervades institutions and practices in different and distinct institutions. 
The name attached to the dominant ideology reflected in Australian state is neo 
liberalism. This ideology becomes most apparent when considering the very recent 
changes to the state regulation of OHS in NSW. This whole agenda for change has 
been underpinned by a search for reduced costs or better efficiencies, rather than a 
concern with safety or lack of effectiveness in existing practices or institutions. 
This study has examined how workplace traumatic injury resulting in death, is 
treated under a particular State system, and in a particular period of time, that is from 
1988 to 2008. It has explored some of the intricate hegemonic relationships that 
contribute to contradictory positions among State agencies and State apparatus. The 
outcomes at the level of law and justice for the punishment of OHS crimes has been 
less than satisfactory for workers, and indeed for sections of the construction 
industry, in their striving for ‘level playing fields’. It is necessary to give some 
consideration to recent institutional and legal changes that began in the later part of 
the study period and which have, and will continue to have, direct effects on these 
problems. 
The previous chapters have described how the State and its judicial, regulatory and 
parliamentary instruments produce varied health and safety outcomes for workers, 
depending on which political force gained ground in the ‘war of position’ between 
capital and labour. That is, on occasion the state Labor government supported more 
progressive health and safety legislation but ultimately, it did not opt to frustrate 
business interests, as exemplified in the regulator’s approach to compliance. The 
courts’ rhetoric about the seriousness of OHS offences that led to fatalities in 
workplaces did not lead to substantial penalties or other forms of deterrence.  
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At the federal level, regressive industrial legislation
1
 that weakened unions’ ability to 
protect workers from health and safety harms was endorsed by both sides of politics. 
While progressive individuals and unions struggled to maintain parity, in the end, 
legislation and practices that privileged business were implemented. The corollary of 
the form that this policy agenda has taken has been a weakening of the collective 
voice of workers in OHS machinery in NSW. Employees and their unions have a 
limited number of legitimate avenues to exert influence or enforce employer 
obligations, and where they have attempted to do so, have been limited by legislation 
that attaches criminality to union activities.  
This Chapter considers the changes to OHS legislation, arguing that they did little, if 
anything, to re-position serious health and safety offences as essentially criminal in 
nature, and for NSW, there were some tangible losses. It is likely that significant 
changes to the state judiciary will also have a bearing on how courts, other than the 
NSW IC, frame OHS offences. Their interpretation and future judgements on OHS 
offences will also ultimately have a bearing on the deterrence of workplace harms. 
The federal Labor government elected in 2007 softened, but did not entirely reject 
aspects of the conservative WorkChoices industrial legislation which had severely 
restricted the traditional rights of unions including their rights of entry to workplace 
provisions
2
 and as shown in the previous chapter Federal Labor retained the onerous 
provisions of the ABCC. In NSW, the Labor government lost the 2011 election to the 
conservative LNP coalition that quickly moved amendments to the OHS Act 2000 
and introduced the harmonised legislation before its expected commencement in 
2012. 
The federal arena: moving to national harmonisation of health and 
safety laws 
The incremental move toward common OHS standards at a national level has been 
framed by a rhetoric of efficiency rather than safety. The initiatives for uniformity 
have come from government concerns over the compliance costs of different 
regulatory regimes rather than any disquiet over the inadequate protection of worker 
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health and safety. The federal Labor government elected in 2007 followed through 
on a long-standing policy of national OHS harmonisation, one that had begun under 
a former federal Labor government. Following its creation in the mid 1980s, 
Australian states endeavoured to develop some consistency in the treatment of 
particular workplace hazards by adopting the standards promulgated by the tripartite 
national OHS body, (formerly called the National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission (NOHSC), now known as Safe Work Australia (SWA). In 1991, the 
NOHSC developed a strategy to harmonise OHS standards across Australia
3
, and this 
policy of national uniformity was implemented with the development and eventual 
promulgation by the state jurisdictions of OHS standards for six priority hazards. The 
take up was slow due to extensive consultation and other impact assessment 
requirements of the individual states.  
In 1995, an Industry Commission noted the probability of increased OHS compliance 
costs to business because of competing state jurisdictions because of increased 
interstate business operations. It recommended a course of cooperative federalism 
whereby all jurisdictions would adopt core health and safety legislation.
4
 In 2004, its 
successor, the Productivity Commission made further inquiries into OHS in 
Australia, with a view to investigate, once again, the possibility of a more 
harmonised framework. Its recommended approach was to strengthen the ‘national 
institutional structure based on NOHSC and the Workplace Relations Ministers 
Council (WRMC)...[and] progressively open up access to the existing Australian 
Government OHS regime, giving businesses the choice of a single set of national 
OHS rules.’5 In 2007, the Commonwealth Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 
(Cwth) was amended to allow licensed self-insurer employers to be regulated by it, 
instead of by the state jurisdictional regulators. This raised questions about the 
suitability of using OHS legislation primarily designed for public service workplaces, 
in more dangerous environments
6
 It also had a significant effect for those 
construction workers in NSW working for companies shifting to the Commonwealth 
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scheme, because unlike the NSW OHS Act 2000 there were no formal consultative 
requirements in the Commonwealth Act, nor did industrial organisations have the 
ability to prosecute employers. Some companies also argued that state union officials 
could not enter their worksites, as they no longer had jurisdictions.   
The LNP government replaced the NOHSC with the Australian Safety and 
Compensation Commission (ASCC) in response to the Productivity Commission 
report. Its role remained much the same, but it was expanded to include workers 
compensation policy.
7
 Its emphasis was on perceived industry cost burdens and it 
eliminated the former statutory inclusion of three worker representatives on the 
Commission.
8
 In 2005, the National Regulatory Taskforce was set up to investigate 
the causes of compliance costs to industry, and recommended inter alia that the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) implement nationally consistent OHS 
standards as a business advantage.
9
 The harmonisation process was incorporated into 
the COAG agenda for a ‘seamless national economy’. Of all regulatory concerns, it 
found that work, health and safety were the most pressing for business. Of the 27 
priority areas of regulation assessed by the COAG Business Regulation and 
Compensation Working Group, health and safety was ‘the number one issue’,10 in 
terms of economic considerations to business. A report of the Productivity 
Commission noted the burden on business due to lack of consistency in jurisdictions’ 
OHS legislations and regulation combined with the amount and complexity of 
differing jurisdictional OHS requirements.
11
 While all Australian OHS legislation 
mirrored the Robens model, there were differences between the states and territories 
in relation to the obligations of duty holders, defence provisions and compliance 
requirements. Differences also existed in unions’ ability to launch prosecutions and 
in OHS representatives’ ability to issue immediate ‘cease or improve’ work notices 
on employers.  
In 2007, the newly elected federal Labor government continued with the former 
government’s policy position of harmonisation and initiated consultation with 
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industry, unions, states and territories about introducing national workplace health 
and safety legislation. The following year all states and territories signed the 
Intergovernmental Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in OHS (IGA) 
12
 which committed the parties to a number of initiatives including the establishment 
of a new body to replace the ASCC, which would also play a role in workers 
compensation matters.
13
 This new body, called Safe Work Australia, (SWA) was 
established in July 2009, and it was charged with developing a model Work Health 
and Safety Act, which was to commence in 2012.  
Over the course of the decade and a half, the contested agenda for national standards 
around priority safety areas had been replaced by an agenda, largely accepted by 
state governments, for national OHS legislation. A model Work Health and Safety 
Bill developed under the auspices of SWA was released in late 2009. The federal 
government argued that this harmonised law would enhance the transfer of training 
and licensing requirements across state and territory borders, which would relieve 
intra state businesses of perceived cost imposts. This shift was to be more beneficial 
to large business rather than small firms operating within state boundaries.
14
 Even so, 
a peak employer body the Australian Council for Commerce and Industry (ACCI) 
was concerned about the compliance burden to intra-state industries and whether 
harmonisation would deliver productivity gains to business.
15
  
Other areas of concern to big business were matters contained in the new model that 
‘are peripheral to the achievement of better safety outcomes but rather are linked to 
other agendas’.16 These were to do with ‘issues resolution, union right of entry and 
the power of health and safety representatives to direct employees to cease work....’17 
 In ACCI’s view ‘...OHS laws should never be used as a vehicle to drive other 
agendas’,18 a statement that reflected prevailing ideas that unions used health and 
safety as an excuse to push other industrial agendas. ACCI was also disturbed about 
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the ‘massive’ increase in fines for corporations under the primary duty of care that 
would increase to $3,000,000, as compared to the lowest existing penalties of 
$150,000 in Tasmania and the highest of $1,650,000 in NSW. However, this last 
amount was reserved for the offence of reckless corporate conduct occasioning 
death, and on present record, a punishment unlikely to be used as the existing 
provision of s32A in the NSW OHS Act 2000, for the same type of offence, has 
never been employed.  
Business interests were the main drivers for regulatory reform, evidenced in that the 
OHS harmonisation process was grounded in the report of a taskforce established by 
the Coalition of Australian Governments (COAG) to investigate the regulatory 
burden on business.
19
 A Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) carried out by Access 
Economics
20
 for the harmonisation process noted that ‘the actual costs of OHS 
compliance in Australia are not known’, nor are costs caused by jurisdictional 
differences.
21
 It was ‘generally accepted’ for most OHS laws that ‘there should be at 
least offsetting safety benefits’. 22  The ‘largely financial’ benefits for employers 
would accrue through reduced workers compensation payouts, higher productivity 
and lower staff turnover, with improved safety being the only benefit for workers.
23
  
The report observed that costs to governments would not be significant, as they were 
in a continual process of review of the legislature and associated policies, and had 
allocated budgets to deal with training and education costs. ‘None indicated that they 
would require funding above their normal budget allocation’.24 The report concluded 
that ‘the costs and benefits of the model Act are not readily quantifiable...the model 
Act is expected to bring medium sized benefits for business...partially offset...by 
adjustment costs...’ with workers experiencing ‘...some small safety benefits’. 
Overall, ‘...the model Act will confer an overall marginal to small net benefit.’25 
However, the Western Australian Government was reluctant to implement the model 
laws arguing that it had not had sufficient time to consider the changes, though 
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unions believed that the government did not want to introduce new provisions 
superior to the current WA OHS legislation.
26
 The Victorian Government also 
announced that it would not adopt the harmonised law, as it ‘...offers little benefit for 
Victoria to offset the $3.4 billion of estimated costs, the majority of which falls on 
small business.’27 The previous NSW Labor government had said that it would not 
adopt the harmonised Act in its entirety, as it removed both unions’ right to 
prosecute, and the ‘reverse onus’ of proof, whereby employers were required to 
demonstrate that they had exercised due care when defending a workplace safety 
prosecution. 
The harmonisation process would principally benefit those businesses operating 
across state boundaries, typically multinationals or multi-state businesses, which 
comprised less than 1 per cent of businesses, but employed 29 per cent of the 
workforce.
28
 According to employer representative submissions made to Safe Work 
Australia by the Australian Industries Group (AiG), ACCI and the NSW Business 
Chamber, concerns were that the draft model Work, Health and Safety Regulations 
and Codes of Practice might impose a regulatory burden that was not offset by 
national consistency, and that supporting guidance material may not be ‘user 
friendly’. However, the NSW Business Chamber and AiG also believed that the 
changes would be positive for the ‘OHS landscape’ in New South Wales.29  
In what was a reflection of a dominant neo liberal ideology, which privileges market 
forces as the best allocator of resources, the rationale for harmonisation was to 
reduce business costs as part of the COAG National Reform Agenda. Its aim was to 
‘... deliver more consistent regulation across jurisdictions and address unnecessary or 
poorly designed regulation, to reduce excessive compliance costs on business, 
restrictions on competition and distortions in the allocation of resources in the 
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economy’.30 COAG also believed that its outcomes would create a seamless national 
economy, enhance the country’s longer-term growth, and improve labour 
participation rates and labour mobility.
31
 
That harmonisation of workplace health and safety legislation was principally driven 
by economic considerations was further evidenced by the remarks of the Review 
team in its first report to the Workplace Relations Ministers Council (WRMC). They 
noted that: ‘(h)armonising OHS laws in this way will cut red tape, boost business 
efficiency and provide greater certainty and protections for all workplace parties’. 32 
It was adopted by most states and territories, with the exception of the Western 
Australian and Victorian governments. With the change in government in NSW in 
2011, the objections to the model legislation held by the previous Labor government 
dissolved, and the new government adopted the model Act, with its own 
amendments, as discussed below.  
Effects of harmonisation 
The national harmonisation initiative was not without controversy that resonated 
between different fractions of capital, and industrial organisations. In particular, 
unions in New South Wales were concerned about the removal of the reverse onus of 
proof and the rights of unions to prosecute offenders that existed under the OHS Act 
2000. After the draft harmonised legislation was circulated nationally in 2009, the 
ACTU began a public campaign against what it saw as the diminution of OHS 
protections for workers in favour of business drivers for productivity, as exemplified 
in ACCI’s statement that ‘[T]he real objective of OHS...is to provide a safe place of 
work while maintaining a productive and sustainable business.’33 The ACTU had 
actively participated in the national consultations and initiated the campaign after 
some of its extensive recommendations failed to persuade the national harmonisation 
consultative Review Panel. One of the main concerns for the ACTU was what it saw 
as a lessening of the rights, powers and protections for health and safety 
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representatives, which would make their job harder in the future.
34
 ACCI maintained 
the position that the unions’ campaign was designed to implement pro-union and 
punitive OHS rules, and its CEO stated  
Behind the emotive message of this union campaign is a push for laws that 
would give union officials ...more rights for shop stewards elected as OHS 
representatives to stop work in a business.
35
  
The ACTU’s submission36 to the exposure drafts for the Model Act and regulations 
set out other concerns, including objections to the complicated and bureaucratic 
requirements for unions’ rights of entry provisions that limited their timely access to 
workplaces thus increasing risks, especially in dangerous industries. The ACTU 
noted that genuine consultation between employers and workers was one that 
depended on valid representation without bureaucratic constraints. Its position was 
that to be consistent with the model legislation and to comply with ILO Convention 
155, the objects of the Model Act should state that union and employer involvement 
rather than mere encouragement in overseeing health and safety was a preferred 
approach.
37
  
Harmonisation in NSW 
When the NSW Labor government lost the election in 2011, within two months the 
incoming LNP coalition introduced the Work Health Safety Bill (WHS) 2011 and the 
Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Bill 2011.
38
 The WHS Bill enacted the 
model national work health safety legislation that was due to be implemented 
nationally in January 2012. The state government wished to implement immediately 
what it saw as three key reforms so that they might have take effect without delay. 
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These were the removal of the reverse onus of proof whereby the defendant was 
required to prove that they had complied with their duty of care; the removal of an 
absolute duty of care to one of due diligence and the removal of unions’ rights to 
prosecution contained in the OHS Act 2000.
39
  The Labor opposition condemned the 
haste with which the Bills were introduced, and the matters they addressed.
40
   
The ACTU argued that the reverse onus of proof provisions of the former NSW OHS 
legislation was consistent with that of anti-discrimination law and the Fair Work Act 
general protections, in which it was acknowledged that the operator of a business has 
better access to information about the operational needs of the business.
41
  This was a 
position consistent with a 2007 WorkCover review (the Stein report) which found 
that it was appropriate that the evidentiary burden falls on employers/defendant.  
Quite frequently, the onus of proving defences peculiarly within the knowledge 
of the defendant is placed upon that party on the civil standard of proof – the 
balance of probabilities. There is nothing unique or unusual about this. Modern 
examples abound in consumer protection and environmental law.
42
 
This Report also found that the principle was compatible with the European 
Convention of Human Rights.
43
 The Labor opposition highlighted the contradictory 
position of the government  
....it supports the business lobby argument that unions should not have the right 
to prosecute employers responsible for the death or injury of a worker when at 
the same time this lobby supports draconian legislation in the construction 
industry. The existing occupational health and safety legislation allows 
employers to defend themselves in court, yet the Australian Building and 
Construction Commission (ABCC) gives workers no rights to silence, no right 
against self-incrimination and automatic jail sentences and heavy fines for 
workers who do not comply.
44
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The ACCI was in favour of removing unions’ rights of prosecution in OHS matters, 
as well as the reverse onus of proof provisions, these being aspects of the NSW OHS 
Act, which it opined ‘undermine fundamental legal principles and processes’.45  
The haste with which both pieces of legislation were introduced caught many by 
surprise, including officers of WorkCover itself. Certainly, most inspectors had no 
idea that the state would move so quickly on introducing the new WHSA provisions, 
and were concerned about the organisation’s ability to implement the changes with 
their existing staffing levels.
46
 The Parliamentary debate that ensued around these 
changes was intense. The government was at pains to point out the benefits of the 
new Bill and highlight the long-held criticisms of particular elements of the OHSA 
2000, criticisms that mainly came from employers and their associations. 
47
  
Under the NSW OHS Act 2000, union officials had a right to enter a workplace 
during working hours if it contained members of that union and if they held relevant 
permits. More recently, union officials were also required to hold a permit under the 
federal Labor government’s Fair Work Act 2009 (Cwth) which had retained the 
tightened union entry provisions introduced by the WorkChoices legislation in 2006 
(see below).
48
 Employers were advised to determine if an entry request in relation to 
OHS matters was ‘genuine’ and ‘legitimate’ by asking officials to give advance 
details about the OHS matter they intended inspecting
49
 a move which would be 
likely to defeat the purpose of hazard detection and legitimate safety inspection. 
The NSW WSHA 2011 allowed union officials a limited right of entry to workplaces 
to investigate possible breaches of the Act, if they were trained, ‘fit and proper 
persons’. However, the restrictions placed on unions’ entry into workplaces for the 
purposes of inspecting health and safety conditions are quite onerous under the 
federal legalisation. This is demonstrated by the 34 sections of Part 7 of the WHSA 
provisions for ‘Workplace entry by WHSA entry permit holders’, a number greater 
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than for those relating to ‘Health and safety duties’ of those controlling businesses, 
and for sections related to ‘Enforcement measures’.50  
Presently, in NSW, the permit allowing entry to a workplace is issued by the 
Industrial Registrar under Part 7 of Chapter 5 of the NSW Industrial Relations Act 
1996. Persons requesting right of entry must give at least 24 hours notice if they wish 
to inspect relevant documents related to suspected contraventions of the WHSA, or to 
enter the workplace to consult and advise workers.
51
 Entry permit holders must also 
hold an entry permit under the federal Fair Work Act or relevant state/territory act.
52
 
They may only enter a premise where they ‘reasonably suspect’ a contravention of 
the Act that could relate to or affect a worker.
53
 There were a number of other 
restrictions associated with right of entry, including the requirement to show the 
permit and photo identification to anyone who so required it,
54
 the right to only be 
exercised during usual working hours,
55
 restrictions on the area to be inspected to 
work areas that may be directly affected by OHS risks.
56
 The maximum penalty for 
breaches of these sections is $10,000.  
Union officials can apply to the IRC for permits if they have completed a training 
course and hold an entry permit under the Fair Work Act or relevant state/territory 
legislation.
57
 When considering applications for entry permits, FWA must determine 
if the union official is a fit and proper person. In doing so it considers ‘whether the 
official, or any other person, has ever been ordered to pay a penalty under this Act or 
any other industrial law in relation to action taken by the official’ and /or ‘whether 
the official has ever been convicted of an offence against an industrial law’.58 As 
mentioned in the last chapter, this had particular significance for officials of the 
CFMEU, as most actions taken by the ABCC had been against the union, its officials 
and delegates, effectively barring experienced organisers and worker representatives 
from gaining entry permits and consequently accessing sites. 
                                                 
50
 Model Work Health and Safety Act revised draft 23 June 2011  
51
 Ibid above n12 ss117-121. 
52
 Ibid s124. 
53
 Ibid s117 
54
 Ibid s125. 
55
 Ibid s126. 
56
 Ibid s127. 
57
 Ibid s131. 
58
 Fair Work Act 2009 s513. 
 177 
The new OHS legislation had mixed signals for NSW. The removal of an absolute 
duty of care weakens the previous legislation that required an absolute duty on the 
employer. The removal of the reverse onus of proof means that the regulator might 
choose to take fewer prosecutions, because of financial and resource constraints. 
During parliamentary debate on the three ‘reforms’, a successful amendment meant 
that unions’ right to prosecute was reinstated in a limited way, that is, if the regulator 
failed to act then unions could launch an action themselves. On the other hand, 
penalties for OHS offences were substantially increased. However, as has been 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, increasing penalty sanction in legislation has not 
had significant flow-on to actual penalties imposed. It remains to be seen if the 
changes in penalty amount coupled with the changes in judicial jurisdiction, will alter 
the lenient financial penalties amounts seen for workplace fatalities.  
Downgrading the NSW IRC jurisdiction 
Another controversial action by the newly elected NSW LNP government in May 
2011 moved OHS jurisdiction from the Industrial Court to mainstream criminal 
courts for the most serious offences. Category 1 offences relating to serious injury or 
death, such as those cases examined in this thesis would be heard in the Supreme 
Court, while other offences would be handled summarily in the District or Local 
courts. The President of the Industrial Court, Justice Boland, was taken unawares by 
this announcement in relation to the changes of jurisdiction for OHS offences and its 
immediate introduction of elements of the national model Act. For him, the ‘biggest 
surprise...was the government’s intention to remove occupational health and safety 
from the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction’, 59as the government, when in opposition had 
assured him that the Industrial Court would retain jurisdiction over all but the most 
serious Category 1 offence of recklessly causing death or serious injury to a person. 
In these cases, the offence would be an indictable one and tried before a jury. The 
president remarked at a public meeting 
I have been criticised for having the temerity to express my concern to the 
relevant ministers at not being advised about a change that will have a profound 
effect on the Industrial Court’s jurisdiction. I remain puzzled though as to why 
it was necessary to keep the matter secret until the bills were tabled in the 
Parliament on 5 May...[I]t is now proposed that the jurisdiction will go to the 
so-called mainstream courts that have no background, body of law or expertise 
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in occupational health and safety...[O]ne may debate the role of specialist 
courts, but it cannot be denied OHS law is a special area of law, one which is 
complex and, as many cases have demonstrated, replete with legal issues 
peculiar to the jurisdiction, including sentencing and remediation. 
60
 
In support, the President cited the findings of the Stein review into OHS, in which 
Stein J of the Supreme Court addressed this specific question 
The expertise of twenty years in the Industrial Court dealing with occupational 
health and safety proceedings outweighs the general expertise in mainstream 
criminal law of the District and Supreme Courts. Occupational health and safety 
law is very specialised and the generalist courts do not have that experience and 
expertise. I recommend that the jurisdiction for serious occupational health and 
safety proceedings remain with the Industrial Court of New South Wales
61
  
Given that WorkCover has two years to file a prosecution in the Industrial Court, or 
two years after a coronial inquiry, it is unlikely that prosecutions under the new Act 
will be filed in the IC. If the provisions of the WHS Act which came into effect from 
1 January 2012 are to have effect, then the IC would have no jurisdiction regarding 
OHS. There would be questions as to whether prosecutions in 2013 would be dealt 
with under the (amended) OHS Act 2011, given the two-year period.
62
 This would be 
an untenable situation if the object of the whole exercise was to harmonise OHS 
legislation. The incoming government’s haste in introducing these new pieces of 
legislation, with no consultation by the Minister with the IC, and without a reasoned 
basis for the transfer of jurisdictions, as Boland J maintains,
63
 appears to be an 
ideological, rather than a pragmatic decision.  
Conclusion 
OHS enforcement has been switched from a specialist court to general courts. The 
rationale for these changes was driven by the conservative government’s ideological 
agenda
64
 and political alliance with big business interest, rather than concern about 
the ineffectiveness of IC in enforcing safety. In the light of the evidence from the 
previous chapters, it may be surmised that these changes may not see a change in the 
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courts view of the causes of workplace harms as criminal actions. The NSW state 
government’s reasoning was that it would ensure better ‘integration’ with general 
criminal law. It is yet to be seen if this ‘integration’ with criminal law is to be 
realised. If it were to cement the perception that OHS harms were legitimate criminal 
matters, rather than regulatory misdemeanours and if those harms were punished 
accordingly, then the deterrent component of the sentencing process might become 
more effective. It should be noted again that only the most 'serious' offences will be 
heard in the Supreme or District Court, that is for category 2 and 3 offences. All 
other offences will be heard in district or Local Courts, and Johnstone's evidence for 
provides little optimism for better deterrence in these jurisdictions. 
The District Court is already a very busy jurisdiction hearing criminal and civil 
cases. It appears that it has not been allocated any extra resources to carry out its new 
function, so there is a real concern that because of this, OHS prosecutions may not be 
given priority. There is also an issue about the change in judicial personnel hearing 
cases. While moving the jurisdiction over OHS prosecution to the general courts 
results in a loss of specialist tribunal/judicial members who have industrial expertise, 
it may be the case that judges of the District and Supreme Courts might be more 
willing to apply higher fines available under the new legislation as they see the 
damage that can be wrought as a result of OHS incidents through their civil case 
load.
65
 Alternatively, these courts are just as likely to fall back on the individualised 
and decontextualised analysis of actions that lead to fatalities, which is to overlook 
systemic causes. If the IC, which has relevant industrial experience, has problems 
grappling with broad safe management systems of work, the question must be asked , 
would a mainstream court be any more effective? 
This chapter shows the developments in the regulation of OHS in NSW and how 
these developments have arguable reflected a broad neo-liberal ideology privileging 
market relations. Through IR and OHS legislative changes, the ability of workers’ 
representatives to protect and monitor worksite conditions was weakened. However, 
the competing interests and conflicts of State institutions between and among 
themselves meant that dominant hegemonic interests were unable to reframe 
completely OHS laws in terms of their business ‘efficiency’. The left wing of the 
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federal and state branches of the Labor Party were more vocal in their condemnation 
of various aspects of the OHS legislation and other regressive IR legislation, as well 
as speaking out about the continuation of the ABCC. Not only were there 
irreconcilable class antagonisms, there were irreconcilable fractional difference 
within class divisions. As described by Gramsci, the state acts as a cohering force for 
dominant class interests, because there is no unity among the capitalist class, and the 
state assumes the form of a ‘collective capitalist’ representing ‘long term interests of 
the class as a whole, under the hegemony of one of its fraction...monopoly 
capitalism.’ 66  That such hegemony exists is evident in the actions of the State 
discussed here and in Chapter Six.  
While the State exerts hegemonic control through ideological and repressive actions, 
the future for workers’ health and safety cannot be optimal. The rhetoric of ‘equal 
responsibility’ and ‘mutual interest’ at the level of the worksite, is plainly false, 
because of the inherent inequality of power and structural antagonisms within the 
capitalist labour process. The dismantling of previous OHS legislation in NSW, the 
removal of employers’ absolute duty of care and the probability that the regulator 
will be more reluctant to launch prosecutions because of the removal of the reverse 
onus of proof, may see workplaces become less safe. For the construction industry, 
this is a major concern, given its dangerous nature. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
Corporate and safety crimes can be produced by an organisation’s structure, its 
culture its unquestioned assumptions, its very modus operandi, and so on. Thus 
to understand such phenomena must not obscure human agency, but does 
require a shift from abstracted, atomised individuals to account for agency in 
the context of structures.
1
 
The problem re-visited 
Chapter two of this thesis revealed that the number of workers killed through 
traumatic workplace fatality in NSW has not diminished, with latest figures showing 
that the state had the highest numbers of deaths from traumatic workplace incidents 
in the first quarter of 2012
2
; the majority occurred in the construction industry. 
Chapter Four showed that when offenders were prosecuted, the monetary penalties 
imposed were less than one fifth of the maximum allowable. 
In seeking to explain this phenomenon, the thesis has sought to situate it within the 
relations of production that exist within the building and construction industry and 
the wider social relations (civil society, the State, the judiciary) that ultimately affect 
the lives of workers. This was done by developing a framework in Chapter One, 
which demonstrated the interactions and interrelationships between the different 
institutions of the State in the spheres of IR and OHS. This model was predicated on 
the notion of a hegemonic State within which institutions acted with autonomy. 
Together, these interactions legitimate structures and define activities that set the 
boundaries for workplace activities with its consequent impact on workers’ health. 
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These processes are often in conflict, sometimes in concert, but operate to sustain the 
broad conditions for capitalist accumulation. These structural conditions must be 
considered when thinking about the apparent lack of measures to counteract 
workplace harms. By divorcing the conditions that produce ‘dangerous behaviours’ 
from the behaviours themselves (by decontextualizing, individualising) consideration 
of OHS obligations become disconnected from the economic environment in which 
they are embedded. For example, McQueen
3
 has shown that fluctuations in 
construction cycles, as well as investment risks on borrowed capital dictate the speed 
of work vital to profit maximisation. Sub-contractors work on a bonus or penalty 
system for early or late completion of work and economic risks are transferred to 
workers in the form of physical harms.
4
 
Given that the numbers of deaths in the construction industry in Australia and NSW 
have not significantly declined, the question of the deterrent value of current levels 
of punishment was one issue considered in this thesis. It also suggested that the ways 
in which the state’s regulation of health and safety management and of judicial 
regulation through sentencing and criminal laws, contributed to judges’ operating in 
a ‘confined space’. That is, sentencing rules directed them toward pulverised 
penalties, through the mandatory use of mitigation discounting. Various legislative 
changes were mapped temporally from 1988 to 2008 to show, on one hand, changes 
to industrial relations legislation and other social and political actions, and, on the 
other, the legislative changes that were occurring in the sphere of workplace health 
and safety. 
The thesis looked at approaches to sentencing OHS offenders by using empirical 
methods to examine a wide range of elements or factors relating to the circumstances 
of the fatalities, and their subsequent prosecution. Data analysis confirmed the 
conclusions from others’ research which demonstrated the leniency of OHS 
penalties, and by applying Mathiesen’s typologies to the judgements, the thesis 
showed how judgements were narrowly constructed, thus limiting judges’ ability to 
address broader and inherent safety problems in the industry. However, although the 
‘silencing’ techniques applied in the courtroom, such as anthropomorphism, temporal 
relegation of events and so on, mirrored Johnstone’s Victorian research, this study 
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also showed that structural differences in court procedures and practices, and 
adherence to sentencing rules also had a bearing on judges’ decisions.  
Chapter One introduced the model and approaches, as well as stating the research 
problem and method. The underlying theoretical approach was drawn from 
Gramscian theory about the role of the State and the tensions inherent in hegemonic 
struggles over the contested terrain of industrial relations and health and safety. 
These were explicated in subsequent chapters, especially Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven. 
In Chapter Two, the role played by the construction industry in the Australian 
economy was described, along with the particular characteristics of its work 
organisation. The relations of production in the industry contribute to elevated 
incidence of injury disease and death
5
.  Practices such as work intensification, 
dubious or illegal contracting arrangements and the lack of integrated safety 
management systems were identified as contributing factors in poor workplace OHS 
outcomes. While the CFMEU C and G Division had endeavoured to alleviate this toll 
on the workforce, it was seen that successive governments, lobbied by powerful 
industry interests, moved to lessen union strength, because of its perceived 
interference in capital production and accumulation. 
The theoretical perspective informing the thesis was established more fully in 
Chapter Three. Gramscian theory was used as a framework for the research, because 
of its ability to analyse civil society in terms of State functions and to take account of 
the shifts in groups seeking hegemonic control. For example, the struggle of labour 
to maintain at least some control over working conditions, and the response of the 
State to that endeavour. This thesis showed how the State wielded its ideological and 
repressive forces against trade unions, as exemplified by the passing of the 
Australian Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 and the 
establishment of the Building Industry Taskforce, and subsequent Australian 
Building and Construction Commission. 
The ambiguous response of regulators to white-collar crime, combined with 
perceptions of safety offences as regulatory infractions rather than criminal acts was 
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seen as an important factor in the marginalisation of safety crimes, and a factor in the 
imposition of lenient sentences.
6
 This was further compounded by views that safety 
crimes were accidental and even isolated events; workplace harms were more the 
fault of operators, rather than management, and they fell outside mainstream ideas 
about ‘violence’. Health and safety crimes are anomalous; though technically 
criminal, they have been dealt with in courts that deal with regulatory offences, 
rather than the more usual criminal jurisdictions.
7
 
Social harm theory allowed health and safety crimes to be considered through the 
spectrum of emotional, psychological, social and economic harms, as well as through 
the broad social construction of harms, and was a valuable tool when considering the 
complex mechanisms which contribute to workplace fatalities. This was particularly 
so when reflecting on the harms done to families of those killed at work and their 
perceptions about unjust penalties. The chapter considered some of the contradictions 
inherent in self-regulatory systems in a neo-liberal framework and the implications 
this had for effective deterrence measures. 
Chapters Four and Five focused on the empirical results, which found that penalties 
for traumatic workplace fatalities caused by breaches of the 1983 and 2000 OHS 
legislation were less than one fifth of the maximum penalties allowable. This figure 
accords with previous research and government investigative reports. All 
prosecutions involved breaches of the general duties of care under both OHS Acts, 
that is, the failure of the employer to ensure the health, safety and welfare of all 
employees, sub-contractors and other persons, such as visitors, at the place of work. 
The majority of prosecutions were laid against corporations, and most offences were 
caused by medium to large companies, that is, those employing 20 or more persons. 
No particular trends were seen in judges’ sentencing patterns as far as their 
affiliations to labour law or non-labour law chambers were concerned.  Labour law 
judges imposed lesser penalties on corporations, but also allowed lesser discounts, 
while non-labour law judges penalised corporations at a higher level, but allowed 
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greater discounts. In speculating about the reasons for lenient penalties and 
discounting practices, the thesis considered the effects of the regulator’s prosecution 
policies and the state’s sentencing legislation and guidelines. In addition to these 
formulas, the use of guideline judgements and sentencing styles, (that is ‘two-tiered’ 
or ‘instinctive synthesis’) contributed to formulaic sentencing patterns, and a 
reluctance to apply more innovative sentencing options, such as court orders. 
Mackenzie’s study of the Queensland judiciary and media interviews of NSW judges 
shed light on the attitudes and beliefs of judges on sentencing issues, showing that 
some judges felt constrained by social rules (around sentencing) and by social norms 
(community expectations, professional expectations, customs, attitudes and beliefs). 
Judges in the NSW IC rarely took the opportunity to impose punishments other than 
financial ones, and overall, were tied to guideline judgements. In other words, the 
inherent conservatism of the law showed in the somewhat standard judgement 
statements. There is also the unexplored issue of whether judges perceive breaches of 
OHS duties as ‘actual’ crimes, or, even if they do, if the sentencing result is softened 
by more general perceptions of OHS offences as regulatory matters. These 
perceptions may also contribute to the continuation of seemingly lenient sentencing 
in OHS matters in cases of workplace fatalities.
8
 
Chapter Five continued the theme of investigating the ‘pulverisation’ of OHS harms 
through applying the elements or techniques of ‘silencing’ events surrounding 
incidents, as proposed by Mathiesen. This textual analysis of decisions from the 
NSW IC confirmed Johnson’s findings for the Victorian magistrates’ courts, but with 
some exceptions. These were that judges had a less biased view of workers as being 
‘at fault’ than did Victorian magistrates; judges were accustomed to hearing only 
OHS and industrially related matters, thus had built up a body of expertise over 
twenty years, and showed that they had more of a contextualised understanding of 
work related harms. Defendants were prosecuted under specific sections of the 
performance based OHS Acts, rather than the more prescriptive regulations, which 
presumably would provide an opportunity for judges to consider the broader aspects 
of OHS management. However, the thesis showed that this opportunity was not 
explored to any real advantage. 
                                                 
8
 Tombs S and Whyte D, A Crisis of Enforcement: the decriminalisation of death and injury at work. 
(London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, 2008).  
 186 
Chapter Six explored other dimensions contributing to the pulverisation process, 
specifically, the effect of state and regulatory policies and legislation. It also looked 
more broadly at some of the structural reasons behind the ‘silencing’ of workplace 
safety crimes, and the absence in general discourse that would position OHS harms 
as essentially criminal incidents. Health and safety offences are legally criminal, but 
are diluted through the structure of the (regulatory) OHS legislation and the way that 
it is enforced. That is, penalties are minimised through pulverisation and the 
silencing of other important dimensions associated with the social relations of 
production. The thesis showed that while judges made pronouncements about the 
seriousness of the defendant’s omissions, one aspect of deterrence, that is the 
financial penalty, was ameliorated by the sentence outcome. If OHS breaches are not 
recognised as an important problem, then industrial policing, in the form of union 
action, is an important factor for the welfare of workers. However, this action was 
seen as a threat by governments and capital, which at times, combined to minimise 
industrial strength. For building trade unions, this was attempted though the use of 
ideological and repressive forces, represented by Royal Commissions and oppressive 
legislation. 
Chapter Seven reintroduced the role of the State in recent developments that led to 
national harmonisation of health and safety legislation, which, at the local level saw a 
downgrade of some previous OHS conditions with the implementation of the NSW 
Work Health and Safety Act 2011. The chapter highlighted the tensions and 
manoeuvres between capital and labour as each strove to push a particular agenda in 
these debates.  
Empirical and theoretical considerations 
The thesis makes a theoretical contribution by looking at the interactions between 
different elements of the State in a broader context as a hegemonic force, rather than 
as a set of complimentary institutions that are usually considered separately. It 
considers the hegemonic ideologies that inform thought and action around the 
regulation of health and safety and asks what effect they have on penalty outcomes, 
deterrence, legislative effectiveness and delivery of justice. It makes a more specific 
empirical contribution through the study of penalties and judgements delivered in a 
specialist court, the NSW IC, for OHS crimes committed in one specific industry, 
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that of building and construction. The thesis explains the empirical phenomenon of 
the penalty quanta by considering social norms and State rules about judicial 
sentencing, arguing that the de-contextualising of workplace crime in both a wider 
social context and in the court process acted to dilute punishment. It also argued that 
industrial relations laws pertaining to the construction industry had a bearing on 
workplace health and safety. The conceptual model used in the thesis has avoided a 
determinist and one-dimensional view of the State and its agents. By using a radical 
criminological approach, the sociological elements in question are better explicated. 
That is, it has been able to extend the focus onto social agency to see how those 
working for their agencies see their roles, duties and obligations. In turn, this sheds 
light on the tensions and contradictions inhabiting institutional structures; how the 
‘war of position’ is contested over the hegemonic landscape.  
The thesis makes a number of empirical, conceptual and methodological 
contributions to the field of workplace health and safety. It further informs the 
literature about health and safety concerns in a specific industry, that of building and 
construction. It raises the connections between health and safety literature that is 
concerned with regulation and deterrence, with that of industrial relations. It has not 
been content with looking at OHS harms and their punishment through the lens of 
standard criminological theory of causality, but has considered the wider social, 
political, and economic issues, which ultimately affect the everyday lives of workers. 
To do this, it has considered the role of the labour movement in protecting those 
workers, through the actions of building and construction unions. This is turn has led 
to consideration of the historical and continuing conflict between capital and labour, 
mediated by the ideological and repressive apparatus of the State.  
The thesis has reaffirmed the usefulness of Mathiesen’s typology in identifying 
underlying themes surrounding traumatic events. In terms of the judgements selected 
for analysis, it showed how silencing techniques were used to pulverise the details 
surrounding fatal incidents, such that the broader structural relations of production 
were left unexamined. However, this thesis has also considered other factors such as 
State sanctioned rules and regulations that governed judges’ ability to hand down 
sentences truly reflective of the gravity of the offence. This in turn touched briefly on 
the issue of State interference in judicial matters, which exercised the NSW Director 
of Public Prosecution in defending the independence of the courts. The thesis also 
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considered the structural problem of the silencing of OHS crimes through non-
reportage in official documents and statistical outlets. 
Implications for policy/ practice 
The thesis questioned if the level of penalty evidenced in the NSW IC was capable of 
delivering the deterrent effect desired by WorkCover NSW under the self-regulatory 
environment of OHS legislation. Presumably, its success relies on effective 
surveillance, as well as sanctions. However, this requires sufficient resources, and in 
a neo-liberal environment that is wedded to ‘small government’, the contradiction 
arises that by reducing regulatory resources, there is a reduction in inspections and 
other formal regulatory mechanisms. If self-regulation, as espoused by Robens 
legislation, is ineffective in reducing workplace traumatic fatalities in construction, 
what forms of deterrence are available? 
Jamieson et al
9
 observed that classical deterrence theory operationalised through 
prosecutions is a necessary, but insufficient condition to prevent death and serious 
injury. Other regulatory analysts such Neil Foster, Andrew Hopkins, Neil 
Gunningham and Richard Johnstone
10
 have observed that senior managers may be 
best encouraged to care for workers when their personal liberty and liability is at 
stake. The Victorian governments’ review into OHS, conducted by Chris Maxwell 
QC
11
 (the Maxwell Report) found that ‘...the threats of prosecution, and the size of 
the potential penalties, are significant factors in promoting compliance’. As Chapter 
Seven noted, WorkCover NSW senior inspector was also of the view that company 
directors saw criminal convictions as the best deterrent for OHS offences. However, 
Chapter Two suggested that WorkCover NSW has reduced the numbers of 
prosecutions in NSW over the past few years, allegedly as a means of placating 
business interests who have expressed concern about penalty increases since 2006. 
Furthermore, while companies in the NSW construction industry are able to avoid 
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their responsibilities through absorption of low penalties, bankruptcy proceedings or 
other administrative means, neither higher monetary penalties or enforceable 
undertakings, as envisioned under the NSW WSH Act (see below) are likely to have 
much impact on preventing construction fatalities. 
Contrary to popular opinion, Maxwell was of the view that large companies were 
less concerned about OHS than small business, because ‘...larger businesses felt 
much less apprehensive about OHS compliance than did small business’,12 with the 
main reason being that large corporations had more managers to look after health and 
safety compliance. Owners of small businesses were concerned about understanding 
and then implementing compliance requirements. The performance-based model of 
self-regulation is geared more to large corporations, rather than small business, 
whose owners are less able to identify and control hazards.
13
 For business generally, 
cost was a major factor for duty holders and the inspectorate in deciding on risk 
mitigation procedures.
14
 
However, 
Once an accident happens...the reluctance to spend money disappears. The 
future possibility has, all of a sudden, become a present reality. When a duty 
holder is prosecuted in respect of OHS breaches associated with the accident, 
the relevant safety measure – which did not exist at the time – will almost 
invariably have been implemented by the time the matter comes on for trial.
15
 
Maxwell was unsure if improvements were made with an eye to penalty reduction or 
because of moral responsibility. 
Anecdotal and personal observation suggests that administrative enforcement, such 
as the use of provisional improvement notices and prohibition notices by the 
inspectorate were a better deterrent than ‘advise and persuade’ approaches in the 
day-to-day management of safety in the construction industry. Both forms of 
notification require immediate action on the employer’s part in order to avoid 
financial penalties imposed by the regulator and by the client, because of job ‘over 
runs’. Employers were also quick to act where a union has taken stop work action 
over health and safety matters, for the same financial reasons, though occasionally 
larger companies purport to act for what could be described as ‘virtuous’ reasons. 
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 Ibid at 81. 
13
 Ibid at 238. 
14
 Ibid at 121. 
15
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However, these measures were generally only directed at specific OHS problems 
arising at a particular time and place, and did not address broader issues, such as 
attention to, and implementation of, whole of site safety management. 
Accepted forms of regulation and conventional criminological theory are informed 
by causal relationships between sanctions and resulting effects. This thesis has 
shown that there are other contributing factors that have to be considered when 
thinking about deterrence. These include confronting the contradictions inherent in 
work health and safety legislation, which continue to remain unaddressed, one aspect 
of which is the tension between civil and criminal liability and between regulatory 
and criminal law. 
In this respect, it is useful to re-consider the purposes of sentencing as described in 
the NSW Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s 3A. These are, in order, to 
punish, deter, provide community protection, rehabilitate offenders, make offenders 
accountable for their acts, denounce offenders and recognise the harm done to 
victims and the community. Deterrence, as an objective, does not figure in the 
‘Objects’ of the NSW OHS Act 198316, NSW OHS Act 200017 or WHS Act 201118 
The main objective of OHS legislation is to prevent workplace harms, so deterring 
employers from doing so is presumably the major goal when prosecuting under its 
auspices. The judgements considered in this thesis show that the court mainly 
concerned itself with aspects of deterrence (both specific and general), and 
implicitly, an element of community (that is, worker) protection. However, apart 
from the issue of deterrence and punishment, the other elements of the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 s3A were not given particular attention, possibly 
because they are seen as more applicable to ‘conventional crimes’. If courts 
addressed each of these elements within the context of the sentencing process, it 
might assist in highlighting the essential criminal nature of OHS breaches and might 
provide some redress to the families of victims. Alternatively, other sentencing 
procedures could be developed which are more specific to OHS harms. 
WorkCover NSW has concentrated its deterrence effort at the bottom end of the 
regulatory pyramid, emphasising the need to advise and educate employers. Its media 
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 ‘Objects’ s5(1) 
17
 ‘Objects’ s3. 
18
 ‘Objects’ s3. 
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campaigns have emphasised mutual responsibility for safe workplaces and of late, 
that has turned more to placing responsibility on individual workers themselves. 
With the advent of the new harmonised OHS legislation, the regulator could take an 
approach that informs industry that breaches to the WHS Act and regulations 
resulting in serious injury and death are, in fact, criminal matters, not just regulatory 
misdemeanours. The courts take their lead from governments and regulators, and in a 
cycle of reinforcement do not treat practices that lead to injury and death at work as 
crimes. This is evident by looking at how they are prosecuted and sentenced. So if 
they are not seen as crimes is there a better way forward to try and change these 
practices within this prevailing view of non-crime? Would enforceable orders be 
useful in this respect?. 
Consideration of alternatives 
Enforceable orders 
Enforceable undertakings (EUs) have been in use by federal and state agencies since 
1983, and appear in the OHS legislation of the Australian Capital Territory, 
Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania.
19
 As the first part of this discussion shows, 
enforceable undertakings are attempts by regulators to address some of the aims of 
sentencing, that is redressing wrongs, making reparation to the victims and 
community, ensuring that offenders recognises harms caused by them and so on. 
They can also be viewed from the perspective of the restorative justice model 
(discussed below). However, their value as a deterrence measures remains largely 
unexplored.  
EUs are ‘...an agreement between the individual or firm and the regulator, in which 
the former undertake to do or refrain from doing certain activities...[they are] a 
substitute for, or augmentation of, other regulatory enforcement methods...’20 They 
are designed ‘...to secure quick and effective remedies for contraventions of 
regulatory provisions without the need for court proceedings...’21 They circumvent 
the narrow options available to courts through prosecution, which is also adversarial, 
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 Johnstone R and Parker C, ‘Enforceable Undertakings in Action: Report of a Roundtable 
Discussion With Australian Regulators’ Working Paper 71 National Research Centre for OHS 
Regulation (Australian National University February 2010).  
20
 Ibid at 5. 
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 Ibid. 
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costly and ‘...precludes the kind of ‘cooperative’ negotiation that best achieves the 
desired organisational cultural change required’.22 As the term suggests, they are an 
agreement enforceable by the court. For proponents, their value lies as an alternative 
to ‘traditional coercive, regulatory enforcement action’.23 They should not be used to 
the exclusion of other enforcement measures and Parker maintains that they are most 
successful in a business environment, as one of a number of other options and in an 
environment where the regulator is known as a strict enforcer of the law.
24
 Critics of 
the use of EUs suggest that they are an example of regulators being ‘soft’ on 
corporate crime, as businesses are allowed the option of voluntary compliance, 
instead of punishing them proportionally to their the amount of harm caused by 
them.
25
 
NSW had no option of EUs under its former OHS legislation; instead, court orders 
could be imposed, as noted previously, but this thesis showed that they were rarely 
seen as an option by the NSW IC for reasons that appeared less than satisfactory. 
Court orders in NSW were to be used in addition to any other penalty that the court 
imposed, rather than an alternative penalty in themselves, as with EUs.. Enforceable 
undertakings are an alternative to standard deterrence options under the national 
harmonised WHS legislations and were adopted by NSW in its WHS Act 2011.
26
 In 
general, for less serious offences, that is, those in Category 3,
27
 EUs might be 
effective in ensuring that appropriate reparation is made, fulfilling the aim of 
recognising the harm done to individuals and the community as set out in sentencing 
legislation.  
Economic imperatives are apparent in the NSW regulator’s reasoning for the 
introduction of enforceable orders. A 2008 WorkCover NSW publication noted that 
EUs would ‘... allow WorkCover more flexibility to support businesses with 
occupational health and safety, while rigorously enforcing the legislation where 
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necessary.’ 28 It also observed that public submissions during the 2006 review of the 
NSW OHS Act 2000 ‘...highlighted the time taken for an occupational health and 
safety investigation and for a matter to proceed through the courts, and the associated 
cost and effort for employers and for WorkCover in these matters.’29  
WorkCover NSW described the enforceable undertakings as ‘an additional 
compliance measure’ that could replace prosecution, except for matters dealt with 
under s32A of the NSW OHS Act 2000. that is, reckless conduct occasioning serious 
injury or death. These binding commitments would allow the offender to take 
‘...preventative or pro-active steps to correct or prevent breaches of occupational 
health and safety legislation to the benefit of the workplace and industry...’ 30. EUs 
would be voluntary, could be suggested by WorkCover NSW or the ‘other party’ that 
is the offender, would be registered and monitored, with a mandatory compliance 
provision built in. They are not an admission of guilt by the person giving the 
undertaking. 
The national harmonised health and safety legislation introduced the concept and use 
of ‘enforceable undertakings’ (EU) and they were subsequently adopted in the NSW 
WHS Act 2011.
31
 They may not be used when the prosecution is for a Category 1 
offence where a person who engages in ‘reckless conduct’ and who has a health and 
safety duty ‘...and without reasonable excuse, engages in conduct that exposes 
individuals to whom that duty is owed to a risk of death or serious injury or illness, 
and the person is reckless as to the risk to an individual of death or serious injury or 
illness.’32 However, given that the most severe penalties under the now repealed 
OHS Act 2000 of a 5 year term of imprisonment (for offences under s32A of the 
NSW OHS Act 2000), and of 2 years imprisonment available for repeat offenders, 
for breaches of ss9 and 10 were never exacted, it is unlikely that there will be many, 
if any, prosecutions taken under Category 1 offences.  
It is disturbing to find that EUs are an option for Category 2 offenders, that is those 
persons who fail to comply with their health and safety duties and by doing so, 
                                                 
28
 WorkSafe New South Wales OHS Act Review 2006 Fact Sheet Enforceable Undertakings. 
http://www.workcover.nsw.gov.au/formspublications/publications/Documents/enforceable_undertaki
ngs_fact_sheet_ohs_act_review_2006_4842.pdf (19/9/2008) 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 NSW Work Health Safety Act 2011 Part 11 s216-222. 
32
 Ibid at s31 1(a), 1(b), 1(c). 
 194 
expose individuals to a risk of death, serious injury or illness.
33
 If offenders are  
allowed to nominate a mutually agreed EU for a Category 2 offence in the case of a 
fatality, it might be conjectured that even less deterrence will be achieved, and the 
criminality of OHS harms further diluted The implementation of EUs as an 
alternative to prosecution for OHS crimes as set out in Category 1 and 2 offences 
will be a seriously retrograde step. The other issue is that they are still awarded in the 
current decontextualised prosecution process. As this focuses on specific events, it is 
unlikely that any EU would be granted that addressed the broader economic factors 
that led to a particular event, for example, the cost cutting associated with contracting 
that encourages companies to neglect safety. 
Administrative enforcement such as the use of EUs and penalty notices are part of a 
reactive strategy that stops short of actual prosecution. The literature has shown that 
in some cases, employers are resentful when the next step in the regulatory pyramid 
is employed, that is, when they are prosecuted. It has been shown that prosecution 
has some deterrent effect, but how long that effect lasts is another matter. The 
construction industry is very fluid; even if the prosecuted corporation is a large one 
that has a good chance of survival, to what extent its corporate memory continues to 
be cognizant of its punishment is unknown. If increased penalties under WHS Act 
2011 are imposed more realistically, then positive OHS changes might result in 
decreased fatalities. However, as Schofield
34
 points out, evidence for the deterrent 
effect of prosecution and criminal conviction is inconclusive and further research 
needs to be based on rigorous theoretical, as well as empirical study. So here there is 
a conundrum - if the penalties imposed are so low, then making any conclusions 
about their deterrent effect is flawed. Penalty rates would have to be increased to 
gauge their deterrent impact, so, in the current circumstance, it is difficult, or even 
impossible to tell if high financial penalties are a deterrent.  
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Restorative justice 
Johnstone and Parker see EU’s as contributing to the ‘...goals of rehabilitation and 
restorative justice.’35 Restorative justice is a process where all affected stakeholders 
have an opportunity to discuss how they have been affected and to decide on a plan 
of reparation. Where criminality is concerned, its operating principle is that as crime 
hurts, so justice should heal.
36
 Braithwaite’s restorative regulatory theory argues that 
restorative justice should be at the base of a regulatory pyramid. He argues that these 
‘responsive justice pyramids’ cover the weaknesses of one strategy with the strengths 
of other strategies higher up the pyramid.
37
  
Strang and Sherman, 2003
38
 argue that the interests of victims have been abandoned 
by the ‘jurisprudence of retribution’; restorative justice focuses on repairing and 
preventing the harms of crime, rather than concentrating on retribution. Empirical 
evidence
39
 demonstrates that victims’ sense of justice is affirmed through the 
restorative justice process, and Strang and Sherman ask if a new justice system could 
be developed that allowed for more ‘procedural and distributive fairness… without 
harming offenders’ rights or public safety? 40 ’ The historic shift from victim 
compensation to compensating the Crown resulted in the latter form being regarded 
as the natural form of justice, while the victim is institutionally excluded from the 
process.
41
 In recent times, some minor changes have occurred in the NSW judicial 
system to take account of victims’ needs, such as allowing Victim Impact Statements 
to be read in court hearings and trials. Nonetheless, families of those killed at work 
remain unhappy about the justice system; dissatisfied with procedural practices, such 
as exclusion about progression of the case, no recognition of the emotional harms 
caused to them and a lack of respect and fairness in the justice system.  
                                                 
35
 Johnstone R and Parker C, Enforceable Undertakings in Action: Report of a Roundtable Discussion 
With Australian Regulators ,Working Paper 71, National Research Centre for OHS Regulation 
(Australian National University February 2010) at 6 
36
 Braithewaite, J. ‘Restorative justice and de-professionalization’ (2004) The Good Society, Vol.13, 
No.1 at 28.  
37
 Braithewaite, J. ‘Encourage restorative justice’ Criminal and Public Policy, (2007). Vol.6, No.4,: 
689-696 at 694.  
38
 Strang H and Sherman L W. (2003). ‘Repairing the harm: victims and restorative justice’ (2003) 
Utah Law Review Vol.3, pp. 15-42 
39
 Ibid 
40
 Ibid at 15. 
41
 Ibid at 16. 
 196 
Empirical evidence shows that about two thirds of victims of crime in general, in the 
UK were willing to engage in some form of reparative activity with the offender
42
 
and that emotional healing took precedence over seeking material gain
43
.While 
restorative justice is found to be successful most of the time for juvenile offenders 
and in cases of assault, robbery and so on,
44
 Braithewaite
45
 observes that, firstly, it is 
not effective in all cases and secondly, for corporate crime it is only as effective as 
the willingness of executives to take responsibility for their harmful actions. 
Research shows that some executives are simply uncaring, disinterested or unwilling 
to accept responsibility.
46
 In this case, restorative justice must be over-overridden by 
strategies of deterrence. Moreover, it is questionable whether it would be effective 
where there are strong economic imperatives to establish systems of work that are 
cost effective, that is, where financial risk management, rather than hazard 
management renders workplaces unsafe (as in the construction sector). In these 
cases, individual choice is diluted as systemic risk is accepted.  
The regulatory pyramid model provides for ‘integration of restorative, deterrent and 
incapacitative justice’, where restorative justice sits on the bottom tier, engaging the 
‘virtuous actor’, followed by deterrence, which applies to the ‘rational actor’ and 
finally to ‘incapacitation’ at the apex of the pyramid which is employed to deal with 
the ‘incompetent or irrational actor’.47 However, safety crimes are less likely to be 
committed by ‘irrational’ persons, (though a case might be argued for their 
incompetence). A virtuous response is one where repetition of the event is unlikely, 
and where the offending organization made significant changes to its OHS practices 
and polices following the fatality.
48
 In the judgements examined for this thesis, the 
only assessment of ‘virtue’ was gleaned through the court transcripts and, as 
rectification of OHS practices and policies were a major mitigating factor in their 
defence, their ‘real’ virtue was hard to assess, and 17 defendants  companies were re-
offenders in any case. 
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Braithwaite
49
 has suggested applying the restorative justice model to offenders under 
the occupational health and safety regulations. In his view, the ability of trade unions 
to prosecute would enable the state, unions and employers ‘to take credible 
enforcement action against each other [so that] each will display an enforcement 
pyramid to the others that will motivate all to sit together in the restorative justice 
circle…’.50 The advent of Australia’s national OHS laws has not seen trade union 
inclusion in the prosecution role, although NSW was allowed limited access to this 
avenue in its WHS Act 2011. 
The Restorative Justice and Work-Related Death project
51
 explored the possibility of 
offering a restorative justice (RJ) approach in the case of workplace traumatic deaths, 
as a means of providing ‘better healing’ to the bereaved’. While RJ programs exist 
for other crimes, for example, youthful offenders, it is not used in Australia in the 
context of workplace fatality. If RJ were to be an option in the case of workplace 
fatality, as in the case of Category 2 offences, it should be used in addition to any 
other penalties and after careful research, consultation and evaluation with families 
(and always with their agreement) and other key stakeholders, such as trade unions.  
Specific recommendations 
Of course, administrative and criminal enforcements are not the only methods of 
improving workplace conditions. Construction health and safety performance can be 
enhanced through a number of externalities, such as improvements in 
communications, coordination of projects, better integration of supply chains, and 
better overall safety management.
52
 These initiatives should also include recognition 
of the underlying economic realities of the industry as discussed in Chapter Two and 
ensure that tenders contain mandated and realistic OHS budgets, assessed by 
competent persons who would be held responsible for allowing dubious documents 
to be approved.   
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Chapter Two commented on the ways companies could avoid penalties for 
workplace OHS crimes through deregistration, liquidation and ‘phoenixing’. As a 
preventive measure, the CFMEU
53
 suggested that legislative amendments to all OHS 
legislation could require the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) to refer changes in companies’ status to Safe Work Australia. In cases of 
serious injury, disease or fatality, corporate changes, which might nullify the 
potential liability of individual company officers or the corporation, should be 
disallowed without an order of the relevant court approving such change. In order to 
pierce the ‘corporate veil’, reports on businesses’ financial status should be provided 
to an appropriate panel of experts to provide meaningful information on company 
liabilities and assets.
54
 The judgements examined in this thesis showed that thorough 
scrutiny of company financial records was not required by the court and therefore 
sentencing decisions were occasionally made in the absence of clear information. 
Where it is likely that a defendant will plead insolvency, it would be advantageous 
for the prosecution to obtain all relevant details. 
To allow for more consistent jurisdictional penalties, a national register of decided 
cases could be established, thus allowing a transparent comparison of national 
company performance and a comparison of the judicial performance of the states. 
Further, each OHS jurisdiction should keep records and details of all prosecutions, 
and these should be readily available to the public. At present, there are many 
impediments for policy and research analysts in obtaining relevant and accurate data. 
Further research 
The problem of ‘decriminalisation’ of OHS offences and the ‘generalised denial’ of 
employers toward their legal responsibilities for workplace health and safety, 
remains a serious obstacle in bringing attention to workplace harms and the most 
suitable way of dealing with them.
55
 Criminal law has the potential to deter corporate 
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offenders, as it is ‘…aimed at organisations that claim rationality for themselves and 
operate on the basis of calculability, as well as being managed by individuals with 
careers, prestige and status to protect’. 56  It is able to signal symbolically 
unacceptable behaviours, important in a context where many do not believe that 
corporate crimes are ‘real’. Finally, criminal law is that which is used by victims in 
seeking redress and justice. 
However, Tombs argues, criminalisation was never ‘a key part of the state’s 
agenda’. 57  Its promise to protect the health, safety and welfare of workers was 
limited at best and illusory at worst. Therefore, in order to ‘mitigate the violent 
effects of capitalist production’, 58  a social harm approach leads to other 
considerations that are beyond, but not contrary to criminal law. ‘In particular, such 
approaches are likely to point to mechanisms (including the use of law) to empower 
those who are most likely to be the victims of particular harms’.59. In this context, a 
most effective means of improving workplace health is the presence of trade unions 
and effective health and safety representatives. In the wider context, the redressing of 
power imbalances in the workplace and the resisting of managers’ ‘unhindered rights 
to manage’ is imperative.60   
The empirical findings of this thesis show that penalties for workplace fatalities in a 
very dangerous environment, namely the construction industry, are so lenient as to 
seriously undermine their deterrent value. The impediments placed in the way of its 
principal industrial organisation, the CFMEU C and G Division, along with a velvet 
gloved regulatory response are also factors to be considered if workplace harms are 
to be averted. The thesis also charted significant changes to the regulation of OHS, 
particularly as it pertains to the building and construction industry. Together these 
findings raise a series of questions that could inform future research. 
Taking a social harm approach to the study of the effects of the actions and policies 
of the former Building Industry Taskforce and the ABCC on building and 
construction workers and their unions would reveal contradictions between the 
decriminalisation of OHS offences and the recriminalisation of workers and their 
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organisations in acting for OHS improvements. Among other things, this would 
entail a comprehensive evaluation of the ABCC’s enforcement role and its legal 
prosecutions to determine the extent to which unions have been overrepresented in 
court actions. A related avenue is to determine if union organisers and site delegates 
have been hindered in exercising their rights to act in health and safety matters 
because of ABCC activities, and if workers have been intimidated from reporting 
OHS risks for similar reasons. 
Another area of research lies in the new directive of the NSW government to relocate 
OHS jurisdiction from the IC to the District and Supreme Courts. These Courts are 
already busy jurisdictions hearing criminal and civil cases. There is no guarantee that 
extra resources will be allocated to carry out their new jurisdictional responsibilities, 
so the question is whether or not courts will be more over burdened. Research could 
inquire into the effects of the loss of specialist knowledge of jurists in the NSW IC in 
OHS cases, and whether courts will impose greater or lesser penalty amounts in the 
case of fatalities. Such a study would also inquire into the use of, and effectiveness of 
EUs.  
The thesis raised the problem of perceptions of OHS harms as non-criminal 
happenings. It is postulated that unless relevant State institutions make it a priority to 
address this perception it is doubtful that these harms will be seen as anything other 
than regulatory matters, only dealt with summarily. A comprehensive study of the 
perceptions of the public and government agencies, including those involved in 
jurisprudence, about OHS harms could enhance future policy directions that position 
serious OHS offences in the criminal arena. 
The operations, policies and practices of the prosecution division of WorkCover 
NSW remain less than transparent. Research designed to explicate its functions and 
to make recommendations around establishing better reporting databases on all 
details of prosecutions readily accessed by the public would be a useful tool and 
allow for more evidence informed policy development. 
The conceptual model seen in Chapter One proposed that the dialectical and 
hegemonic relations between the neo-liberal State, the judiciary, government as 
legislator, government as regulator and industrial representatives of workers, 
produced health and safety outcomes that were not beneficial to workers. Where 
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industrial protection for them is weak, their exposure to workplace harm is increased. 
A neo-liberal economic system is one that privileges businesses, who, in 
construction, de-prioritise safety, and whose courts generally treat OHS infractions 
leniently. The construction of safety laws as representative of common interests does 
not recognise the realities of workplaces where rates of injury and death remain 
relatively constant. The interpretation of these laws necessarily emphasises the 
instrumental and individualising aspects of workplace health and safety incidents, at 
the expense of highlighting the economic imperatives driving the enterprise. 
Throughout capitalist democracies, the modern state is engaged in constant struggle 
to maintain the stability and legitimacy of an economic system that, for all its 
productive potential, generates intense inequality and is the vehicle for perpetrating 
massive harms on humans, other species and the environment.
61
 Consideration of 
white-collar crime is seemingly divided between two approaches, the first being a 
radical position that vigorously contests the view that capitalism will correct itself 
and the harms caused by it, presumably through some market driven mechanism and 
a second, more reformist stance that examines how corporate harms can be reduced 
by State intervention. Whichever approach the researcher chooses, Haines and 
Sutton
62
 contend that research in this area necessarily involves political choices. In 
the light of current political realities, the best to be hoped for is an approach that 
uncovers inequalities and contradictions that can lead to better informed law, policies 
and actions. Whatever the outcome, dominant hegemonic relationships will ensure 
that the struggle will continue. 
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Appendix A 
Thomas Mathiesen and Pulverisation 
When an oilrig capsized in the North Sea in 1980 with a loss of 123 lives, Thomas 
Mathiesen
1
 showed how ‘pulverising’ techniques were used in an attempt to obscure 
the social relations of production, which contributed to the incident. After events 
such as these, a ‘fundamental’ questioning about cause and relationships between 
events begin to be established, so, in the case of oil production, the relationships 
between profit and production pace or poor safety measures may be discerned. If this 
realisation occurs on a broad scale, ‘…the activity itself begins to be threatened’2 and 
it is in the interest of the involved company’s representatives to obscure or pulverise 
these ‘revealing relationships’. An effective way to do this is to ‘…isolate the event 
which was the point of departure from the rest of the activity which the event is a 
part of…’ 3  The bigger and more sensational the event, the more important 
pulverisation becomes, serving to ‘bring people back into line…silencing them 
anew.’4 
It was important for the oil industry and the Norwegian government that this incident 
be isolated from the industry as a whole. This was achieved in the first few days of 
the incident, using isolating techniques by the media and the government.
5
 The event 
was individualised and presented as a unique and atypical occurrence. The media ran 
stories, which described the event as ‘unbelievable’ ‘unthinkable’ and the loss of life 
unprecedented in modern times.
6
 On the other hand, another isolation technique is to 
normalise events, making them appear every day and ordinary occurrences, but in 
this case, the ‘ordinariness’ is put into other contexts and thus removed from the 
original context. For example, in this case, it was important for authorities to remove 
                                                 
1
 Mathiesen T, Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiescence in Modern Society 
(Winchester: Waterside Press, 2004) at 39. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Mathiesen emphasises that the use of the term ‘technique’ implies some degree of consciousness and 
planning, but that this may differ according to circumstances, and that ‘other issues’ may be present.  
6
 Ibid 38-39. Mathiesen observes that only two years before, the media ran an almost identical story 
about a fire on another oilrig. 
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the capsize incident out of its oil context and transform it into ‘…something 
relatively common and expected within another frame of reference’.7 The head of the 
Oil Directorate neatly accomplished this by declaring that while the capsize was a 
tragedy, it was more like a shipping accident, rather than something specifically tied 
to the oil industry, and was thus ‘normalised within a navigational context’. In other 
official statements, the event was also normalised in the contexts of mining and 
airline incidents.
8
  
Events may be ‘splintered’ so that the event is divided into ‘…more or less free 
flowing and unrelated bits and pieces’. 9  The particulars of the event, though 
important, become the focus, while the actuality or context of the event itself 
vanishes. Mathiesen argues
10
 that to understand the totality of an event, it is 
necessary to consider it in its temporal context. If the aim is to obscure associations 
surrounding the event, then it becomes important to obscure that temporality and this 
occurs when the relationships between time and space are disrupted. In other words, 
the past, present and future actions associated with the incident are isolated from 
each other. The future was isolated in the North Sea example through official 
statements and actions that concentrated on immediate actions, and refusal to discuss 
future ramifications of the incident.  s Mathiesen puts it ‘…by…placing important 
aspects and issues tied to the events in the future, [they] are put off for a more or less 
indefinite period. When the time finally comes, people generally have put a distance 
between themselves and those who lost their lives.’11  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Ibid 39. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid 40. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid 41. 
